Ortiz v. Holmes, Jr. et al.

Filing 24

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Moving defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 10 ) is converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for partial dismissal and is granted. The claims against defendants DiBenardi and Holmes in their official capacities are dismissed. Additionally, all claims against Mahoning County are dismissed. Plaintiff shall have leave until February 2, 2016 to either move for default judgment against Holmes in his individual capacity or voluntarily dismiss him from the lawsuit. In the event that plaintiff fails to move for default judgment, Holmes shall be dismissed from this action without prejudice. Judge Sara Lioi on 1/18/2016. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RAYVENN D. ORTIZ,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.

SHEROD D. HOLMES, JR., et al.,

DEFENDANTS.

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CASE NO. 4:15cv1085

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Before the Court is the motion of defendants Dawn DiBenardi (“DiBenardi”) and
Mahoning County Operators of the Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center (“MCOJJC”)
(collectively “moving defendants”) for partial judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) (Doc. No. 10 [“Mot.”]). Plaintiff Rayvenn Ortiz (“plaintiff” or “Ortiz”) opposes the
motion (Doc. No. 13 [“Opp’n”]), and moving defendants have filed a reply (Doc. No. 14
[“Reply”]). For the reasons that follow, the motion is converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for
partial dismissal and is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The background facts set forth herein are either undisputed or taken from
plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 6.) On June 5, 2013, plaintiff, then 15
years old, was adjudicated a delinquent child by the Mahoning County Court of Common
Pleas—Juvenile Court Division, and was placed on probation. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 10-11.) DiBenardi, a
probation officer employed by the Mahoning County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”), was

assigned to plaintiff’s case.1 (Id. ¶¶ 7, 12.)
At all times relevant to the present dispute, defendant Sherod Holmes, Jr.
(“Holmes”) was also employed by the Juvenile Court as a probation officer. (Id. ¶ 6.) It is alleged
that Holmes used his position with the Juvenile Court to obtain confidential information about
plaintiff that he used to “make contact with [plaintiff] in social settings.” (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) “After
making initial contact with” Ortiz, Holmes “deceived [Ortiz] on his age and position as a
probation officer in order to engage in a sexual relationship with” her. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Upon enrolling for classes at Mahoning Valley High School, plaintiff “learned the
true identity of” Holmes and that “he was a probation officer with the Mahoning County Juvenile
Justice Center.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Thereafter, Holmes frequented the high school, removed plaintiff
from classes, and “transported her using a Mahoning County vehicle to engage in sexual
relations at his personal residence.” (Id. ¶¶ 18-20.) Plaintiff alleges that DiBenardi knew of
Holmes’s illicit sexual relationship with plaintiff, failed to report it to the proper authorities, and
permitted Holmes to use her county vehicle to facilitate Holmes’s sexual misconduct with
plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.)
On March 12, 2013, Holmes was found guilty by the Mahoning County Court of
Common Pleas of two counts of gross sexual imposition, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §
2907.05(A)(1)(c)(1), a fourth degree felony, and two counts of importuning, in violation of Ohio
Rev. Code § 2907.07(B)(1)(f)(3), a fifth degree felony. (Id. ¶ 25.) He was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of two years and was required to register as a sex offender. (Id. ¶ 26.)
On May 29, 2015, plaintiff filed the present action against Holmes, DiBenardi, the

1

Moving defendants refer to Dawn DiBenardi as “Dawn DiBernardi.”
2

Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center (“Justice Center”), and various John Does. (Doc. No.
1 (Complaint [“Compl.”]).) Brought under the umbrella of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and relying on
asserted violations of the Eighth Amendment, the original complaint raised claims against
Holmes for the sexual assaults, against DiBenardi for failing to protect Ortiz from the assaults,
and against the Justice Center for failing to monitor, supervise, and train Holmes. The filing of
the initial complaint was immediately followed by a motion to dismiss brought by DiBenardi and
the Justice Center. (Doc. No. 4 (Motion to Dismiss [“MTD”]).) The motion challenged the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the claims raised in the complaint, and the plausibility
of a constitutional claim against DiBenardi for failure to protect Ortiz. The motion also raised
several immunity arguments, claiming that the various defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial,
qualified, and/or sovereign immunity.
In lieu of filing an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Ortiz filed the FAC against
defendants Holmes, DiBenardi, MCOJJC, and the John Doe defendants, with the individual
defendants sued in their official and individual capacities. (FAC ¶¶ 6-8.) It is unclear from the
FAC whether MCOJJC represents the previously sued Justice Center, the Juvenile Court, or
Mahoning County, itself. What is clear is that the claims are no longer dependent on the Eighth
Amendment. Instead, plaintiff’s § 1983 civil rights claims are now couched in terms of
Fourteenth Amendment violations, and the factual allegations supporting the claims appear to
have been fleshed out in greater detail. Notwithstanding these revisions, the claims in the FAC
still retain the essence of the constitutional claims raised in the initial pleadings.
The moving defendants acknowledge that the FAC cured certain deficiencies
identified in the previously filed motion to dismiss but insist that it did not cure all of them.
3

