Rayford, Jr. v. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc.

Filing 9

Memorandum Opinion and Order: It is ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) and this case is closed; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is enjoined from filing any new motions or do cuments in this case; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's 8 Motion for Leave is DENIED; and the Court FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge James R. Knepp II on 3/10/2025. Copy sent to Kibwe Rayford, Jr., Apt. A, 1657 Botkins Drive, Toledo, OH 43605 by regular U.S. Mail on 3/10/2025. (B,JL)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
KIBWE RAYFORD, JR.,

CASE NO. 3:25 CV 332

Plaintiff,
v.

JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

ADVOCATES FOR BASIC LEGAL
EQUALITY, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION

This Complaint is one of many in a long line of employment discrimination cases with
which pro se Plaintiff Kibwe Rayford, Jr. has flooded the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas
and, in turn, this Federal Court upon removal by the Defendants. See Rayford, Jr. v. Amazon.com
Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195-JGC (N.D. Ohio) (removed Dec. 17, 2024); Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle
Media, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 12, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 14,
2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00326-JJH (N.D. Ohio)
(removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Sigma Technologies, Ltd., No. 3:25-cv-00329-JJH (N.D.
Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., No. 3:25cv-00332-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies, LLC, No.
3:25-cv-00338-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 19, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr.
v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25-cv-00348-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford,

Jr. v. Lucas County Workforce Development, No. 3:25-cv-00350-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Board of Lucas County Commissioners, No. 3:25-cv-00351-JRK (N.D.
Ohio) (removed Feb. 21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Impact Employment
Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Concord
Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 25, 2025); Rayford,
Jr. v. Northwest Ohio Realtors, No. 3:25-cv-00380-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 26, 2025);
Rayford, Jr. v. Community Health Services, No. 3:25-cv-00381-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Fresh Products, LLC, 3:25-cv-00432-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Mar.
4, 2025).
BACKGROUND
In each of the removed actions, Plaintiff utilizes the same self-styled form Complaint,
changing only the name of the Defendant and the position for which he applied. In all other
respects, the form is the same in each case. The form Complaints contain no facts specific to their
respective case and simply list causes of action as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. § 42112, and Title XV the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act (“EEOA”) 47 U.S.C. §554. The form states only that he applied for a position and contains
spaces for him to write in the job for which he applied, the date he applied, and the date on which
the application was denied. The form then states that although he “surpass [sic]or meets the
qualifications, … [he] was not selected for Interview or considered for hiring practices.” (Doc. 11, at 3). The form Complaint states:

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The discriminatory conduct of which Plaintiff complain [sic] in this action includes:
rr. Failure to Hire
ss. Unequal terms and conditions of employment
tt. Retaliation
Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on:
uu. Race
vv. Color
ww. Gender
xx. National Origin
yy. Disability
zz. Education
Id. The form Complaint seeks $ 15,000.00 in damages. Id. at 4.
On the form Complaint in the instant case, Plaintiff named Advocates for Basic Legal
Equality, Inc as a Defendant and indicated he applied for a position as a Human Resource
Generalist on May 31, 2024. Id. Those are the only factual allegations in the Complaint specific to
this case. The rest of the form reads as stated above.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court is required to construe a pro se Complaint liberally and to hold it to a less
stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney.1 Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248, 250 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent,
district courts are permitted to conduct a limited screening procedure and dismiss, sua sponte, a
fee-paid Complaint filed by a non-prisoner if it appears that the allegations are “totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,

1. As an initial matter, Plaintiff indicates in a “Disclosure” attached to his form Complaint that
he attended law school. (Doc. 1-1, at 5). He does not indicate whether he graduated from law
school or passed a bar exam in any state. It is therefore not clear that Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
is entitled to the liberal construction given to the pleadings prepared by non-attorneys who are
not familiar with the law and general pleading requirements.

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536-37 (1974)). Dismissal on a sua sponte basis is also authorized where the asserted claims lack
an arguable basis in law, or if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.
Id. at 480; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196
(6th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s prolific filing of frivolous form Complaints is patently vexatious. Plaintiff filed
48 cases in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in late January 2025, of which only 21 have
been removed to this federal court to date. Thirty of those cases were filed on the same day, January
17, 2025, and eighteen of them were filed five days later on January 23, 2025. Each day, this Court
receives more cases using the same form Complaint. Plaintiff has not put forth a sincere effort to
draft a pleading that contains facts specific to each case or an explanation of why he believes he is
entitled to relief from any specific Defendant under the various statutes identified. The Complaints
do not appear to seek real relief from the Defendants. At best, this conduct could be construed as
a misguided attempt to supplement his income through frivolous litigation, hoping one of these
cases will produce a settlement or a judgment in his favor. Viewed less generously, it could be
construed as harassment of the Defendants and the courts. Neither is a proper use of this Court’s
time and resources.
The Court is aware that, at this stage, Plaintiff is not required to plead his discrimination
claims with heightened specificity. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that a Plaintiff must still provide “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (“[A] complaint [will not] suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 557). The Sixth Circuit clarified the scope of Twombly and Iqbal, noting that “even though a
Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true.’” New Albany Tractor v. Lousiville Tractor, 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (alteration in original).
Plaintiff’s Complaint never rises above the speculative level. He provides no facts specific
to this case, and the Court is left to guess his race, color, gender, national origin, and disability;
what the actual qualifications for the position were; whether Plaintiff truly met all of those
qualifications; and what facts, if any, support his assertion that a decision was made not to hire
him and that such decision was based on prohibited criteria.2 The form Complaint merely states
that he applied for a job and ultimately was not offered employment. Simply applying for a job,
even if fully qualified, does not guarantee employment, and failure to offer an employment
interview, alone is not a violation of federal law. Plaintiff’s bare bones form Complaint, devoid of
factual allegations and composed entirely of legal conclusions, is not sufficient to meet even the
minimum basic pleading requirements in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim” made by “simple, concise, and direct”
allegations); see also Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and court is not required to
accept “unwarranted factual inferences”). Plaintiff’s repeated filings of the same form Complaint
lacking any factual basis is frivolous. This case must be dismissed.

2. Indeed, the form Complaint has a line for the date on which Plaintiff was denied employment;
it is left blank. (Doc. 1-1, at 4).

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Furthermore, undeterred by the Court’s warning against filing frivolous and harassing bulk
litigation, See Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc, No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2025),
Plaintiff continues to engage in vexatious behavior by filing self-styled form Motions that are
composed entirely of excepts of statutes and case citations. The Motions are the same in every case
and do not contain any case specific information. See Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle Media, Inc, No. 3:25cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6); Rayford Jr. v. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 7); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv00326-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 10); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies, LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00338-JJH
(N.D. Ohio) (Docs. 4, 7); Rayford Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 4); Rayford, Jr. v. Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D.
Ohio) (Docs. 6,8); Rayford, Jr. v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25-cv-00348-JJH (N.D. Ohio)
(Docs. 4, 6); Rayford Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio)
(Doc. 5); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25-cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6);
Rayford Jr. v. Impact Employment Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 6); Rayford
Jr. v. Concord Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 3); Rayford, Jr.
v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (Doc. 4). This Court also notes that
Judge James G. Carr enjoined Plaintiff from filing additional Motions in his case due to Plaintiff’s
excessive filings. See Rayford, Jr. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195 (N.D. Ohio).
In light of Plaintiff’s behavior in this federal court and in state court, Plaintiff is enjoined from
filing any new Motions or documents in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

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ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED, Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) and this case is closed; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is enjoined from filing any new motions or
documents in this case; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave (Doc. 8) is DENIED; and the
Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 10, 2025

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