Collazo v. Corrections Corporation Of America
Filing
3
Memorandum Opinion and Order: This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 USC 1915(e) and this case is closed. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 11/30/11. (BR,S)
PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JORGE A. COLLAZO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 4:11cv1424
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Jorge A. Collazo filed this Bivens1 action against Corrections Corporation
of America (“CCA”). He also asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in a cell that
could not accommodate his disability. ECF No. 1. He seeks monetary damages. ECF No. 1 at
15.
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). While Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
there is no allegation of action under color of state law. Plaintiff is a federal prisoner, in the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons. Bivens provides federal inmates and detainees with a cause of action
analogous to § 1983.
(4:11cv1424)
I. Background
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner housed at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center
(“NEOCC”), a private prison owned and operated by CCA. He is also a paraplegic confined to a
wheelchair. When he arrived at NEOCC, he was placed in a cell that could accommodate his
disability.
Plaintiff received two conduct reports in 2010. He contends that he acquired an additional
bed sheet, and was charged with a Code 305 offense for receiving property not issued to him through
proper channels. He was sanctioned to loss of commissary privileges for 90 days. During the 90 day
restriction period, Plaintiff accepted a commissary food item from another inmate. He was charged
with a second Code 305 offense. He acknowledged that he did accept the food item, but claimed that
the officer was “taking this personal” and proclaimed that it was “not a big issue.” ECF No. 1-1 at
1. The Unit Disciplinary Committee reviewed his second violation and recommended a change in
living quarters as soon as a bed became available. Plaintiff was moved to a disciplinary cell on
December 7, 2010. This cell was not designed to accommodate inmates with disabilities. ECF No.
1 at 2-3.
Plaintiff claims that his new cell housed three inmates when it was constructed to hold only
two. A foldable bed was attached to the wall for the additional inmate. Plaintiff states that the cell
was very crowded with the additional bed and did not have sufficient space for his wheelchair.
When he entered the cell, he was forced to leave his wheel chair by the door. He further contends
that the cell did not contain grab bars near the toilet to assist him. ECF No. 1 at 2-3.
Plaintiff was attempting to maneuver around his cell without grab bars or his wheelchair
2
(4:11cv1424)
on December 8, 2010 and fell backward hitting his head. An ambulance was called and he was taken
to an area hospital where he was treated and released. Although no new serious injuries were noted,
he continued to complain of neck and back pain. He contends that the institution physician
prescribed a muscle relaxant, but it did not alleviate his pain. ECF No. 1 at 3-4.
The Complaint contains two Bivens claims and one claim for relief under the ADA. First,
Plaintiff contends that moving him as punishment to a cell that did not accommodate his disability
violated the Eighth Amendment. He also claims that the conditions in the cell were crowded in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, he claims that the prison did not accommodate his
disability under the ADA. ECF No. 1 at 8-14.
II. Standard for Dismissal
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99
F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on
an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
2
An in forma pauperis claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff
and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking
section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons
set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte
v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v. Johnson,
784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).
3
(4:11cv1424)
490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it
lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading
must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all
the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not
required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A pleading that offers
legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this
pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th
Cir.1998).
III. Law and Analysis
A. Bivens Claims
Plaintiff first claims CCA violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to
overcrowded conditions in a cell not equipped for physically disabled inmates. CCA, however, is
not a proper party to a Bivens action. Bivens provides a cause of action only against individual
officers acting under color of federal law alleged to have acted unconstitutionally. Correctional
Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). A Bivens action cannot be brought against
a federal prison, the Bureau of Prisons, or the United States Government. Id. CCA is a private
corporation. Because inmates housed in federal correctional institutions cannot bring a Bivens action
4
(4:11cv1424)
against the Bureau of Prisons, the Supreme Court declined to extend that cause of action to a
corporate entity that owns and operates a private prison housing federal inmates. Id. at 74. Plaintiff
states these claims only against CCA. Consequently, his Eighth Amendment claims must be
dismissed.
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
Plaintiff next claims that his placement in a disciplinary cell without modifications for
disabled inmates violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The ADA is divided into
three sections: Title I which regulates discrimination in the workplace; Title II which prohibits
discrimination by public entities; and Title III which prohibits discrimination by private entities in
places of public accommodation. None of these sections appears to apply to CCA or the facts of this
case.
Title I concerns discrimination in the workplace. Plaintiff is not raising ADA claims in the
context of employment. This section clearly does not apply to this case.
Title II is applicable only to public entities. A “public entity” is defined by the ADA as “any
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality” of a state or local government.
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B). A private prison does not qualify as a department or agency of a state or
local government and therefore is not a “public entity” under the statute. Edison v. Douberly, 604
F.3d 1307, 1308 -13 (11th Cir. 2010); Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 938 (D.Ariz.2010)
(company to which the state contracted out prisoner's labor was not a public entity because
contractual relationships between private and government entities are insufficient to render the
private entities instrumentalities under Title II); Gonzalez Jarquin v. Corrections Corp. of America,
5
(4:11cv1424)
No. CV 308-013, 2008 WL 3285764, *1 (S.D.Ga. Aug.8, 2008)(holding that CCA is not a public
entity under Title II); Maringo v. Warden, Corrections Corp. of America, No. 07-20639, 2008 WL
2477582, at *1 (5th Cir.2008). Moreover, NEOCC houses federal prisoners under contract with the
Bureau of Prisons. Even if CCA could be construed as an “instrumentality”under the statute, it
would be considered to be an instrumentality of the federal government. Title II of the ADA is
applicable only to state and local governments, not the federal government. See 42 U.S.C.
§12131(1); Cellular Phone Taskforce v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000); Beaird v. Gonzales,
495 F.Supp.2d 81, 83 (D.D.C. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring his claim against CCA
under Title II.
Finally, a private prison corporation does not fit easily into a cause of action under Title III
of the ADA. Title III prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability “in the full and equal
enjoyment [...] of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. section 12182(a). The phrase “public
accommodation” is defined for purposes of Title III in terms of 12 extensive categories of facilities
leased or operated by private entities “if the operations of such entities affect commerce.” The
facilities covered are:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging ...;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other
place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D)an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
6
(4:11cv1424)
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office
of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate
private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food
bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment;
and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other
place of exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); Maringo, No. 07-20639, 2008 WL 2477582, at *1. The ADA only
regulates non-residential facilities. American Patriots Advocating for Disabled Rights, Inc. v.
Budget Suites of America LLC, No. 2:09–CV–01528–KJD, 2011 WL 1197531 at *3 (D.Nev.
Mar. 29, 2011); Thompson v. Sand Cliffs Owners Ass'n, Inc., No. No. 3:96cv270/RV, 1998 WL
35177067, at *3-5 (N.D.Fla. Mar. 30, 1998.); Independent Housing Servs. of San Francisco v.
Fillmore Center Assocs., 840 F.Supp. 1328, 1344 (N.D.Cal.1993). A jail or prison facility does
not constitute a place of “public accommodation” as defined in the applicable statutory
provisions. See Wattleton v. Doe, No. 10-11969-JGD, 2010 WL 5283287, at *2 (D.Mass. Dec.
14, 2010) (Federal prison does not constitute a place of public accommodation under Title III of
ADA); James v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:04-CV-678, 2008 WL 686419, at *6
(E.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 2008.). Title III does not apply. Therefore, Plaintiff’s ADA claim must be
dismissed.
7
(4:11cv1424)
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 30, 2011
Date
3
/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?