Tisron v. Newland et al

Filing 3

Memorandum of Opinion and Order For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. Furthermore, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 1/25/2015. Related document(s) 1 . (JLG)

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARLES SAMUEL TISRON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
AMANDA NEWLAND, et al.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 4:14cv2513

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER [Resolving ECF No. 1]

Pro se Plaintiff Charles Samuel Tisron is a federal prisoner incarcerated at FCI Elkton.
He filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against his prison case manager Amanda
Newland, her supervisor Don Wilcome, and the associate prison warden Bill Story, alleging he
was denied 12-months’ placement in a halfway house as permitted under the Second Chance Act
and transfer to a minimum security facility “[b]ecause of [his] race and religion.” ECF No. 1 at
3–4. Plaintiff seeks halfway house time under the Second Chance Act and transfer to a minimum
security facility. Id. at 5. He also seeks return of payments he made on a court-ordered fine he
contends he was forced to pay that is not due until he is released. Id. For the reasons stated
below, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), 28 U.S.C. §1915A
requires district courts to screen cases in which a prisoner seeks relief from a governmental

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entity, officer, or employee and to sua sponte dismiss those that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted when it lacks “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under §
1915A). The court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept
all well-pleaded allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations present
plausible claims. Although a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. Rather, the plaintiff’s pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78.
Although a pro se litigant is not held to the same standard as a lawyer, he still must set
forth factual allegations sufficient to give the defendants fair notice of his claims and the grounds
on which they rest; a court is not required to conjure up allegations on the plaintiff’s behalf. See
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).
Analysis
Even when liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient to meet the basic
pleading requirements necessary to state a plausible claim for relief. The basis for Plaintiff’s

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claims is that he was discriminated against on the basis of his “race and religion,” but he has set
forth no factual allegations in his complaint supporting a plausible conclusion that he was
discriminated against on those grounds. “The Equal Protection Clause prevents . . . distinctions
that (1) burden a fundamental right; (2) target a suspect class; or (3) intentionally treat one
individual differently from others similarly situated without any rational basis.” Johnson v.
Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010). To the extent Plaintiff purports to assert an equal
protection claim, his claim is wholly unsupported by any facts in his complaint. There are no
allegations that Defendants burdened one of Plaintiff’s fundamental rights, targeted a suspect
class of which Plaintiff is a member, or treated Plaintiff differently from others similarly situated
to him. In short, Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination is a purely conclusory allegation of
unconstitutional conduct which, without specific factual allegations, fail to state a claim. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–78; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915A. Furthermore, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from
this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 25, 2015
Date

/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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