Rayford Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation

Filing 7

Memorandum Opinion and Order: It is ORDERED that Defendant's 5 Motion to Dismiss be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's 4 Motion for Judgment and 6 Motion for Leave be, and the same h ereby are, DENIED; and the Court FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge James R. Knepp II on 3/10/2025. Copy sent to Kibwe Rayford, Jr., Apt. A, 1657 Botkins Drive, Toledo, OH 43605 by regular U.S. Mail on 3/10/2025. (B,JL)

-IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
KIBWE RAYFORD, JR.,

CASE NO. 3:25 CV 345

Plaintiff,
v.

JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

KRISPY KREME
DOUGHNUT CORPORATION,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
This Complaint is one of many in a long line of employment discrimination cases with
which pro se Plaintiff Kibwe Rayford, Jr. has flooded the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas
and, in turn, this Federal Court upon removal by the Defendants. See Rayford, Jr. v. Amazon.com
Services, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-02195-JGC (N.D. Ohio) (removed Dec. 17, 2024); Rayford, Jr. v. Kyle
Media, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00269-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 12, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00294-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 14,
2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Panda Restaurant Group, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00326-JJH (N.D. Ohio)
(removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Sigma Technologies, Ltd., No. 3:25-cv-00329-JJH (N.D.
Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., No. 3:25cv-00332-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 18, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. CCFI Companies, LLC, No.
3:25-cv-00338-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 19, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corporation, No. 3:25-cv-00345-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v.
Whiteford Kenworth, No. 3:25-cv-00347-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford, Jr.
v. Boy Scouts of America, No. 3:25-cv-00348-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 20, 2025); Rayford,
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Jr. v. Lucas County Workforce Development, No. 3:25-cv-00350-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Board of Lucas County Commissioners, No. 3:25-cv-00351-JRK (N.D.
Ohio) (removed Feb. 21, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hospital Service Associates, Inc., No. 3:25-cv00362-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Hirzel Canning Company, 3:25cv-00365-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Impact Employment
Solutions, 3:25-cv-00366-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 24, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Concord
Care Center of Toledo, No. 3:25-cv-00372-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 25, 2025); Rayford,
Jr. v. Northwest Ohio Realtors, No. 3:25-cv-00380-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb. 26, 2025);
Rayford, Jr. v. Community Health Services, No. 3:25-cv-00381-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Libbey Glass LLC, No. 3:25-cv-00382-JRK (N.D. Ohio) (removed Feb.
26, 2025); Rayford, Jr. v. Fresh Products, LLC, 3:25-cv-00432-JJH (N.D. Ohio) (removed Mar.
4, 2025).
BACKGROUND
In each of the removed actions, Plaintiff utilizes the same self-styled form Complaint,
changing only the name of the Defendant and the position for which he applied. In all other
respects, the form is the same in each case. The form Complaints contain no facts specific to their
respective case and simply list causes of action as Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. § 42112, and Title XV the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act (“EEOA”) 47 U.S.C. §554. The form states only that he applied for a position and contains
spaces for him to write in the job for which he applied, the date he applied, and the date on which
the application was denied. The form then states that although he “surpass [sic]or meets the
qualifications, … [he] was not selected for Interview or considered for hiring practices.” (Doc. 11, at 2). The form Complaint states:
The discriminatory conduct of which Plaintiff complain [sic] in this action includes:
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o Failure to Hire
o Unequal terms and conditions of employment
o Retaliation
Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff based on:
o
o
o
o
o
o

Race
Color
Gender
National Origin
Disability
Education

Id. The form Complaint seeks $ 15,000.00 in damages. Id. at 3.
On the form Complaint in the instant case, Plaintiff named Krispy Kreme Doughnut
Corporation as a Defendant and indicated he applied for an assistant manager position on
December 26, 2024. Id. at 2. Those are the only factual allegations in the Complaint specific to
this case. The rest of the form reads as stated above.
On February 27, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5). First, it asserts that
Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
against them as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Second, it asserts that Plaintiff’s Complaint
fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It contends
Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of nearly any factual allegations and alleges in conclusory fashion
that he was not selected to interview for a position based on several characteristics, some of which
(e.g., education) are not even protected under Title VII or the ADA. Defendant claims Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations still do not allege the elements sufficient to state a claim for relief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When deciding a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the
Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Mayer v. Mulod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th
Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009) clarified the law regarding what the Plaintiff must
plead in order to survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The plaintiff's obligation to provide
the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Although a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. The
Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
The Court in Iqbal further explains the “plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s prolific filing of frivolous form Complaints is patently vexatious. He currently
has over twenty cases pending in this Court, and all but one of them were removed to federal court
in February 2025. Each day, this Court receives more cases using the same form Complaint.
Plaintiff has not put forth a sincere effort to draft a pleading that contains facts specific to each
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case or an explanation of why he believes he is entitled to relief from any specific Defendant under
the various statutes identified. The Complaints do not appear to seek real relief from the
Defendants. At best, this conduct could be construed as a misguided attempt to supplement his
income through frivolous litigation, hoping one of these cases will produce a settlement or a
judgment in his favor. Viewed less generously, it could be construed as harassment of the
Defendants and courts. Neither is a proper use of this Court’s time and resources.
The Court is aware that, at this stage, Plaintiff is not required to plead his discrimination
claims with heightened specificity. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that a Plaintiff must still provide “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 677-78 (“[A] complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The Sixth Circuit clarified the scope
of Twombly and Iqbal, noting that “even though a Complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, its ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true.’” New Albany Tractor v.
Lousiville Tractor, 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)
(alteration in original).
Plaintiff’s Complaint never rises above the speculative level. He provides no facts specific
to this case, and the Court is left to guess his race, color, gender, national origin, and disability;
what the actual qualifications for the position were; whether Plaintiff truly met all of those
qualifications; and what facts, if any, support his assertion that a decision was made not to hire
him and that such decision was based on prohibited criteria.1 The form Complaint merely states

1. Indeed, the form Complaint has a line for the date on which Plaintiff was denied employment;
it is left blank. (Doc. 1-1, at 2).
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that he applied for a job and ultimately was not offered employment. Simply applying for a job,
even if fully qualified, does not guarantee employment, and failure to offer an employment
interview, alone is not a violation of federal law. Plaintiff’s bare bones form Complaint, devoid of
factual allegations and composed entirely of legal conclusions, is not sufficient to meet even the
minimum basic pleading requirements in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a complaint must
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim” made by “simple, concise, and direct”
allegations); see also Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding
legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and court is not required to
accept “unwarranted factual inferences”). Plaintiff’s repeated filings of the same form Complaint
lacking any factual basis is frivolous. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) be, and the same hereby is,
GRANTED and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment (Doc. 4) and Motion for
Leave (Doc. 6) be, and the same hereby are, DENIED; and the Court
FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 10, 2025

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