Roper v. Bureau of Prisons et al

Filing 6

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/23/15 granting petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and setting forth the grounds for dismissal of the petition. (Related Docs. 1 , 3 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

LENNOX L. ROPER,
Petitioner,
v.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al.,
Respondents.

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CASE NO. 4:14 CV 2291
JUDGE JAMES S. GWIN
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

On October 14 2014, petitioner pro se Lennox L. Roper, a federal inmate at the Northeast
Ohio Correctional Center (“NOCC”), filed the above-captioned in forma pauperis habeas corpus
action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is a deportable alien serving a 265 month sentence for
convictions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. See, U.S. v.
Roper, E.D. Tenn. Case No. 3:98-cr-00058. He alleges that his immigration status renders him
ineligible for certain programs at NOCC, and that he is therefore ineligible for placement in a
Residential Reentry Center before the completion of his sentence. Petitioner asserts this
situation subjects him to cruel and unusual punishment and violates his constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.
There is no constitutional right to be confined in, or transferred to, a particular
correctional facility. Devonshire v. Holder, No. 11–344–GVT, 2013 WL 460532, at *2 (E.D.
Ky.2013); see also, McKune v. Live, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238
(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is
vested “with the right to exercise complete and absolute discretion in matters relating to the
incarceration and classification of lawfully convicted prisoner.” Halka v. Shartle, 2010 WL

2730936, at *4 (N.D.Ohio) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 (1976)). BOP has the
express authority to designate the place of a prisoner's confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b);
Devonshire, 2013 WL 460532, at *2. Further, prisoners do not a due process right to eligibility
in rehabilitation programs, Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 fn.9, or a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in discretionary release prior to the expiration of their prison terms.
Excluding prisoners with Immigration Customs Enforcement detainers from eligibility
for a sentence reduction that is contingent upon completion of a community-based substance
treatment programs does not violate equal protection. Fellove v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No.
CV 310–058, 2010 WL 4941481, at *3 (S.D.Ga.2010) (citing McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d
1176, 1185 (9th Cir.1999)). Denying such prisoners participation in such programs is
permissible so as long as the difference in treatment has a rational basis. Mendez v. United
States, No. 02 CR 745(RPP)., 2009 WL 4857490, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citing Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 78–83 (2001)); see also, Lizarraga–Lopez v. United States, 89 F.Supp.2d 1166
(S.D.Cal.2006). In United States v. Tamayo, 162 F. App'x 813 (10th Cir.2006), the Tenth Circuit
held that there was a rational basis to deem deportable aliens ineligible for rehabilitation
programs aimed at preparing prisoners for reentry into society. Id. at 816; see also, Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (denying participation in certain prerelease programs is
permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion). This court agrees.
Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The court certifies, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2015

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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