Muhammud v. Coakley
Filing
4
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 3 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied, and this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this action could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan (C,KA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
ABDUL KARIEM MUHAMMUD,
Petitioner,
v.
JOE COAKLEY,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 4:13 CV 2370
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 2013, Petitioner pro se Abdul Kariem Muhammud, an inmate at the
Federal Correctional Institution at Elkton (“FCI Elkton”), filed the above-captioned habeas
corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to a guilty plea, of conspiracy to
distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was found to be a career offender,
receiving a total sentence of 90 months pursuant to the plea agreement. Petitioner now asserts he
is “actually innocent,” relying primarily on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). In
particular, he states there was insufficient evidence he actively employed a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking crime, and that he should not have been found to be a career offender. For the
reasons stated below, this action is dismissed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This matter is before the Court for initial screening. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Harper v. Thoms,
No. 02–5520, 2002 WL 31388736, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct.22, 2002). A court is required to award an
application for writ of habeas corpus “unless it appears from the application that the applicant or
person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Sixth Circuit has consistently held
that “[t]he burden to show that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United
States is on the prisoner.” Jones v. Russell, 396 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.1968); Gray v. Johnson, 354
F.2d 986 (6th Cir.1965). Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 138 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 906 (1970). Petitioner has not met his burden.
DISCUSSION
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to claims that the
petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U .S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A habeas corpus proceeding brought under § 2241 is the proper
mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence or the “fact or duration” of
confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973); see
also United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1008 (2001).
However, when a federal prisoner seeks to challenge his conviction or the imposition of his
sentence, on grounds that the sentence was imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack,” he generally must file a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence in the
sentencing court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755–56 (6th
Cir.1999); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir.1998); Cohen v. United States, 593
F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir.1979).
-2-
Under highly exceptional circumstances, a federal prisoner may challenge his conviction
and the imposition of his sentence under § 2241, instead of § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e);
Charles, 180 F.3d at 755–56. Section 2255 provides a safety valve whereby federal prisoners
may bring such a § 2241 claim if it appears that the remedy afforded under § 2255 is “inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209,
72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir.1997). It is the
prisoner's burden to prove that his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See
Charles, 180 F.3d at 756. The Sixth Circuit explained in Charles that the remedy under § 2255
is not rendered inadequate or ineffective simply because a petitioner has already been denied
relief under § 2255, because the petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or
successive motion to vacate, or because the petitioner has allowed the one-year statute of
limitations to expire. Id. at 756–58. Ultimately, the remedy afforded under § 2241 is not an
additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under § 2255. See id. at 758.
To date, the only circumstance in which the Sixth Circuit has determined § 2255 to be an
ineffective or inadequate remedy is when the petition stated a facially valid claim for actual
innocence. Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir.2003); Peterman, 249 F.3d at 462
(“[C]laims do not fall within any arguable construction of ... [the savings clause when]
defendants have not shown an intervening change in the law that establishes their actual
innocence.”); Charles, 180 F.3d at 756–57 (collecting cases); see also Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d
799, 804 (6th Cir.2003). A valid assertion of actual innocence is more than a belated declaration
that the prisoner does not believe his sentence is valid. Actual innocence suggests an intervening
change in the law that establishes a prisoner's actual innocence of a crime. See Martin, 319 F.3d
at 804; Peterman, 249 F.3d at 462. Secondly, “actual innocence means factual innocence, not
mere legal insufficiency.” Martin, 319 F.3d at 804 (quoting in Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)). In other words, Petitioner must point
to a decision holding a substantive criminal statute no longer reaches certain conduct, i.e, that he
-3-
stands convicted of “an act that the law does not make criminal.” Bousely, 523 U.S. at 620
(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). See, e.g., Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 150–151 (1995) (prisoners convicted of “using” a firearm during a drug crime or
violent crime found themselves innocent when Supreme Court redefined “use” in a restrictive
manner).
In the past, those prisoners who have obtained review of such claims under the savings
clause did so because they did not have a prior opportunity to present their claims on appeal or in
a prior § 2255 motion to vacate. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609, 611 (7th Cir.1998);
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363, 378–80 (2d Cir.1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir.1997). In this case, Petitioner has, in fact, already filed an unsuccessful motion
to vacate or set aside his sentence.
Petitioner has not set forth a colorable actual innocence claim. Indeed, he pleaded guilty
to the offenses of which he was convicted. Moreover, he does not cite a retroactive Supreme
Court decision announced since his conviction that establishes his innocence.
Pursuant to Alleyne, Petitioner claims that his sentence of imprisonment was improperly
enhanced. In Alleyne, the defendant was convicted by a jury of using or carrying a firearm in
relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), a violation subject to a
mandatory minimum five years incarceration. At sentencing, however, over Alleyne's objection,
the judge found that he had “brandished” a firearm, raising his mandatory minimum sentence to
seven years under the applicable statute. The sentencing court determined that, under Harris v.
United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), brandishing was a sentencing factor, which the court could
find without violating Alleyne's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The court of appeals
affirmed, and Alleyne petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that Harris could not be
reconciled with the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held
that any “facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed are elements of the crime[,]” which must be proved to a jury. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. 2151,
-4-
2160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court agreed with Alleyne, holding that any fact that increases a mandatory
minimum sentence for a crime is an “element” of the crime, not a “sentencing factor,” that must
be found by a jury. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2162. In doing so, the Court overruled Harris,
which limited Apprendi to facts increasing the statutory maximum, concluding that mandatory
minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime, and that the facts used to enhance a
sentence are offense elements “that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable
doubt” before an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence can be imposed. Id. at 2162-63. Thus,
the Court held that the district court erred when it imposed a seven-year mandatory minimum
sentence on Alleyne, because the jury had not found the fact - brandishing - supporting the
mandatory minimum beyond a reasonable doubt.
Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, Alleyne does not support his claim because that
decision is not an intervening change in the law that decriminalized the acts forming the basis of
his conviction. Alleyne is a sentencing-error case, and claims of sentencing error may not serve
as the basis for an actual innocence claim under Martin. See Bannerman, 325 F.3d at 724
(holding Apprendi could not be basis for actual innocence claim) (citing Peterman, 249 F.3d at
462). Alleyne, like Apprendi before it, “does not bear on whether a defendant is innocent of a
crime, but merely limits the potential punishment for it.” Roberts v. Snyder, 77 F. App'x 292, 294
(6th Cir.2003) (citing Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir.2002), cert denied, 537
U.S. 1096, 123 S.Ct. 711, 154 L.Ed.2d 647 (2002). If Alleyne were made retroactively available,
Petitioner might be able to raise his claim in a § 2255 proceeding.1
1
This Court offers no opinion as to the retroactive availability of Alleyne. Further,
issues regarding whether or not Petitioner may be able to overcome procedural
bars to filing a second or successive § 2255 petition are not properly addressed to
this Court. The Court only holds here that Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable
under § 2241 via the savings clause of § 2255.
-5-
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is
granted, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied, and this case is DISMISSED pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal of this action could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 3/05/14
/s/Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-6-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?