Grzegorczky v. United States of America et al

Filing 4

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 1/11/17. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ZENON GRZEGORCZKY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Respondents.

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CASE NO. 4:16 CV 2654
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

On October 31, 2016, petitioner pro se Zenon Grzegorczky, an inmate at the Federal
Correctional Institution at Elkton (FCI Elkton), filed this action for writ of habeas under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. The petition and its attachments reflect that Grzegorczky was disciplined for
fighting and lost 27 days of good time credit. He asks this court to review the finding of the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) and remove the sanctions imposed on him.
Writs of habeas corpus “may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
Section 2241 “is an affirmative grant of power to federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to
prisoners being held ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”

Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 249 (6th Cir.2011) (quoting Section 2241).
A federal prisoner must challenge the legality of his conviction or sentence by filing a
post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the trial court. Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135
F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir.2003). A habeas corpus petition under § 2241 may be used by a federal
prisoner only to challenge the manner in which his sentence is being carried out, such as the
computation of sentence credits or parole eligibility. United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 894
(6th Cir.1999). Each of these statutes provide its own type of relief, and for this reason, they are
not interchangeable. Because the loss of good time credits affects the manner in which
Grzegorczky’s sentence is carried out, his petition is properly filed under § 2241.
This court's ability to review prison disciplinary proceedings is limited. District courts
have no authority to review a disciplinary committee's resolution of factual disputes, or to make
a redetermination of an inmate's innocence or guilt. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional
Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The only question for the court to determine is
whether the hearing complied with basic requirements needed to satisfy due process. This
standard is not a difficult one to meet. To comply with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause, prison officials need only provide a prisoner facing loss of good time credits with: (1) a
written notice of the charges at least 24 hours prior to any hearing, (2) an opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will
not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, and (3) a written statement
by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1972). Prisoners do not have a due process right of
confrontation and cross-examination, or a right to counsel, in prison disciplinary proceedings.

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Id. at 569–70.
Due process requires only that disciplinary findings resulting in the loss of good time
credits be supported by "some evidence" in the record. Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, 472 U.S. at 455. This standard is satisfied where "there is any evidence
in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Id. The DHO
is not required to base findings on overwhelming or irrefutable proof of guilt. Even where the
evidence is contradictory or partially exculpatory, a DHO may base a finding of guilt on only
"some evidence" that indicates the prisoner is guilty. Id. at 457.
There is no suggestion Grzegorczky was not afforded basic due process requirements.
Further, it is apparent on the face of the petition and attachments that the DHO had some
evidence to support a finding of guilt.
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: 1/11/17

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