(Reply at 113.) Carrying over from the motion to dismiss, the moving defendants argue that
DiBenardi and Holmes are entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent they are sued in their
official capacities as employees of the Juvenile Court. They also argue that Mahoning County, to
the extent it has been sued in this action, is not sui juris and must be dismissed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Conversion of Rule 12(c) Motion to a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
Plaintiff suggests that the present Rule 12(c) motion is premature because not all

of the defendants have filed an answer. Rule l2(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Relying on cases that provide that pleadings are not “closed” until all of
the defendants have filed answers or otherwise responded to the complaint, plaintiff argues that
the pleadings remain open because Holmes has not yet filed an answer or moved for summary
judgment. (Opp’n at 102 (citing, among authority, Nationwide Children’s Hosp., Inc. v. D.W.
Dickey & Son, Inc. Employee Health & Welfare Plan, No. 2:08-cv-1140, 2009 WL 5247486
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 31, 2009)).)
The Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether, when there are
multiple defendants, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be filed before all the
defendants have answered the complaint so long as the moving defendants have answered. See
Dunn-Mason v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-cv-13419, 2013 WL 4084676, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2013). This Court, however, has recently had occasion to consider how a
court should proceed under circumstances similar to those presented in this case.
In Prade v. City of Akron, No. 5:14CV188, 2015 WL 2169975 (N.D. Ohio May
4

8, 2015), this Court held that a Rule 12(c) motion that was prematurely filed before all
defendants had answered could be converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion provided the issues raised
in the motion were sufficiently raised in the moving defendant’s answer as affirmative defenses.
Prade, 2015 WL 2169975, at *2. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied on another recent
decision out of the Western District of Michigan. In Gillespie v. City of Battle Creek, No. 1:13CV-1320, 2015 WL 1459611, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2015), the court observed with favor
the practice of district courts within the Sixth Circuit of permitting post-answer Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, as well as the practice outside the Sixth Circuit of construing premature Rule 12(c)
motions as Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Gillespie, 2015 WL 1459611, at *3 (citing, among authority,
Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo City Sch. Dist., 594 F. Supp. 2d 833, 840-41 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(noting that district courts have the discretion to construe a “pre-answer Rule 12(c) motion as a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)”)). Finding that the issues
raised in the premature Rule 12(c) motion had been raised in the answer, and further finding that
the plaintiff could point to no prejudice, the court determined that converting the motion to one
under Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate. Prade, 2015 WL 2169975, at *2.
The focal point of the present motion is the application of the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to certain of the asserted claims. This very issue was raised by the moving
defendants in their answer as an affirmative defense. (Doc. No. 9 (Answer of DiBenardi and
MCOJJC to First Amended Complaint [“Ans. FAC”]) ¶ 41.) The moving defendants also argue
that Mahoning County, to the extent it has been sued, is not a proper defendant to these
proceedings. In their answer, these same defendants denied the lynchpin allegation lodged
against Mahoning County, and raised as an affirmative defense the argument that the complaint
5

fails to state a claim against one or more of the defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 40.) While this second issue
represents a closer call, the Court finds that both issues raised in the moving defendants’ Rule
12(c) motion were previously raised in their answer to the FAC.
Additionally, the Court notes that Holmes has failed to file an answer, despite
being timely served with the summons and complaint, and that the time to file such an answer
has passed. It appears, therefore, that Holmes is in default. Under these circumstances,
withholding a ruling on threshold matters, when they have been fully briefed by the parties that
are actively participating in this case, would accomplish nothing more than unnecessarily
delaying this action. The fact that plaintiff has had an opportunity to fully brief these issues also
demonstrates that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by immediate consideration of the present
motion, and plaintiff has not even argued that any prejudice would result.2
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Rule 12(c) motion can properly be
converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
B.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule

