Thomas v. Mahoning County Jail et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's claims against the Mahoning County Jail, Wellington, Szekley, Gideon, Lewis, Felton, Herman, Duncan, Denno, and Rojas are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e). This actio n shall proceed solely against Novicky, Schoolcraft and Bielecki. The Clerk's Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of this order in the documents to be served upon the remaining defendants. Judge Sara Lioi on 3/28/2014. (P,J)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SHAWN M. THOMAS,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
MAHONING COUNTY JAIL, et al,
DEFENDANTS.
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CASE NO. 4:13CV1469
JUDGE SARA LIOI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Shawn M. Thomas filed the above-captioned action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Mahoning County Jail and various employees of the Mahoning
County Sheriff’s Department1 (collectively “defendants”). In his complaint, plaintiff asserts,
among other things, that Deputy Novicky and Deputy Schoolcraft used excessive force to
subdue him. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1.) He seeks $5,000,000.00 in monetary damages, as well
as injunctive and declaratory relief.
Plaintiff originally filed this action in 2010 against the Mahoning County Jail,
Deputy Denno, Deputy Novicky, and Deputy Schoolcraft. Thomas v. Denno, Case No.
4:10CV2723 (N.D. Ohio 2010). This Court dismissed the claims against the Mahoning
County Jail, with prejudice, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim upon which
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The individual defendants are: Sheriff Randall A. Wellington, Lieutenant Steve Szekley, Sergeant Gary
Bielecki, Deputy Brian Gideon, Deputy John Denno, Deputy Matthew Novicky, Deputy Jeff Schoolcraft,
Deputy Jeffrey Lewis, Deputy Jeremiah Felton, Deputy Joseph Herman, Deputy Sherman Duncan, Deputy
Marcio Rojas, and Unknown John/Jane Does. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1.)
relief may be granted. The Court later granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
remaining defendants because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing the action as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The claims against Denno, Novicky, and
Schoolcraft were dismissed without prejudice.
I.
Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges he was being held in the Mahoning County Jail on December
6, 2008 when the incident in question took place. He contends he just received his dinner
food tray in his cell when he was notified that he had visitors. He claims he left his tray
untouched in his cell, intending to eat when his visit was over. When he returned, he found
his food tray had been removed, his cell had been searched, and he had been given a conduct
report. He pushed the intercom button in his cell to ask Deputy Novicky what had happened.
He claims Novicky laughed at him and when plaintiff requested he call the sergeant, he
refused.
Plaintiff contends he then created a security breech by covering his cell
window with a towel, knowing Novicky would have to summon the sergeant. After several
failed attempts to get plaintiff to voluntarily remove the visual obstruction, Novicky called a
sergeant to resolve the situation. Sergeant Bielecki came to plaintiff’s cell and plaintiff
removed the towel. He told the sergeant what had occurred with Novicky and asked to be
moved away from that deputy. The sergeant indicated he would replace the food tray,
photocopy pictures that were damaged during the cell search, and speak to Novicky
regarding his behavior. Plaintiff was not satisfied with this proposed solution, and informed
the sergeant that if he left without granting all of plaintiff’s requests, plaintiff would “pop the
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water sprinkler head on the wall[.]” (Doc. No. 1 at 11). Bielecki strongly advised against this
course of action indicating to plaintiff that he would not like the consequences of that action.
Plaintiff alleges that after the sergeant left, Novicky came on the intercom to
speak to him. Plaintiff claims this behavior antagonized him and he responded by popping
the water sprinkler in his cell, causing a small flood. At that point, Bielecki and
approximately fifteen other officers came to plaintiff’s cell, and ordered him through the
closed cell door to face away from door, and get on his knees. Plaintiff did not comply with
this request. Novicky opened the slot on the cell door and sprayed pepper spray into
plaintiff’s face. Novicky and Schoolcraft then opened the cell door and entered. Plaintiff
claims Novicky placed him in a headlock position, struck him in the face with his radio, and
threw him to the floor. He alleges that while other officers were placing him in handcuffs,
Novicky began choking him as other deputies began beating him. He contends deputies lifted
him out of the water in the flooded cell and carried him to the booking area where they
forced him to shower. Several nurses came to treat plaintiff. He alleges he was taken to an
area hospital where he received stitches for a gash above his eye.
Plaintiff entered into a plea agreement on December 16, 2008. Following
sentencing, he was transferred to another facility on December 19, 2008 to begin serving his
ten-year sentence.
