Walton v. American National Red Cross et al

Filing 20

Memorandum Opinion and Order: It is ORDERED that Defendant's 17 Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Judge James R. Knepp II on 3/5/2025. (R,EM)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JON WALTON, et al.,

CASE NO. 3:23 CV 625

Plaintiffs,
v.

JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS,
et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Deanna Walton claims that, following her blood donation, Defendant American
National Red Cross 1 (the “Red Cross”) negligently managed and supervised the blood collection
and refreshment area, causing her to pass out and sustain several injuries. Mrs. Walton’s
husband, Jon Walton (collectively “Plaintiffs”), brings a loss of consortium claim. Before the
Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs opposed (Doc. 18),
and Defendant replied (Doc. 19).
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the background of this case is
as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint names as Defendants American National Red Cross and American Red
Cross Ohio Region. (Doc. 1). In its Answer, American National Red Cross stated: “‘American
Red Cross Northern Ohio Region’ is not a proper legal entity. The American National Red Cross
is one corporation nationwide; all of its regional and local offices are operating units of the same
corporation.” (Doc. 8, at 2).

American National Red Cross
The Red Cross operates a nationwide blood bank that collects blood and blood
components from volunteer donors to supply blood products to hospitals in the United States.
See American Red Cross, Blood Supply Statistics, https://www.redcrossblood.org/donateblood/how-to-donate/how-blood-donations-help/blood-needs-blood-supply.html. The Red Cross
must adhere to both the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) guidelines and the
Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”). See 21 C.F.R. § 600 et seq. The CFR requires Red Cross
employees to perform a physical assessment prior to blood donation to ensure donors are in
sufficient health to donate blood. 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(d). Such an assessment includes examining:
(1) temperature; (2) blood pressure; (3) hemoglobin or hematocrit levels; (4) pulse; (5) weight;
and (6) skin. 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(f).
April 2021 Blood Donation
On April 8, 2021, Mrs. Walton donated blood at a drive in Upper Sandusky, Ohio. (Doc.
18-1, at ¶ 2). Upon arrival, Defendant’s employee, Cynthia, checked her in. Id. at ¶ 4.
During check-in, Cynthia asked Mrs. Walton questions and took her vitals. Id. Mrs.
Walton informed Cynthia that, after a previous blood donation with Defendant, she became very
dizzy and had to lie down. Id. at ¶ 5. Additionally, Mrs. Walton told Cynthia she had been
advised to inform future Red Cross employees of her history of dizziness and lightheadedness.
Id.
Following check-in, Cynthia drew Mrs. Walton’s blood. Id. at ¶ 6. Afterwards, a different
Red Cross employee approached Mrs. Walton, finished the collection, and began to handle the
blood donation. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7. Mrs. Walton told the employee she was not feeling well. Id. at ¶ 7.
The employee told Mrs. Walton there were refreshments on the table and then walked away,

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leaving Mrs. Walton in the blood draw chair unattended. Id. at ¶ 8. Mrs. Walton “sat in the
donation chair and looked around seeking help[,] but could not see anyone.” Id. at ¶ 9. She
“waited several minutes and realized [her] only option was to try and get some juice.” Id. She
recalls “sliding off the donor chair and taking a few steps”, then waking up on the floor on the
left side of her body with a throbbing head and painful left shoulder. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Mrs. Walton
realized she had passed out and hit the floor. Id. at ¶ 11.
Thereafter, Wyandot County Emergency Medical Services arrived; emergency medical
technicians (“EMTs”) attempted to get Mrs. Walton’s vitals while asking her what happened. Id.
at ¶ 112. Against EMTs’ recommendations, Mrs. Walton refused to be transported to the hospital
for further examination. (Doc. 19-1, at 13). 2
Expert Disclosures
Plaintiffs’ expert disclosure deadline was originally April 1, 2024; Defendant’s was May
6, 2024. On April 14, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to extend its expert disclosure deadline
because Plaintiffs had not yet disclosed their expert witnesses. (Doc. 14). During a telephone
status conference held on May 9, 2024, this Court granted Defendant’s motion and extended the
Defendant’s disclosure deadline to June 7, 2024. 3 To date, neither party has disclosed any expert
witnesses.