12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the same as for a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). E.E.O.C. v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
tests the sufficiency of the pleading. Davis H. Elliot Co., Inc. v. Caribbean Util. Co., Ltd., 513
F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 1975). All allegations of fact by the non-moving party are accepted as
2

Plaintiff has argued, however, that the fact that Holmes has not filed an answer creates a genuine issue of material
fact. (Opp’n at 103.) Genuine issues of material fact are demonstrated through the discovery of disputed facts, and
not through the failure of a party to answer.
6

true and construed in the light most favorable to that party. See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 421
(citing Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir. 1990)). The court,
however, “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Mixon v.
Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10,
12 (6th Cir. 1987)).
The sufficiency of the pleading is tested against the notice pleading requirements
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Although this standard is
liberal, Rule 8 still requires a complaint to provide the defendant with “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).3 Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the plaintiff has not “nudged [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted).

3

In her opposition brief, plaintiff suggests that the Court must determine whether the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of her claims. (Opp’n at 102.) This standard, first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.
Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), has been flatly rejected by recent Supreme Court rulings. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at
562-63 (“Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough . . .
and after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.”)
7

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
Moving defendants maintain that plaintiff’s claims against Holmes and DiBenardi

in their official capacities as employees of the Juvenile Court/and or the Justice Center are barred
by sovereign immunity. “The desire to protect the solvency and dignity of the states motivates
the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.” Lowe v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job
& Family Servs., 610 F.3d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing, among authority, Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52, 115 S. Ct. 394, 130 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1994)); see Pucci v.
Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2010) (“States and the federal government
‘possess[] certain immunities from suit in state and federal courts.’”) (quoting Ernst v. Rising,
427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). “The doctrine ‘flows from the nature of
sovereignty itself as well as the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” Lowe, 610 F.3d at 325 (citing Ernst, 427 F.3d at 358). The doctrine is subject to
numerous exceptions, however, one of the most prominent being that “state instrumentalities that
properly are characterized as political subdivisions, rather than arms of the state, are not entitled
to sovereign immunity.” Id. at 324-25 (citing Ernst, 427 F.3d at 358-59); see Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977)
(citations omitted).
The Court must, therefore, determine whether the Juvenile Court, and by
extension the Justice Center, is an arm of the state and not merely a political subdivision that is
not entitled to sovereign immunity. Such a determination involves a question of law. See Barton
8

v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Resolution of this issue will
also be dispositive of whether Holmes and DiBenardi may be sued in their official capacities, as
official capacity suits “‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct.
3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
471, 105 S. Ct. 873, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985) (“a judgment against a public servant in his official
capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
To answer the question of whether a juvenile court is an arm of the state and
entitled to sovereign immunity, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the law in this area in the
Sixth Circuit. In Mumford v. Basinski, the Sixth Circuit determined that a domestic relations
court was an arm of the state of Ohio that enjoyed immunity from suit. Mumford, 105 F.3d 264,
269 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Consequently, an Ohio common pleas court is not a segment of county
government, but an arm of the state for purposes of section 1983 liability and Eleventh
Amendment immunity analyses.”) (emphasis in original). In arriving at this conclusion, the
circuit recognized that the domestic relations court was part of the state court system established
by the Ohio Constitution, that supervisory responsibility for the court rested with the Ohio
Supreme Court, and that the standards controlling election, residency, tenure, compensation, and
eligibility of judges who served on the court were also dictated by the state constitution. See
Mumford, 105 F.3d at 268-69 (citing Ohio Const. art. IV, §§ 4, 5, 6). Additionally, the Sixth
Circuit relied upon the fact that the jurisdiction and employment of court personnel was
9

