White v. Bank of New York et al

Filing 7

Memorandum Opinion and Order This action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 5/11/2011. (S,L)

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KENNETH WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 4:11CV333

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff pro se Kenneth A. White filed this action under the Truth-In-Lending Act
(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1639 et seq., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as well as State claims for fraudulent misrepresentation,
breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, Ohio’s Civil RICO statute and
complaint to quiet title to real property against the Bank of New York, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., Duglas P. Punchak, Richelle Punchak and Manley Deas Kochalski
LLC. The Complaint concerns a mortgage loan and foreclosure. Plaintiff requests transfer or
release of legal title and alleged encumbrances and possession of the subject property.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is
required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

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319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,
99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant
to section 1915(e).
This Complaint is Plaintiff’s second involving a mortgage loan and foreclosure. See
White v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 1:11cv0018, which was dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff requests that the Court find that the underlying mortgage loan
obligation is invalid and the foreclosure judgment is void. The same reasoning relied upon by
the Court in the prior case applies.
The Court cannot void the judgment of foreclosure. United States District Courts do not
have jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions even if those challenges allege that the
State court’s action was unconstitutional. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
Federal appellate review of State court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme
Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this principle, generally referred to as the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in State court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based
on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Federal jurisdiction cannot be invoked by couching
the claims in terms of a civil rights action. Lavrack v. City of Oak Park, No. 98-1142, 1999 WL
801562, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999); see Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir.1992).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the party losing his case in state court files

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suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's
decision itself. Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857-59 (6th Cir. 2006). The United States
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth two elements to a Rooker-Feldman analysis. First, in
order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the
issue before the court must be inextricably intertwined with the claim asserted in the state court
proceeding. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998); see Tropf v. Fidelity National
Title Insurance Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002). “Where federal relief can only be
predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal
proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state court judgment.”
Catz, 142 F.3d at 293. Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court’s
jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly or
unconstitutionally applied in plaintiff’s particular case as opposed to a general constitutional
challenge to the state law applied in the state action. Id. Plaintiff questions the State court’s
decision granting a foreclosure. Any review of federal claims asserted regarding the foreclosure
would necessarily require the court to review the specific issues addressed in the state court
proceedings against him. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review or
grant the relief as requested. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16; Catz, 142 F.3d at 293.
Moreover, Plaintiff simply seeks to litigate matters which were raised or which should
have been raised in the State court foreclosure and eviction proceedings. A federal court must
give a State court judgment the same preclusive effect it would have in the courts of the
rendering State. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736, 744 (6th Cir.
2002). The preclusive effect of the previous State court judgments are therefore governed by

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Ohio law on preclusion. Id. Under Ohio law, an existing final judgment or decree is conclusive
as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in the first lawsuit. National Amusement,
Inc. v. City of Springdale, 53 Ohio St. 3d 60, 62 (1990). The doctrine of res judicata requires a
plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first action he files, or forever be barred from
asserting it. Id. The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the finality of judgments and thereby
increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial resources. Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The Court is bound to give full faith and credit to the decision
of the State court granting the foreclosure.
Accordingly, this action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 11, 2011
Date

/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge