Quinn v. Pay et al

Filing 6

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this matter. An appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 2/23/15. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JEREMY J. QUINN,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. PAY, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 4:14 CV 1972
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff pro se Jeremy J. Quinn, an inmate at the Ohio State
Penitentiary, filed this in forma pauperis 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants J. Pay and
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) Director Gary C. Mohr. Plaintiff
alleges in the Complaint that ODRC adopted a new policy in 2012 that funds may be deposited
in inmate accounts only by persons on an inmate’s visitor list, and that the funds must be
processed through J. Pay, a private company. He asserts in generalized fashion that this policy
violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, because: 1) persons
who are approved to deposit funds must provide a copy of valid identification, thereby risking
identity theft; 2) some persons and organizations are unable to be placed on inmate visitor lists;
3) the processing fee charge by J-Pay is an illegal “tax” on gifts and donations; and, 4) the policy
imposes an undue hardship on Ohio prisoners.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis
in law or fact.1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th
Cir. 2010).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation. Id. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertion devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. It must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent
with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id.
Applying the above standard, even construing the Complaint liberally in a light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 2008), it does not contain
allegations reasonably suggesting he might have a valid federal claim against these Defendants.
See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ,, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to

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An in forma pauperis claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the
plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that
it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for
one of the reasons set forth in the statute. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d
910, 915 (6th Cir. 2007); Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 261 (6th Cir. 1990); Harris
v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986).
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accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint
states a claim for relief). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and
this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 23, 2015

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