controlled by state statute, rather than by the commissioners for the county in which the domestic
relations court sat. Id. at 269 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.01 et seq.) Along a similar vein, in
2000, the court was asked to determine whether a juvenile detention center was entitled to
immunity from suit. In Oswald v. Lucas Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., the court held that “a
county juvenile detention center is part of the juvenile court, which is an arm of the state.”
Oswald, 234 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (Table), 2000 WL 1679507, at *2 (citing Ohio
Rev. Code § 2151.34).
The Sixth Circuit revisited its decision in Mumford in 2003, after intervening law
from the United States Supreme Court stressed that the question of which entity—state or
county—would be responsible for satisfying a judgment was a paramount concern in
determining whether an entity was an arm of the state. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe,
519 U.S. 425, 430, 117 S. Ct. 900, 137 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1997) (stating that “the question of whether
a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the
State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and
the entity or individual being sued”) (citations omitted); Hess, 513 U.S. at 48 (recognizing “the
vulnerability of the State’s purse as the most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations”) (citations omitted). In Alkire v. Irving, the court called into question the
“reasoning in Mumford, if not the result[,]” because that court did not consider whether the state
would be legally liable for a judgment against the county court. Alkire, 330 F.3d 802, 812 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Hess, 513 U.S. at 48; and Doe, 519 U.S. at 430). Ultimately, the court
remanded the matter to the district court for consideration of this and other relevant factors in
determining whether the county court of common pleas was an arm of the state. Id. at 813.
10

Plaintiff suggests that, in the wake of Alkire and intervening Supreme Court law,
“the determination of whether or not the [sic] Mahoning County and its Juvenile Justice Center is
an arm of the state remains an open question.” (Opp’n at 104.) Moving defendants disagree,
underscoring the fact that “while the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may have questioned the
rationale of some of the older cases on the application of [Eleventh] Amendment immunity in
these situations, the [court] has expressly stated that, despite this uncertainty, it has not decided
that Mumford was incorrect and that these previous cases have not been overruled.” (Reply at
114-15 (citing Triplett v. Connor, 109 F. App’x 94, 96 n.4 (6th Cir. 2004) (while acknowledging
“some doubt about the continued validity of Mumford’s reasoning” the court held that “[w]e
have not, however, decided that Mumford was incorrect”)).).
Moving defendants also note that, even after Alkire, district courts within the
Sixth Circuit continue to rely on Mumford and Oswald in finding juvenile courts and juvenile
detention centers in Ohio to be arms of the state and entitled to sovereign immunity. 4 See, e.g.,
Burress v. Hamilton Cnty. Office of Child Support and Enforcement, No. 1:14-cv-391, 2014 WL
2515413, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2014) (juvenile court is an arm of the state and entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity), report adopted by 2014 WL 4075949 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 14,
2014); Hinton v. Teodosio, No. 5:12 CV 1267, 2012 WL 5354584, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29,
2013) (suit brought against officials of juvenile court in their official capacities was barred by the
4

Plaintiff relies heavily upon the S.J. v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 374 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2004), to support her
argument that the Juvenile Court and the Justice Center should not be considered an arm of the state for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. In S.J., however, the court was confronted with the question of whether a juvenile
training center—and not a juvenile detention center—was an arm of the state, a distinction that the Sixth Circuit
made clear in its decision. S.J., 374 F.3d at 422-23 (in distinguishing Oswald, the court noted that Ohio law vested
with the county the authority to grant or deny the juvenile court’s request to create a training facility, while the
county was obligated to create a juvenile detention center upon the recommendation of the juvenile court) (citing
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2151.65 and 2152.41); see Winston, 2013 WL 684742, at *6 (distinguishing S.J. on the same
grounds).
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Eleventh Amendment) (citing Mumford, 105 F.3d at 269); Winston v. Franklin Cnty., Case No.
2:10-CV-1005, 2013 WL 684742, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2013) (juvenile detention center
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Conner v. Catalano, Case No. 1:10 CV 1860, 2010
WL 4316752, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2010) (“The current state of law, as set forth by the
binding precedent of the Sixth Circuit opinions in Mumford, Triplett and Oswald, unequivocally
states that a juvenile detention facility is part of the juvenile court, which is an arm of the state.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court was an arm of the state for
purposes of sovereign immunity. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 763. While the decision related to “a court
within Michigan’s state judicial system[,]” and not a state court in Ohio, the Court finds the
approach taken in Pucci instructive. Id. at 755. There, the plaintiff brought suit against the state
district court, and the court’s chief judge, after she was terminated from her position as court
administrator. The Sixth Circuit determined that both defendants were entitled to the protections
of the Eleventh Amendment. The court applied a four-factor analysis set forth in prior decisions.
Specifically, the court considered:
(1) The State’s potential liability for a judgment against the entity; (2) the
language by which state statutes and state courts refer to the entity and the
degree of state control and veto power over the entity’s actions; (3) whether
state or local officials appoint the board members of the entity; and (4)
whether the entity’s functions fall within the traditional purview of state or
local government.
Id. at 760 (quoting Ernst, 427 F.3d at 359) (further citation omitted).
While the court observed that the first factor—the State’s potential liability—
“will generally be the most important [factor],” the court emphasized that it was not the “sole
criterion” for determining whether an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 761
12

(quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). The court explained that the twin
reasons for granting a state sovereign immunity—“the desire not to infringe either a state’s purse
or its dignity”—require consideration of both the state’s economic liability and the indignity of
subjecting the state to the judicial process. Id. at 761 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Applying the four-factor test, and mindful of the “twin reasons” for sovereign immunity, the
court determined that, “in certain cases—such as the one before us here—the last three factors
may demonstrate that an entity is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity despite the
fact that political subdivisions and not the State are potentially liable for judgments against the
entity.” Id. at 762.
The Court need not decide whether it may continue to rely on prior Sixth Circuit
cases finding Ohio county courts and detention centers to be arms of the state for purposes of
sovereign immunity. Whether the Court relies on the prior rulings in Mumford and Oswald, or
applies the four-factor test anew, the result is the same—the Juvenile Court and the Justice
Center are arms of the State of Ohio, and DiBenardi and Holmes are entitled to immunity for any
action against them in their official capacities.
1. The State’s Obligation to Pay any Judgment
The moving defendants “concede that the state treasury will not pay for judgment
in this case.” (Reply at 118.) They insist, however, that this concession “does not defeat
sovereign immunity” and underscore the fact that “application of the remaining factors [and
consideration of the dignity of the state] demonstrate that Ohio common pleas courts, and in turn
Ohio juvenile courts and juvenile detention centers, are arms of the state and entitled to
sovereign immunity.” (Id.) While this first factor clearly counsels against finding that the
13

Juvenile Court is an arm of the state, the Court agrees with the moving defendants that this does
not end the inquiry.
2. Treatment of the Juvenile Court by the State’s Statutes and Courts and the Degree of
State Control
As was the case for Michigan courts in Pucci, Ohio common pleas courts are
established by the Ohio Constitution as part of a unified, state-wide judicial system. See S.J. v.
Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 374 F.3d 416, 421-22 (6th Cir. 2004) (Ohio’s court system is mandated to
be uniform) (citing, among authority, Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5). Pursuant to Article IV, § 5(A)(1)
of the Ohio Constitution, “the supreme court shall have general superintendence over all courts
in the state.” Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5. Similarly, the powers of the county common pleas courts
and county juvenile courts are delegated by the Ohio General Assembly and codified in Titles
XXI and XXIII of the Ohio Revised Code.
Plaintiff points out that Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.41 requires the county
commissioners to fund the construction of a juvenile detention center. Indeed, § 2152.41(A)
states that “[u]pon the recommendation of the judge, the board of county commissioners shall
provide, by purchase, lease, construction, or otherwise, a detention facility that shall be within a
convenient distance of the juvenile court.”5 Notwithstanding the county’s funding obligations for
the facility itself, the Ohio Revised Code also provides that “[a]ny detention facility established
under section 2152.41 of the Revised Code shall be under the direction of a superintendent. The
superintendent shall be appointed by, and under the direction of, the judge or judges. . . . The
superintendent serves at the pleasure of the juvenile court . . . .” Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.42(A).
5

The fact that the statute provides that the county commissioners shall provide or construct a juvenile detention
facility at the request of the juvenile court is further evidence that the county’s discretion is limited. See Ohio Rev.
Code § 2152.42(A).
14

Because the Juvenile Court is under the direction of the Ohio Supreme Court, control over the
Juvenile Court rests with the state. This factor favors sovereign immunity.
Additionally, the Juvenile Court controls the admission, removal, and transfer of
juveniles to and from the Justice Center. Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.43(E). This lends further
support to a finding that the degree of control of the state over juvenile courts and their detention
centers favors a conclusion that they are arms of the state. The second factor clearly weighs in
favor of sovereign immunity.
3. Appointment of members to the Juvenile Court
It is clear from the Ohio Constitution and relevant statutes that the State of Ohio
has considerable control over the appointment and removal of the members of its judiciary.
While state court judges are elected, similar to the Michigan procedure recognized in Pucci, “[i]n
case the office of any judge shall become vacant . . . the vacancy shall be filled by appointment
by the governor.” Ohio Const. art. IV, § 13. Also, as in the Michigan system as noted by Pucci,
judges in Ohio may be removed from office by concurrent resolution of the General Assembly.
Id. § 17.
With respect to the Justice Center, plaintiff draws the Court’s attention to the fact
that the county, and not the state, must shoulder the burden of paying the operational costs for
the facility. (Opp’n at 105 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.43).) She concedes, however, that it is
the juvenile court that appoints the superintendent of a juvenile detention facility who “serves at
the pleasure of the juvenile court.” (Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.42(A)).) The
superintendent is also responsible to, and under the direction of, the juvenile court. Id. In