2. With its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant submitted an Affidavit from counsel,
Joyce Edelman, as well as several attached exhibits. See Doc. 17-1. Plaintiffs argue Edelman
lacks personal knowledge regarding paragraphs two through seven of the affidavit and cannot
authenticate the attached exhibits. (Doc. 18, at 3-4). Pursuant Federal Civil Rule 56(e), affidavits
in support of a motion for summary judgment must be made based on personal knowledge. In
Reply, Defendant provides additional affidavits authenticating the records. See Docs. 19, at 3;
19-1 (Coleman Affidavit); 19-2 (Risley Affidavit). In deciding the pending motion, the Court has
considered only the properly-authenticated evidence. Moreover, the Court finds these records are
not necessary to decide the issues before it.
3. During that phone call, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated:
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On July 3, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 17).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court determines there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact” and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all
inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court is not permitted to weigh
the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute; rather, the Court determines only
whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986). This burden “may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the district
court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “present affirmative evidence in order
to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
Further, the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court’s attention to those

I think we are relying on our treating physicians, not necessarily a quote/unquote
expert[.] I guess you could consider them experts, that believe the cause of our
client’s injuries are directly related to the fall, so to speak, at the Red Cross place
and so forth, and I think that’s how we’re proceeding.
We had contacted our client, and we’ve talked to her multiple times, once this
week, having her come in. I think we’ve kind of - - I think we relayed to
defendants that we’re trying to get reports - - final reports from the doctors to turn
those over, to get them a demand and so forth.
(Doc. 16, at 4).
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specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material
fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (noting the court “need consider only the cited materials”).
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on two independent grounds. First, Defendant
claims it is subject to a professional standard of care, requiring Plaintiffs to produce expert
testimony and because Plaintiffs failed to disclose any expert witnesses, they cannot establish the
standard of care or breach thereof required to establish a negligence claim. (Doc. 17, at 2).
Second, Defendant argues Mrs. Walton’s treating physicians cannot provide expert opinions
regarding her injuries and damages because they were not identified as experts nor were any
expert reports produced by this Court’s disclosure deadline. Id.
Plaintiffs offer three arguments in opposition: (1) Defendant is subject to an ordinary
standard of care, thus expert testimony is not required; (2) the common knowledge exception
applies; and (3) Mrs. Walton’s treating physicians can provide the necessary causation
testimony. (Doc. 18, at 7-9, 13-14).
The Court finds Defendant is subject to a professional standard of care, expert testimony
is required to establish it (and breach thereof), and the common knowledge exception does not
apply. Because Plaintiffs have provided no such expert testimony, Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment. The Court further finds expert testimony is necessary to establish causation,
and because Plaintiffs failed to produce the required expert disclosures they also cannot establish
the causation element of her negligence claim.
Standard of Care / Breach
Defendant asserts it is subject to a professional standard of care, which requires the
testimony of an expert witness. (Doc. 17, at 7). Plaintiffs argue Defendant is subject to an

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ordinary standard of care and contend that even if a professional standard of care applies, the
common knowledge exception applies to negate the requirement of expert testimony. (Doc. 18,
at 8).
Under Ohio law, the plaintiff in a negligence action has the burden of establishing the
applicable standard of care. Miller v. Toledo Hosp., 2017 WL 1788716, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.).
Expert testimony is generally necessary unless the alleged “lack of skill or care of the
professional is so apparent as to be within the comprehension of a layperson.” Simon v. Drake
Constr. Co., 87 Ohio App. 3d 23, 26 (1993). “This expert must be qualified to express an opinion
concerning the specific standard of care that prevails in the medical community in which the
alleged malpractice took place[.]” Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St. 2d 127, 132 (1976).
Defendant argues courts have consistently held blood donation procedures are not within
the comprehension of a layperson, and a professional standard of care applies. (Doc. 17, at 7-8).
In Zaccone v. American Red Cross, the Red Cross was alleged to have supplied blood infected
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) to the plaintiff, and the court held that blood
banks are subject to a professional standard of care. 872 F. Supp. 457, 460 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
Plaintiffs argue Zaccone is distinguishable from the facts of this case because it only referred to
the duties of processing and supplying blood, not to donor aftercare. (Doc. 18, at 5-7).
While the Zaccone court did not specify what the “collection” portion of the blood
process encompasses, the Court is reluctant to say it does not include aftercare. The Red Cross
has only ever been held to a professional standard of care regardless of the injury or part of the
blood donation process during which the injury occurred. See, e.g., Cruz v. American Nat’l Red
Cross, 2022 WL 2813237, at *3 (10th Cir.) (holding that expert testimony was required to
determine the standard of care for a blood draw); Smith v. Paslode Corporation, 799 F. Supp.

