Hill v. Anderson

Filing 148

Order denying Petitioner's renewed Motion for discovery and to expand the record(Related Doc # 146 ). Judge John R. Adams on 7/10/12.(L,JD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DANNY HILL,
Petitioner,
vs.
CARL ANDERSON, Warden,
Respondent.

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CASE NO. 4:96 CV 00795

JUDGE JOHN ADAMS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Danny Hill’s (“Petitioner” or “Hill”) Renewed Motion
For Discovery and Renewed Motion to Expand the Record. (ECF No. 146.) Through this
motion, Hill requests that this Court reconsider its ruling of December 14, 2010. (ECF No.
132.) Respondent Carl Anderson (“Respondent”) opposes Hill’s motion. (ECF No. 147.) For
the following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.

Relevant Background
This Court dismissed Hill’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 9, 1999.

(ECF No. 54.) Three years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to this
Court with instructions to dismiss Hill’s unexhausted claim pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the death penalty cannot be imposed on a mentally retarded
offender. It further ordered that Hill’s remaining claims should be stayed pending exhaustion
of state court remedies. (ECF No. 60.)
The Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas held an evidentiary hearing on Hill’s
Atkins claim and determined that Hill was not mentally retarded. The Ohio Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh District affirmed the trial court’s decision. State v. Hill, 177 Ohio App. 3d

171, 894 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). The Ohio Supreme Court did not accept the
appeal for review. State v. Hill, 122 Ohio St. 3d 1502 (Ohio 2009).
After exhausting his state court remedies, Hill filed an Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus in this Court on March 15, 2010, asserting three claims: 1) that the death
sentence imposed against him violates the Eighth Amendment under Atkins due to his mental
retardation; 2) that counsel assigned to represent him at the state Atkins hearing rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and to present compelling and
relevant evidence in support of the Atkins claim; and 3) that he is actually innocent of the death
penalty because he is mentally retarded. (ECF No. 94.)
On September 20, 2010, Hill filed several motions with the Court. He sought to
expand the record with various declarations supporting his Atkins claims. (ECF Nos. 119,
120.) Hill also requested discovery to support his Atkins claims and his Atkins-related
ineffective assistance claim. (ECF No. 117.) And he sought an evidentiary hearing on his
Atkins claims. (ECF No. 118.)
This Court ruled on Hill’s motions on December 14, 2010. It denied Hill’s motion to
expand the record, concluding that “Petitioner cannot show that he was not at fault for failing
to develop the record” at the state Atkins hearing and therefore did not satisfy 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2)’s requirements that a petitioner demonstrate that the factual predicates of his claim
could have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and that he is
actually innocent.1 (ECF No. 132, 13.) The Court also denied Hill’s discovery request

1

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) provides:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
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concerning his Atkins-related ineffective-assistance claim during post-conviction proceedings
because “Petitioner is not entitled to effective assistance of counsel during post-conviction
proceedings and the issue cannot be heard on habeas review.” (Id. at 15.)

It granted

discovery relating to the Atkins claims generally, however, as the information, if fully
developed, may entitle Hill to relief. (Id. at 16.) Finally, it denied without prejudice Hill’s
motion for an evidentiary hearing because, again, Hill did not meet the criteria of Section
2254(e)(2). (Id. at 17.)
Hill now requests that the Court reconsider its December 14, 2010 ruling regarding his
requests for discovery and to expand the record “in relation to” his ineffective-assistance claim
in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309
(2012). (ECF No. 146, 1.)
II.

Analysis
Because Hill is asking the Court to reconsider its December 14, 2010, ruling, the Court