15

addition, the superintendent appoints all employees of the facility whose salaries are set by
statute. Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.42(B).
These facts, taken together, demonstrate that the state exercises control over the
appointment and membership of the juvenile courts, and the juvenile courts, in turn, exercise
control over the juvenile detention facilities that exist in each county. 6 Therefore, the third factor
favors sovereign immunity. See Pucci, 628 F.3d at 763-64 (relying on similar facts to find that
the third factor “heavily favors granting sovereign immunity”).
4. Whether the Juvenile Court’s Functions Fall Within the Purview of State or Local
Government
The final factor, which requires inquiry into whether the functions of the
government entity fall within the traditional purview of state or local government, also favors a
finding that the Juvenile Court and the Justice Center are arms of the state and entitled to
immunity. The “inquiry into the ‘traditional purview’ of state government stems from the
importance of dignity in the origins of [the] sovereign immunity doctrine; if the agency in
question carries out a long-recognized state function, it is a particular affront to a state to subject
this agency to suit.” Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. In applying this final factor, the court in Pucci
explained that:
We have previously recognized that “[c]onsiderations of dignity are particularly
relevant in a suit against a state court, which is the ‘adjudicative voice’ of the
State itself.” Barachkov [v. 41B Dist. Ct, 311 F. App’x 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2009)].
This respect for a state’s dignity in Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis “is
particularly true in the context of a court system that . . . is mandated by the state
constitution to be uniform and to be supervised by one supreme court.” S.J., 374
6

Michigan counties are also responsible for the operational costs of their courts. Though not discounting entirely the
county’s burden in funding the operation of the district court, the court in Pucci recognized that “the expenses of
justice are incurred for the benefit of the State and only charged against the counties in accordance with old usage,
as a proper method of distributing the burden.” Id. at 763 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
16

F.3d at 421-22 (discussing Ohio’s unified court system); see also Barachkov, 311
[F. App’x] at 868 (quoting same in connection with Michigan’s 41B District
Court.) As noted above, Michigan’s state constitution explicitly vests “the judicial
power of the state . . . in one court of justice,” headed by one supreme court with
“general superintending control over all courts.” Mich. Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 4. Our
concern for the dignity of the state, therefore, also counsels in favor of granting
sovereign immunity here.
Id. While not discounting the fact that the county was potentially liable for any judgment in the
case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that such a consideration was “outweighed by the integrated
role of Michigan’s district courts within the state judiciary (as provided for by Michigan’s
Constitution and statutes), the degree of supervision and control that the Michigan Supreme
Court and legislature exercise over those courts, the role of state actors in appointing and
removing district court judicial officers, and the traditional state function the Nineteenth District
Court carries out.” Id.
Similarly here, because the Juvenile Court is a part of Ohio’s integrated system of
courts, established by state constitution and governed by state statutes, the dignity of the Juvenile
Court is a significant concern that cannot be overlooked. This final factor, therefore, weighs in
favor of sovereign immunity.
Ultimately, the Court finds that the importance of the county’s responsibility for
any judgment in this case is outweighed by the other factors that clearly counsel in favor of
sovereign immunity. As employees of the Juvenile Court, Holmes and DiBenardi are, therefore,
entitled to immunity to the extent they are sued in their official capacities.
B.