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960, 966 (E.D. Mo. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
professional standard of care applied because “the uncontradicted evidence . . . show[ed] that
nearly every step in the [Red Cross’] collection, processing and distribution of blood requires
medical expertise.”); see also LifeSouth Cmty. Blood Ctrs., Inc. v. Fitchner, 970 So. 2d 379, 383
(Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (“[V]irtually every step of the blood collection process requires the exercise
of medical expertise by medical professionals.”); Bradway v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 263 Ga. 19,
21 (Georgia 1993) (“We are convinced that the steps involved in the collection, processing and
distribution of blood by the Red Cross constitute a professional medical service.”); Doe v. Am.
Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E. 2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (“Since the transfusion of blood is
characterized as a skilled medical service, then we hold that the Red Cross, as a blood collector
and processor, should be treated as professional.”). Further, Plaintiffs have pointed to no case
law suggesting the Red Cross is subject to anything but a professional standard of care.
Both parties point to the Sixth Circuit case of Ross v. American Red Cross, 567 F. App’x
296 (6th Cir. 2014). In Ross, a Red Cross employee improperly inserted a needle into the
plaintiff’s arm, causing significant nerve damage in the form of a medical condition known as
complex regional pain syndrome (“CRPS”). Id. at 300. The plaintiff in Ross failed to present
expert testimony to support her negligence claim, and the district court granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 310. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning:
In granting the Red Cross’s motion, the district court observed that in a prior
order it had “specifically stated … that expert testimony or some type of
testimony would be needed to explain the standard of care necessary on an
aftercare claim.” In the order, the district court explained that “[Ross’s] negligent
aftercare claim does not allege a claim of ordinary negligence that would be
within the knowledge of a lay juror.” Rather, Ross “claims that negligent aftercare
either caused or exacerbated her condition.” The district court stated that “[i]f
[Ross] is seeking to link the Red Cross’s allegedly negligent aftercare to the onset
or worsening of her CRPS/RSD condition, such a theory requires expert
testimony to assist the jury, at least with regard to the issue of causation” because
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“it takes specialized knowledge to make a valid factual determination of whether
certain factors contributed to the onset or exacerbation of a complex medical
condition like CRPS/RSD.”
Id. at 311.
Both parties agree that pursuant to Ross (and Ohio negligence law generally), a party is
held to a professional standard of care when the alleged negligence is not within the common
knowledge of a layperson. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether aftercare following a blood
donation is within the common knowledge of a layperson. The Court finds that it is not.
Defendant argues Plaintiffs failed to produce specific evidence of the Red Cross’s duties
and breach thereof, and given the complex nature of blood donation such knowledge would not
be within the common knowledge of a layperson. See Doc. 17, at 9-11. Plaintiffs respond this
case is distinguishable from Ross because, here, Mrs. Walton’s injuries are not complex and are
within the comprehension of laypersons. (Doc. 18, at 5-6). But Plaintiffs’ argument conflates the
issues of duty and causation. It is not the complexity of the injuries that determines the
applicable standard of care.
Plaintiffs further argue that, unlike Ross, this incident did not require Red Cross
employees to make medical decisions during the aftercare process, and blood donation aftercare
is commonly known. Id. at 6-8. While Plaintiffs argue all laypersons are aware of the “standard
waiting period” and “ordinary symptoms” following blood donation, they fail to provide any
suggestion as to what these are. Id. at 5-6. Absent evidence that such information is known, a
layperson would not be able to determine how long the standard waiting period is, what is

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required during that waiting period, nor what behaviors constitute “ordinary symptoms.” As
such, blood donation aftercare is simply not common knowledge. 4
Plaintiffs’ arguments simply beg the question of what the standard of care is and
demonstrate that it is not within the common knowledge of laypersons. As Defendant points out,
Plaintiffs have not identified what, specifically, Defendant was supposed to do in these
circumstances. In their brief, Plaintiffs appear to characterize the standard of care as not leaving
Mrs. Walton “unattended” or that she should have been “monitored”. Were Defendant’s
employees required to observe Mrs. Walton for a certain period of time? If so, how long? Were
they required to sit next to her for that time period or could they observe her from afar? Should
they have instructed her to stay seated for a certain period of time or not to stand up? Should they
have provided her some specific instruction on what to do if she did not feel well? Would the
standard of care involve expecting an individual to verbalize if she needed help or request that
someone accompany her to the refreshment table or bring refreshments to her? All of these
questions demonstrate that the standard of care here is not one within the common knowledge
and understanding of a layperson.
And similarly, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence regarding how this amorphous
standard of care was violated: how long Mrs. Walton was left allegedly unattended, whether
anyone was observing her from afar, etc. Although she states she “sat in the donation chair and
looked around seeking help[,] but could not see anyone” and “waited several minutes and
realized [her] only option was to try and get some juice”, she does not say she called out for help,