Plaintiff contends the defendants violated his First Amendment right to
petition the government, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He specifies that he
is bringing his claims against the defendants only in their individual capacities.
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II.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam), Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss
an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th
Cir. 1996) (applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard). An action has no arguable basis in law
when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or
“wholly incredible[.]” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d
340 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. Although a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be
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enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Id. (internal cite omitted). The Court is “not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009), further explained the “plausibility” requirement, stating that
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
III.
Analysis
As an initial matter, plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted against Wellington, Szekley, Gideon, Lewis, Felton, Herman, Duncan, Denno, and
Rojas. Plaintiff specifically states that he is asserting claims against each defendant only in
the defendant’s individual capacity and not in his official. To state a claim against a
defendant in his individual capacity, plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant
was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional
behavior. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1976);
Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995).
Plaintiff alleges Novicky and Schoolcraft used excessive force to subdue him and appears to
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claim that Bielecki may have been present at the time.2 Because the complaint contains no
facts which reasonably suggest the other defendants participated in the alleged physical
assault of plaintiff, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against them for
use of excessive force.
Plaintiff’s claims against the Mahoning County Jail must also be dismissed.
Plaintiff asserted the same claims against the jail in the original action. This Court considered
that claim and dismissed it on the merits with prejudice. He is now asserting the same claim
in this action.
The doctrine of res judicata dictates that a final judgment on the merits of a
claim precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising
a new defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). It bars relitigation of every issue actually
brought before the Court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in the
previous action. Id. at 660-61. The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the finality of
judgments and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve
judicial resources. Westwood Chemical Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981). A
subsequent action will be subject to a res judicata bar only if there is an identity of the facts
creating the right of action and of the evidence necessary to sustain each action. Id. Both of
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Since the Court is unaware of when plaintiff may have exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court has
not performed an analysis as to whether plaintiff’s claims against the three remaining defendants may be barred
by the statute of limitations. Additionally, since Bielecki was not named in plaintiff’s original complaint, he
may have an additional basis to argue a statute of limitations defense.
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these requirements are met in this case. The claim asserted in this case is identical to the
claim asserted in the 2010 action. Plaintiff is therefore precluded from litigating this claim
for a second time.
The Court is aware that res judicata is an affirmative defense that generally
must be raised by the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Haskell v. Washington Twp., 864 F.2d
1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988). However, the United States Supreme Court as well as the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals have indicated that a court may take the initiative to assert the res
judicata defense sua sponte in “special circumstances.” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
412, 120 S. Ct. 2304, 147 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2000); Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, Tenn.,
326 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2003). The “special circumstance” recognized in Arizona, occurs
when “a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented[.]” Arizona, 530
U.S. at 412 (internal quote omitted); Neff v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 520 F. App’x 323, 327 (6th
Cir. 2013). This case fits precisely within those special circumstances. This Court already
issued a decision on this claim in the original action. Res judicata bars the plaintiff from
asserting it in this action.
Moreover, the claim is subject to dismissal for the same reason it was
dismissed the first time. The Mahoning County Jail is not a legal entity capable of being
sued. See Williams v. Dayton Police Dep’t 680 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
Rather, it is a facility owned and operated by Mahoning County. Id. Plaintiff’s claims against
the Jail therefore are construed as against Mahoning County.
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Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against
Mahoning County. As a rule, local governments may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
an injury inflicted solely by employees or agents under a respondeat superior theory of
liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d
611 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at
694. A municipality can therefore be held liable when it unconstitutionally “implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690; DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d
770, 786 (6th Cir. 1999). Here, plaintiff specifically states that he is suing the Jail under a
respondeat superior theory of liability. The Mahoning County Jail (or more appropriately
Mahoning County) cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees under respondeat
superior. In addition, plaintiff does not identify a particular policy or custom or edit of
Mahoning County that the employees were carrying out when they engaged in the actions
described in the complaint. For the same reason the Court dismissed this claim in the first
action, it is also subject to dismissal here.
IV.
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claims against the Mahoning County
Jail, Wellington, Szekley, Gideon, Lewis, Felton, Herman, Duncan, Denno, and Rojas are
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This action shall proceed solely
against Novicky, Schoolcraft and Bielecki. The Clerk’s Office is directed to forward the
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appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of
this order in the documents to be served upon the remaining defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 28, 2014
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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