Scantlebury v. United States of America

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order For the reasons stated in the Order, the Petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Related document 1 . Signed by Judge Dan Aaron Polster on 1/9/2013. (K,K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

RENATO JAY SCANTLEBURY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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CASE NO. 4:12 CV2736
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Petitioner Renato Jay Scantlebury filed the above-captioned petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant 28 U.S.C. §2241 (ECF No. 1). Scantlebury, who is incarcerated in the
Federal Correctional Institution in Elkton, Ohio (F.C.I. Elkton), names the United States of America
as Respondent. He asserts he is entitled to habeas relief from this Court because he is actually
innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. For the reasons set forth below, this action is
dismissed.
Background1
Scantlebury was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina on September 9, 2009. See United States v. Scantlebury, No.
5:09-cr-254 (E.D. N.C. 2009). A grand jury returned a superceding indictment on January 6,
2010, charging Scantlebury with using counterfeit devices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5)
(count one) and aggravated identity theft (count two) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
Id. at Doc. No. 22. Pursuant to a written agreement with the government, Scantlebury pleaded
guilty on March 12, 2010 to using counterfeit access devices and aggravated identity theft. On
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To accurately address the procedural history, the docket of Scantlebury's criminal case
was accessed through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.

September 8, 2010, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison for count one, along with a
consecutive term of 24 months on count two. Id. at Doc. Nos. 45 & 46. Consistent with the
terms of the plea agreement, Scantlebury did not appeal his conviction. The Bureau of Prisons
website indicates he is scheduled for release from prison on September 21, 2021. See
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/
On December 28, 2010, Scantlebury filed an unsigned Motion to Vacate or Set Aside
Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Eastern District Court of North Carolina. See
Scantlebury vs. United States, No. 5:10-cv-00590 (E.D. NC).2 He complains that he
supplemented the Motion with issues regarding his actual innocence on October 15, 2011, but
the trial court has yet to rule on the pleading. For this reason, he asserts his remedy under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate and he is entitled to habeas relief from this Court.
Discussion
Scantlebury asserts he was denied effective counsel when he agreed to plead guilty. He
claims he was not aware of what elements constituted an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A)(1).
Moreover, Scantlebury maintains that his trial counsel, the Unites States attorney, probation
department and, eventually, the trial judge all ill-advised him that his conduct violated the
statute. He claims he pleaded guilty to aggravated identity theft based on the fact that he
obtained credit card numbers from unknown sources and re-encoded the credit card numbers
under several aliases. When the Supreme Court issued its Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556
U.S. 646 (2009) opinion, however, Scattlebury argues his guilty plea was rendered invalid.
In Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court determined that “in order to convict [a] defendant
of aggravated identity theft for knowingly transferring, possessing, or using, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person, the government must prove that [the]
defendant knew that the means of identification he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or

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While Scantlebury states he filed a signed copy on April 5, 2011, the docket reflects that
a signed copy of the Motion to Vacate was filed on April 11, 2011.
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used did, in fact, belong to another person.” Id., 556 U.S. at 647-48. Scantlebury argues his
lawyer was unaware of this standard and, thus, provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Had
he known all the critical elements of his offense, Scantlebury asserts he never would have
pleaded guilty to the crime.
Scantlebury now maintains the trial court’s continued delay in ruling on his motion to
vacate has rendered his remedy under § 2255 inadequate and ineffective. As such, he believes
he is entitled to habeas relief from this Court under the safety valve provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§2241.
Initial Review
This matter is before the Court for initial screening. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Harper v. Thoms,
No. 02-5520 2002, WL 31388736, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2002).

A court is required to award

an application for writ of habeas corpus “unless it appears from the application that the applicant
or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Sixth Circuit has consistently
held that "[t]he burden to show that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United
States is on the prisoner." Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 906 (1970)(citations omitted). Scantlebury has not met his burden.
28 U.S.C. § 2241
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 addresses any
petitioner’s claim that he or she “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is directed "to the
person having custody of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973) ("The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be
unlawful custody."). Therefore, a court has jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition only if it
has personal jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian. Braden, 410 U.S. at 495. While this
Court does have personal jurisdiction over Scantlebury’s custodian, the warden at F.C.I. Elkton,
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he is not entitled to habeas relief from this Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2255
Relief Not Inadequate or Ineffective
By filing a Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court,
Scantlebury demonstrated his awareness that claims seeking to challenge a conviction or the
imposition of a sentence must be filed in the sentencing court under § 2255. See Cohen v.
United States, 593 F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir.1979). It is only when it appears that the remedy
afforded under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [a prisoner's] . . .
detention,” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952), that a federal prisoner may bring
a § 2241 claim challenging his conviction or imposition of sentence. See In re Hanserd, 123
F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir.1997).
The terms “inadequate or ineffective” raise a high bar for any prisoner to overcome when
he claims he cannot attack his sentence under § 2255. As a matter of law, section 2255 is not
considered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual is unable to obtain relief
under that provision. See e.g., Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir.1999) (per
curiam). Further, the § 2255 remedy is not considered inadequate or ineffective simply because
§ 2255 relief has already been denied, see In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir.1997),
Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988), or because
the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing relief under § 2255, see In re Vial, 115 F.3d
1192, 1194 n. 5 (4th Cir.1997); Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726-27 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986), or because the petitioner has been denied permission to file a
second or successive motion to vacate. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir.1998).
Scantlebury argues the trial court’s inordinate delay in reviewing his Motion to Vacate
entitles him to ask this Court to intervene and declare his innocence. This assertion not only
fails to establish that his §2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective, but a review of the docket in
the Eastern District Court of North Carolina reveals that the basis for his underlying argument is
moot.
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On October 30, 2012, Chief Judge James C. Dever III issued an Order granting the
government’s Motion to Dismiss in opposition to Scantlebury’s Motion to Vacate. See
Scantelbury, No. 5:09-cr-00254 (5:10CV590) at Doc. No. 72. The Order dismissed and, in the
alternative, denied both Scantlebury’s Motion to Vacate on the merits and a Certificate of
Appealability. See id. Scantlebury filed a pending Notice of Appeal in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on November 20, 2012. See Scantlebury v. United States, No.
12-7984 (4th Cir. 2012). A request to set aside or vacate Scantlebury’s sentence was denied on
the merits by Chief Judge Dever on October 30, 2012. Therefore, his identical request before
this Court, through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, is rendered moot.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed as moot
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Dan Aaron Polster 1/9/13
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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