Bey et al v. Meacham
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. # 6 ). This action is dismissed. An appeal from this decision may be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 4/27/16. (K,C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMILA YASMINE BEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RALPH T. MEACHAM,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 4:16 CV 744
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Jamila Yasmine Bey filed this action against Mahoning County Treasuer
Ralph T. Meacham on behalf of her herself as well as Ja’far Amir Bey, and Laurence James
Seldon-Bey. In the Complaint, Plaintiff purports to be a Moorish American National, denies that
she is a tax payer, and contends her Mahoning County home is not subject to property tax
because she declared it to be located on the “Allodial soils of the Moroccan Empire.” She seeks
an order enjoining the collection of future property taxes and reimbursement of taxes already
paid on the property.
I.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint is composed largely of incomprehensible rhetoric. She claims she is
a “natural person, not to be confused with individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association,
company or corporation and [is] NOT [a] taxpayer[ ]... .” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Rather, she
characterizes herself as a Moorish American National on the land under occupation by the
defacto government who violated the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. She contends she is not
subject to internal revenue tax and therefore cannot be considered a tax payer. Although her
property is located on Stocker Avenue in Youngstown, Ohio, she contends she has exempted it
from the City of Youngstown, the State of Ohio and the United States, and considers it to be part
of the Moroccan Empire. She therefore disputes that she is required to pay property taxes to
Mahoning County. She requests that this Court enjoin the collection of the property taxes, and
order the County to return all property taxes previously collected.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) on April 15, 2016 claiming Plaintiff’s
assertion of sovereignty is a frivolous attempt to avoid payment of real property taxes. He
contends there is no legal authority that exempts individuals claiming to be Moorish Americans
from payment of taxes. He asks this Court to dismiss this action with prejudice under Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).
II.
Standard of Review
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the Court must determine the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s claim. See
Mayer v. Mulod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.1993). See also, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (clarifying the legal standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–678 (2009) (same).
When determining whether a Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept
all factual allegations to be true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough facts to
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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A Plaintiff is not
required to prove, beyond a doubt, that the factual allegations in the Complaint entitle him to
relief, but must demonstrate that the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true.” Id. at 555. The
Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
The Supreme Court in Iqbal clarified the plausibility standard outlined in Twombly by
stating that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id.
Making this determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing Court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
For this analysis, a Court may look beyond the allegations contained in the Complaint to
exhibits attached to or otherwise incorporated in the Complaint, all without converting a Motion
to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c); Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108
F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir.1997).
III.
Analysis
As an initial matter, Jamila Yasmine Bey is not an attorney and cannot represent Ja’far
Amir Bey or Laurence James Seldon-Bey in court. In general, a party may plead and conduct his
or her case in person or through a licensed attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Eagle Associates v.
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Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991).1 An adult litigant who wishes to proceed
pro se must personally sign the Complaint to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
1654; Steelman v. Thomas, No. 87-6260, 1988 WL 54071 (6th Cir. May 26, 1988). Only Jamila
Yasmine Bey signed the Complaint. There is no indication that she is a licensed attorney, and
therefore her signature is not effective to bring the claims of Ja’far Amir Bey and Laurence James
Seldon-Bey before this Court. Consequently, only the claims pertaining to Jamila Yasmine Bey
are properly before this Court.
Plaintiff’s allegations of sovereign immunity are frivolous, based solely on creative, but
completely unfounded allegations. The United States has not recognized the Moorish Nation as a
sovereign state. See Sanders–Bey v. United States, 267 F. App’x 464, 466 (7th Cir.
2008)(describing the Moorish American Nation as a notorious organization of scofflaws who
attempt to benefit from the protections of federal and state law while simultaneously proclaiming
their independence from and total lack of responsibility under those same laws); Bey v. Am. Tax
Funding, No. 11 CV 6458 CJS, 2012 WL 1495368, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2012);
Hampton v. City of Durham, No. 110CV706, 2010 WL 3785538, at *2 3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22,
2010); Benton–El v. Odom, 2007 WL 1812615, at *6 (M.D.Ga. June 19, 2007); Osiris v. Brown,
2004 WL 2044904, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2005); Khattab El v. United States Justice Dept., 1988
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28 U.S.C. § 1654 provides:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as by the rules
of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and
conduct cases therein.
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WL 5117, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 22, 1981); We the People Beys and Els v. State of New York, 165
F.3d 16, 1998 WL 801875, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov.12, 1998) (unpublished opinion). Plaintiff cannot
unilaterally bestow sovereign immunity upon herself, and declare the property on which she
lives, which is located within the geographic borders of the United States, to be foreign soil. See
United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984). While she has informally renounced
her United States citizenship, it is of no importance to this matter. Those who voluntarily
relinquished their citizenship, like other aliens living in the United States are subject to and must
obey federal, state, and local laws, just as native-born and naturalized citizens are required to do.
See Bey v. Am. Tax Funding, No. 11 CV 6458 CJS, 2012 WL 1495368, at *6 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2012); Howell–El v. United States, 2006 WL 3076412, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct.27, 2006).
Her assertion that her property is not within the United States and not subject to property tax is
frivolous.
Furthermore, this Court cannot enjoin Mahoning County’s collection of property taxes.
The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341, states that a federal district court cannot “enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341. The
State of Ohio provides a remedy under Ohio Rev. Code § 2723.01, which states: “[c]ourts of
common pleas may enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes and assessments and entertain
actions to recover them when collected, without regard to the amount thereof, but no recovery
shall be had unless the action is brought within one year after the taxes or assessments are
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collected.” Even if Plaintiff had a non-frivolous objection to her property taxes, she could not
bring that claim in federal court.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) is granted, and this action
is dismissed. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: April 27, 2016
/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is
not taken in good faith.
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