Webb v. Farley

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick on 5/21/2013. (S,AL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Todd Steven Webb,

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Petitioner,
vs.
Warden Robert Farley,
FCI Elkton,
Respondent.

CASE NO. 4:12cv1842
Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Petitioner Todd Steven Webb filed the above-captioned petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner, who is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute in Elkton,
Ohio, names F.C.I. Elkton Warden Robert Farley as Respondent. Webb seeks an Order directing
the Respondent to follow Bureau of Prisons policy and refrain from imposing a classification that
prevents his transfer to a federal prison camp.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was sentenced to serve a federal prison term of 180 months in 2007. The BOP
website reveals he is scheduled for release from prison on April 7, 2018. See www.bop.gov/iloc2.
In 2011, Webb submitted a request to F.C.I. Elkton staff seeking a nearer-release transfer to
his family in Miami, Florida. The request was denied on February 17, 2011. Petitioner later
reviewed his Custody Classification and noticed his unit team applied a Code V, “Greater Severity”
Management Variable (MV). A Greater Severity score is applied to prisoners with a “serious history
of violence.”
Webb protested the designation and filed a Request for Administrative Remedy with FCI
Elkton staff to direct the Designations and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) in Grand Prairie,

Texas to remove the Greater Severity MV. Warden Farley denied his request after reviewing the
criminal history provided in Petition’s Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR). The PSIR
indicated Webb pled guilty to Criminal Domestic Violence in South Carolina on November 19,
2000. When Petitioner later failed to comply with the court imposed conditions of the plea, a bench
warrant was issued for his arrest. Two years later, Webb was arrested on April 11, 2002, in South
Carolina and charged with simple possession of marijuana, speeding, and criminal domestic violence.
Although the PSIR did not provide details of a subsequent conviction and sentence, it did indicate
Webb was arrested for Failure to Appear on November 26, 2002. Considering these facts, as well as
the definition of a serious history of violence provided in the Inmate Security and Designation and
Custody Classification Manual, Warden Farley concluded Petitioner’s history of violence score was
appropriately designated “serious.” (Doc. No. 1-2 at 32).
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Director, who denied the request on May 23, 2011.
Although the Director advised Petitioner of his right to appeal the decision to the General Counsel,
there is no indication Webb pursued a final appeal.
In his petition before the court, Webb raises four grounds for relief: (1) entitlement to nearer
release transfer; (2) removal of a Greater Severity MV; (3) declaration that BOP is violating its own
policy; and, (4) declaration that the BOP is violating the Constitution and exceeding the scope of its
discretion.
Webb argues that no BOP policy exists to bar male prisoners from being transferred to a
federal prison camp because of a designated history of violence. He claims the BOP is acting
arbitrarily and in bad faith when it relies on this as a basis to deny him a nearer release transfer.
Citing the BOP criteria for Greater Security classification,1 Webb argues “domestic violence” is not

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 Greater Security. There may be security concerns

which are not adequately reflected in the classification
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included in any of the suggested examples of a security risk. Moreover, he claims his domestic
violence conviction is “adequately reflected in the classification scheme” because 5 points were
added to his classification because of the domestic violence offense. He argues it is, therefore,
excessive to apply a Greater Severity MV when the conviction motivating that decision has already
been taken into account.
Finally, Webb argues his right to due process is being violated by the BOP. Specifically, he
states that the BOP is arbitrarily denying his transfer without following the very policy it is using to
justify the denial of his request. He avers this is the essence of due process because the BOP policy
is “not being followed AT ALL, a situation which is arbitrary, applied with caprice, and the very
definition of the denial of any sort of Due Process.” (Doc. No. 1-1 at 25). For the reasons set forth
below, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, it provides that: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3). I may dismiss the Petition at any time, or make any such disposition
as law and justice require, if I determine the Petition fails to establish adequate grounds for relief.
See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987); see also Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.

scheme. In circumstances where an inmate represents a
greater security risk (i.e., pending charges, detainer,
escape risk, etc.) than their assigned security level,
they may be placed in an institution outside normal
guidelines, and this MGTV will apply.
PS §5100.08, Ch. 5, p. 5(emphasis added).
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1970) (holding district courts have a duty to “screen out” petitions lacking merit on their face under
Section 2243).
Section 2241 only extends its reach to challenges that affect the length or duration of a
prisoner's sentence. Thus, to the extent a prisoner claims the BOP is improperly executing or
interfering with the manner in which his or her sentence is being served, the prisoner shall file a
petition in the court having jurisdiction over his or her custodian. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122,
1123 (6th Cir. 1998)(citing United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991)).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a prisoner's proper custodian, for purposes of habeas review,
is the warden of the facility where he or she is being held. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 319
(6th Cir. 2004)(as a general rule, a petitioner should name as a respondent to his habeas corpus
petition the individual having day-to-day control over the facility in which petitioner is being
detained). Therefore, Petitioner has named the proper respondent in this action, his current
custodian - the warden at F.C.I. Elkton. While this Court has personal jurisdiction over Petitioner’s
custodian, Webb is not entitled to habeas relief for the reasons stated below.
B. No Right to Prison Transfers
BOP policy provides that “[i]nmates may be considered for a nearer release transfer only after
serving 18 consecutive months of clear conduct in a general population. Nearer release transfers
should be incorporated with “Lesser Security” transfers whenever possible.” (BOP P.S. §5100
Chapter 7, p.4)(emphasis added). Webb states he is a Florida resident who has already served over
60 months of his 15 year sentence, without a single disciplinary incident. He argues these facts,
alone, should immediately qualify him for a nearer release transfer.
Petitioner is not being held in violation of the Constitution. As a threshold matter,
pprisoners generally have no liberty interest in their placement or classification while incarcerated.
See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Therefore, without a liberty interest at stake, Webb
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cannot assert any “right” to be transferred to a particular prison. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238, 245 (1983) (transfers and prison assignments are functions wholly within the discretion of the
BOP). To establish the existence of a liberty interest, a prisoner must show that he has been
subjected to an "atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life," see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), or that the government's action "will inevitably
affect the duration of his sentence." Id. at 487. Petitioner has made neither showing. Without the
loss of a liberty interest, Petitioner cannot argue he was deprived of his right to due process because
his request for a prison transfer was denied.
The BOP classification procedure is within the discretion of the Attorney General, as
delegated to the Director of the BOP. See 18 U.S.C. § 4081. As the warden and regional director
both advised Petitioner, his MV expired on March 7, 2012. It is thus within the discretion of the
BOP to reconsider the denial of Petitioner’s request for a nearer release transfer should he submit
one to the agency in the future.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The
Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.2
So Ordered.
s/Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial
court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”
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