Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc.

Filing 12

Memorandum Opinion and Order: It is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) and this case is closed; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's 5 Motion to Strike and Dismiss, 6 Motion for Judgment, and 10 Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File are DENIED; and the Court FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge James R. Knepp II on 3/7/2025. Copy sent to Kibwe Rayford Jr., 1657 Botkins Dr, Apt A, Toledo, OH 43605 by regular U.S. Mail on 3/7/2025. (B,JL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
KIBWE RAYFORD, JR.,

CASE NO. 3:25 CV 326

Plaintiff,
JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
v.
PANDA RESTAURANT GROUP, INC.,
originally named as
Panda Express,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
This case is one of numerous employment-discrimination cases filed by pro se Plaintiff
Kibwe Rayford, Jr., in an Ohio state court and removed to this Court by defendants. See Rayford,
Jr. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195-JGC (N.D. Ohio) (removed Dec. 17, 2024);
Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 12, 2025);
Rayford, Jr. v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio)
(removed Feb. 14, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00326-JJH
(N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Sigma Technologies, Ltd., No. 3:25-cv00329-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Advocates for Basic Legal
Equality, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00332-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI
Companies, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00338-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 19, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20,
2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
20, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25-cv-00348-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed
Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Lucas County Workforce Development, No. 3:25-cv-00350-JJH

(N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Board of Lucas County Commissioners, No.
3:25-cv-00351-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hospital Service
Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25-cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr.
v. Impact Employment Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025);
Rayford, Jr. v. Concord Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed
Feb. 25, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Northwest Ohio Realtors, No. 3:25-cv-00380-JRK (N.D. Ohio)
(removed Feb. 26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Community Health Services, No. 3:25-cv-00381-JRK
(N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK
(N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Fresh Products, LLC, 3:25-cv-00432-JJH
(N.D. Ohio) (removed Mar. 4, 2025).
On February 28, 2025, this Court dismissed one of these cases as frivolous and part of a
pattern of vexatious litigation, and permanently enjoined Plaintiff from filing new actions in this
Court without leave. Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc, No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28,
2025) (Doc. 7). For the same reasons, this case is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
In each of the removed actions, Plaintiff uses a self-styled form complaint, changing only
the name of the defendant and the position for which he applied. In all other respects, the form is
the same in each case.
The form complaint contains no facts specific to the respective cases. It lists three causes
of action, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 42112; and Title XV the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (“EEOA”), 47 U.S.C. §
554. (Doc. 1-3, at 1). It states that he applied for a position and leaves empty spaces for him to
insert the job for which he applied, the date he applied, and the date on which the application was
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denied. Id. The form then alleges that although he “surpass [sic] or meets the qualifications, …
[he] was not selected for interview or considered for hiring practices.” Id. And it asserts that the
defendant discriminated against him based on race, color, gender, national origin, disability, and
education, and engaged in discriminatory conduct consisting of failure to hire, unequal terms and
conditions of employment, and retaliation. Id. The form complaint seeks $15,000.00 in damages.
Id. at 2.
On the form complaint in this case, Plaintiff named Panda Express as the Defendant. Id. at
1. He claims that he applied for a position as store manager with the company on January 14, 2025,
and was denied employment the following day. Id. Those are the only factual allegations in the
complaint specific to this case. The rest of the form reads as stated above.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is required to construe a pro se Complaint liberally and to hold it to a less
stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney.1 Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent,
district courts are permitted to conduct a limited screening procedure and dismiss, sua sponte, a
fee-paid Complaint filed by a non-prisoner if it appears that the allegations are “totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37 (1974)). Dismissal on a sua sponte basis is also authorized where the asserted claims lack
an arguable basis in law, or if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.

1. As an initial matter, Plaintiff indicates in a “Disclosure” attached to his form Complaint that he
attended law school. (Doc. 1-1, at 5). He does not indicate whether he graduated from law school
or passed a bar exam in any state. It is therefore not clear that Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint is
entitled to the liberal construction given to the pleadings prepared by non-attorneys who are not
familiar with the law and general pleading requirements.
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Id. at 480; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196
(6th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s prolific filing of frivolous form complaints is patently vexatious. He currently
has over twenty cases pending in this Court, and all but one of them were removed to this Court
in February 2025. Each day, this Court receives more cases using the same form complaint.
Plaintiff has not put forth a sincere effort to draft a pleading that contains facts specific to each
case or an explanation of why he believes he is entitled to relief from any specific defendant under
the various statutes identified. The complaints do not appear to seek real relief from the defendants.
At best, this conduct could be construed as a misguided attempt to supplement his income through
frivolous litigation, hoping one of these cases will produce a settlement or a judgment in his favor.
Viewed less generously, it could be construed as harassment of the defendants and courts. Neither
is a proper use of this Court’s time and resources.
The Court is aware that, at this stage, Plaintiff is not required to plead his discrimination
claims with heightened specificity. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must still provide “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 677-78 (“[A] complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Sixth Circuit clarified the scope
of Twombly and Iqbal, noting that “even though a Complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, its ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.’” New Albany Tractor v.
Lousiville Tractor, 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)
(alteration in original).
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Plaintiff’s complaint never rises above the speculative level. He provides no facts specific
to this case, and the Court is left to guess his race, color, gender, national origin, and disability;
what the actual qualifications for the position were; whether Plaintiff truly met all of those
qualifications; and what facts, if any, support his assertion that a decision was made not to hire
him and that such decision was based on prohibited criteria. The form complaint merely states that
he applied for a job and ultimately was not offered employment. Simply applying for a job, even
if fully qualified, does not guarantee employment, and failure to offer an employment interview,
alone is not a violation of federal law. Plaintiff’s bare bones form complaint, devoid of factual
allegations and composed entirely of legal conclusions, is not sufficient to meet even the minimum
basic pleading requirements in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a complaint must provide “a
short and plain statement of the claim” made by “simple, concise, and direct” allegations); see also
Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding legal conclusions
alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and court is not required to accept “unwarranted
factual inferences”). Plaintiff’s repeated filings of the same form complaint lacking any factual
basis is frivolous. Indeed, for that reason, this Court has dismissed a case based on one of Plaintiff’s
form complaints and has permanently enjoined him from filing new actions in this Court without
leave. Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc, No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2025) (Doc.
No. 10-4). This case, too, must be dismissed.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has filed several frivolous motions in this case. He has filed a
“Motion to Strike and Dismiss” that appears to challenge the state court’s removal of the case to
this Court. (Doc. 5). He also has filed a “Motion for Judgment” (Doc. 6) and “Motion Pursuant to
Court Order Seeking Leave to File” (Doc. 10), which are substantially similar to motions he has
filed in the numerous other cases before this Court. See Rayford Jr. v. Checkers Drive-In
Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 7); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies,
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LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00338-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Docs. 4, 7); Rayford Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 4); Rayford, Jr. v. Whiteford Kenworth,
No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Docs. 6, 8); Rayford, Jr. v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25cv-00348-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. Nos. 4, 6); Rayford Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No.
3:25-cv-00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 5); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25-cv00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6); Rayford Jr. v. Impact Employment Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6); Rayford Jr. v. Concord Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH
(N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 3); Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio)
(Doc. 4). These motions are factually unsupported, vague, and conclusory, and are denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) and this case is closed; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and Dismiss (Doc. 5), Motion for
Judgment (Doc. 6), and Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File (Doc. 10) are
DENIED; and the Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 7, 2025

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