4. While Plaintiffs suggest many laypersons have supervised family or friends get blood drawn at
the physician’s office, the Court agrees with Defendant that blood draws and donations are
different procedures due to the vast difference in the volume of blood collected. (Docs. 18, at 56; 19, at 5). Thus, the aftercare following a blood donation differs from that of a blood draw and
is not applicable to the facts of this case.
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nor provide any additional information about what Defendant’s employees failed to do that she
contends they should have. (Doc. 18-1, at ¶ 9). These questions and absent facts demonstrate
precisely why expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care and breach thereof,
because they are not answerable by a layperson.
Nor does the Court find persuasive Plaintiffs’ argument that this case is analogous to a
narrow exception of Ohio caselaw applying the common knowledge exception to falls within a
medical setting. This line of cases has been described as “a narrow set of cases in which Ohio
courts have applied the exception to risks laypeople know about and comprehend the extent of—
for example, tripping and falling”, Welch v. United States, 2025 WL 374248, at *7 (6th Cir.), and
“cases dealing with gross inattention during patient care or miscommunication with a patient . . .
[including] supervisory negligence and involv[ing] fact patterns in which a patient suffered
injury after a medical provider has left the patient unattended[,]” Cunningham v. Children’s
Hosp., 2005-Ohio-4284, ¶ 21 (Ohio Ct. App.) (citations omitted); see also Buerger v. Ohio Dep’t
of Rehab. & Corr., 64 Ohio App. 3d 394, 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (“While no general rule can
be stated, those cases [falling within the common knowledge exception] seem to deal with
instances of gross inattention to plaintiff’s needs when it was obvious that plaintiff needed
attention.”).
But the instant case is not analogous to cases where the common knowledge exception
has been applied—e.g., a restless, sedated, expectant mother who had expressed a desire to climb
out of her bed and fell when left unattended (Jones v. Hawkes Hospital of Mt. Carmel, 175 Ohio
St. 503, 505-07 (Ohio 1964)); a mobility device-bound individual with a history of balance
issues left briefly unattended with her walker who fell (Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 114
Ohio App. 3d 711, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)); or a patient with multiple sclerosis, impaired

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balance, lower limb weakness, and increased spasticity who fell multiple times after being
admitted to the hospital (Taliaferro v. S. Pointe Hosp., 2006-Ohio-1611 (Ohio Ct. App.)).
Although these cases involve an individual in a medical setting who suffered a fall, the
Court finds them distinguishable from the instant one, and that the standard of care at issue is not
so obvious as to fit within the narrow common knowledge exception. The facts presented here do
not demonstrate the same “gross inattention” to a known risk as leaving unattended in a hospital
a patient with known balance issues, a patient with multiple sclerosis and seizures, or a patient
who expressed a desire to climb out of a bed. Rather, Mrs. Walton was seated in a chair
following a routine blood donation. The evidence before the Court does not demonstrate that she
suffered from any cognitive or speech issues, but, rather, that she determined, not seeing anyone
in her immediate vicinity, her “only option” was to get herself some juice.
Because the common knowledge exception does not apply, Plaintiffs are required to
establish the standard of care and breach thereof through expert testimony. Plaintiffs did not
disclose any expert witnesses by this Court’s deadline, and as such, Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on this basis alone.
Loss of Consortium Claim
A claim for loss of consortium is a derivative claim which is dependent upon “the
defendant’s having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily
injury.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 384, 392 (Ohio 1992). Because loss of consortium
is a derivative claim that can only be brought in conjunction with and is dependent upon Mrs.
Walton’s negligence claim, Mr. Walton’s loss of consortium claim fails.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

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ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17) be, and the same
hereby is, GRANTED.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 5, 2025

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