Plaintiff’s Claims against Mahoning County
Moving defendants insist that “there is no entity known as ‘Mahoning County

Operators of the Juvenile Justice Center.’” (Mot. at 90.) They further suggest that, to the extent
17

that plaintiff intended to bring suit against Mahoning County, such an attempt should fail
because counties are not sui juris. As to this latter point, moving defendants posit that “[i]t is
well settled that a ‘county’ is nothing more than a subdivision of a state, organized for judicial
and political purposes. As such, counties are not legal entities capable of either suing or being
sued.” (Id. at 90-91 (collecting cases).) The moving defendants argue that, even if Mahoning
County were capable of being sued under federal law, it would be subject to dismissal because
the county does not possess any authority over the juvenile courts. (Id. at 91.) Plaintiff does not
challenge the representation that MCOJJC does not exist, nor does she take issue with moving
defendants’ representation that the Justice Center is not under the supervision of the county.
Instead, she maintains that the question of whether a county can sue and be sued under Ohio law
is not dispositive of whether it can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The question of whether a county’s lack of capacity to sue or be sued under Ohio
law “precludes the ability of such county to become amenable to a § 1983 claim pursuant to
Monell” has been dealt with “inconsistently” by Ohio federal district courts. Stack v. Karnes,
750 F. Supp. 2d 892, 894-95 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (collecting case for and against finding a county
capable of being sued under § 1983). This Court need not weigh in on this issue because, even if
Mahoning County were capable of being sued in this federal action, it would be entitled to
dismissal for plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action against it.
The FAC provides that “Mahoning County, through its Juvenile Justice Center,”
failed to adequately train employees (FAC ¶ 54), failed to adequately monitor its employees (id.
¶ 55), failed to investigate and respond to complaints about sexual harassment (id. ¶ 56),
maintained a policy, practice or custom of exonerating probation officers regarding complaints
18

of misconduct (id. ¶ 57), maintained a policy of failing to seek criminal prosecution of probation
officers who engage in unlawful behavior (id. ¶ 58), and should have instituted a training
program to instruct probation officers about the impropriety and illegality of sexual harassment
(id. ¶ 59).
All of the above allegations of wrongdoing leveled against Mahoning County
hinge on plaintiff’s assertion that “Defendant, Mahoning County, is the government entity or
political subdivision that by and through its agents, employees and contractors, is responsible for
the operation of the Mahoning County Juvenile Court and Mahoning County Juvenile Justice
Center located in Mahoning County, Ohio.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Moving defendants argue that “[t]his
‘factual’ allegation is nothing more than a blatant misstatement of Ohio law and should not be
entitled to an inference of truthfulness.” (Mot. at 91.) The Court agrees. As set forth more fully
above, the Ohio Constitution clearly provides that all supervisory responsibility for the Juvenile
Court falls to the Ohio Supreme Court, an arm of the State of Ohio. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(A).
The operation of the Justice Center, in turn, is entrusted to the superintendent, who is selected by
and responsible to, the Juvenile Court. Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.42; see also Oswald, 234 F.3d at
*2 (“Under Ohio law, a county juvenile detention center is part of the juvenile court, which is an
arm of the state.”) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.34). In light of this clear law demonstrating
that the actual operation of the Justice Center is tasked to the superintendent (and the juvenile
courts), the Court need not accept plaintiff’s unwarranted factual inference to the contrary. See
Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 696 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678); see also Jones v. Lucas Cnty. Sheriff’s Med. Dep’t, No. L-11-1196, 2012 WL 1075180, at
*2 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2012) (“legal conclusions couched as factual allegations do not need to be
19

accepted as true”) (citing Papasan v. Allian, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209
(1986)).
Because the Court cannot accept plaintiff’s unwarranted assertion that Mahoning
County is responsible for the operation of the Justice Center, all claims asserted against
Mahoning County as a result of the operation of the Justice Center fail as a matter of law.
Mahoning County is dismissed from this action.7
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, moving defendants’ motion for partial judgment
on the pleadings (Doc. No. 10) is converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for partial dismissal and is
granted. The claims against defendants DiBenardi and Holmes in their official capacities are
dismissed. Additionally, all claims against Mahoning County are dismissed. Plaintiff shall have
leave until February 2, 2016 to either move for default judgment against Holmes in his individual
capacity or voluntarily dismiss him from the lawsuit. In the event that plaintiff fails to move for
default judgment, Holmes shall be dismissed from this action without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2016
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7

Of course, plaintiff waived any challenge to moving defendants’ argument that Mahoning County was not
responsible for the operation of the Justice Center by failing to address this particular argument in her response brief.
See Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney Gen. Office, 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (A plaintiff must oppose a
defendant’s motion to dismiss or otherwise respond or he waives opposition to the motion); Resnick v. Patton, 258
F. App’x 789, 790-91 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007) (same).
20