Cook v. Chief U.S. Marshal, et al.

Filing 12

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this action without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. See Order for complete details. Judge John R. Adams on 08/01/2016. (M,TL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ALEX COOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHIEF U.S. MARSHAL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 4:16 CV 1529
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Alex Cook filed this Bivens1 action against the Elkton Federal
Correctional Institution Warden, the Chief United States Marshal in Cleveland, Ohio, and the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC) in
Grand Prairie, Texas. In his Complaint, he claimed the Bureau of Prisons had not given him
credit for pretrial detention, and did not properly calculate his good conduct time. He seeks
monetary damages exceeding one billion dollars. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That Court determined the District of
Columbia was not the proper venue for the action, and transferred it to the Northern District of
Ohio.

I.

Background
Plaintiff contends that the BOP is miscalculating the time he is required to serve. He

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Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

provides little information about the BOP’s calculations. He claims that if his Good Conduct
Time (“GCT”) is calculated correctly, he should be required to serve only 85% of his sentence;
however, the BOP’s calculations require him to serve 87% of his sentence. In addition, he
claims he spent 22 months under pretrial supervision, but the BOP did not give him credit for
this time. He does not clarify whether he was incarcerated at any time between the time of his
arrest, and the time he reported to the federal correctional institution to begin serving his
sentence. He contends the Defendants miscalculated his sentence, denied him due process, and
violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

II.

Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,

365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual
allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative
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level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more
than “an unadorned, the Defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must
construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

III.

Analysis
Although Plaintiff captions his pleading as a “Mixed Common Law and Equity

Complaint for Records Cancellation and Restoration of Personal Property,” the central theme of
his pleading is that his sentence is calculated incorrectly. When a prisoner challenges “the very
fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, ... his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
749 (2004)(per curiam).
Plaintiff cannot avoid the ruling in Prieser by seeking monetary damages instead of a
reduction in his sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). When a judgment in
favor of a Plaintiff in a civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence, the Complaint must be dismissed unless the Plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated on direct appeal or by a federal habeas
corpus action. Id. A judgment in this case would directly implicate the validity of the length his
current sentence. Plaintiff cannot pursue these claims in a civil rights action for damages.

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IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/John R. Adams
August 1, 2016

JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is
not taken in good faith.
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