must treat it as a motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that-(A) the claim relies on-(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
This provision applies to motions to expand the record in habeas cases. Holland v.
Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004).
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allows district courts to alter, amend, or vacate a prior judgment.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Huff
v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982). The purpose of Rule 59(e)
is “to allow the district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and appellate courts
the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.” Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472,
475 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting York v. Tate, 858 F.2d 343. 348 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It permits courts to amend judgments in four situations: (1) to
accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; (3) to correct a clear error of law or fact; and (4) to prevent manifest
injustice. See, e.g., Zinkand v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 2007); Lavespere v. Niagra
Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810-1, at 125-27 (2d ed. 1995). The grant or denial of a
Rule 59(e) motion is within the informed discretion of the district court. Huff, 675 F.2d at 122;
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810-1, at 124 (2d ed. 1995).
However, “reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.” 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2810.1, at 124 (2d ed. 1995). Although “there are circumstances when a motion to reconsider
may perform a valuable function, . . . it [is] improper to use such a motion to ask the Court to
rethink what the Court ha[s] already thought through–rightly or wrongly.” Potter v. Potter,
199 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D. Md. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hill claims that the Supreme Court decision Martinez v. Ryan represents “an
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The federal civil rules apply in habeas cases “to the extent that they are not
inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the habeas rules] . . . .” Habeas Corpus
Rule 12.
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intervening change in controlling law.” The Martinez Court held that the “[i]nadequate
assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a
prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct.
at 1315. This holding represents a “limited qualification” to its prior decision Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), in which the Court held that an attorney’s negligence in a
post-conviction proceeding does not establish cause to excuse procedural default. Id. at 1319.
The Court explained that it created this exception to Coleman to acknowledge “as an equitable
matter, that the initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with
ineffective counsel, may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper consideration was given
to a substantial claim.” Id. at 1318. It was careful to note the holding’s limitations, however,
emphasizing that it is an “equitable” rather than a “constitutional” holding. Id. It stated:
The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances
recognized here. The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in
other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral
proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for
discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts. . . . It does not extend to
attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a
prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, even though that
initial-review collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.
Id. at 1320 (citations omitted).
Hill argues that “[s]imilar to in [sic] Martinez, the ineffective assistance of [Hill’s postconviction Atkins counsel] have deprived Mr. Hill of any opportunity to have the merits of his
Atkins claim heard by any court.” (ECF No. 146, 5.) Thus, he contends, the equitable
underpinnings of the Martinez holding “weigh in favor of Petitioner Hill’s claim that the
ineffective assistance of state Atkins post conviction counsel . . . provide him with cause to
demonstrate that failure to develop the record at the state Atkins hearing was not the fault of
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Mr. Hill thereby allowing expansion of the habeas record with the declarations identified . .
. .” (Id.) And more generally, he argues that “Martinez should provide cause to allow this
Court to address Mr. Hill’s Atkins claims raised in the Amended Habeas Petition fully.” (Id.
at 7.)
The Court finds, however, that Martinez does not apply here, and it therefore cannot
support reconsideration of the Court’s December 14, 2010, rulings. Hill wants the Court to
reconsider its rulings only “in relation” to his claim regarding the ineffective assistance of his
post-conviction Atkins counsel. But Martinez does not alter the fact that Hill’s ineffectiveassistance claim is not cognizable in habeas, and therefore does not warrant discovery or
expansion of the record supporting it. The Martinez Court specifically stated that its holding
does not resolve the question of whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel in collateral
proceedings that provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315. To the contrary, the Martinez Court recognized that AEDPA’s
Section 2254(I) precludes the ineffectiveness of a post-conviction attorney as a ground for
relief.3 Id. at 1320.
Martinez, therefore, does not render incorrect this Court’s conclusion that, “[s]ince
Petitioner is not entitled to effective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings
and the issue cannot be heard on habeas review, [Hill’s ineffective assistance of postconviction Atkins counsel] claim will have no merit. Thus, he is not entitled to take
depositions of . . . the attorneys that represented Petitioner during post-conviction
3

28 U.S.C. § 2254(I) provides: “The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a
proceeding arising under section 2254.
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proceedings.” (ECF No. 132, 15.) For the same reason, Martinez does not alter the Court’s
conclusion that it would not permit expansion of the record based on Hill’s argument that he
cannot be faulted for failing to develop the state-court record and therefore meets the
requirements of Section 2254(e)(2) because of the inadequacy of counsel. (Id. at 12-13.)
Despite its equitable groundings, Martinez does not stand for the proposition that if a habeas
petitioner’s post-conviction counsel was ineffective, that somehow nullifies the proceedings
at issue, excuses any failure to meet AEDPA’s requirements, or creates an independent
constitutional claim in habeas.
Moreover, Respondent has not asserted default in regard to any of Hill’s amended
claims, so Hill cannot employ Martinez to support his request s in order to demonstrate cause
for the procedural default of those claims.
Finally, even if Martinez was not so explicitly limited in its holding, the Court does not
agree that the equitable concerns posed by Hill’s Atkins claims justify Hill’s requests. Hill
claims that he was “deprived . . . of any opportunity to have the merits of his Atkins claim
heard by any court.” (ECF No. 146, 5.) This simply is not true. The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on Hill’s Atkins claim that lasted eleven days. Three physicians testified
at the hearing, as well as numerous lay witnesses. State v. Hill, 177 Ohio App. 3d at 179, 894
N.E.2d at 114. The trial court and court of appeals provided detailed analyses of their findings
on the matter. Id. at 188-94, 894 N.E.2d at 121-27.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Renewed Motion For Discovery and Renewed Motion to

Expand the Record is hereby denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

July 10, 2012

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