United States of America v. Trumbull Metropolitan Housing Authority

Filing 75

Memorandum of Opinion and Order For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Supplemental Brief to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68 -1) is granted. The case is closed. A separate judgment entry will issue. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 5/17/2018. (JLG)

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TRUMBULL METROPOLITAN HOUSING
AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 4:17CV101

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER [Resolving ECF No. 68-1]

Pending is Defendants’ Supplemental Brief to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 56] Regarding Counts 1, 2, and 8 of Plaintiffs’ Intervening Complaint. ECF
No. 68-1. Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 73. Defendants replied. ECF
No. 74. For the reasons that follow, the motion (ECF No. 68-1) is granted.
I. Procedural Background
Defendants requested leave to file, instanter, a supplemental brief in support of their
pending motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 68. Defendants contend that the two-year
statute of limitations applicable in § 1983 cases
2305.10

Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) §

bars: (1) Counts One and Two, in which Plaintiffs allege that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Defendants deprived them of a hearing regarding Defendants’ October 2014 decision to
terminate their participation in the voucher program; and (2) Count Eight, in which Plaintiffs
allege that, Defendants violated the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§1437d,

(4:17CV101)
1437f, by terminating them from the Section 8 housing choice voucher program [in October
2014] without providing them with written notice of the opportunity to request an informal
hearing, of Plaintiffs’ Intervening Complaint. ECF Nos. 68-1;16. For good cause shown, the
Court granted Defendants’ motion for leave to file (ECF No. 68). See May 10, 2018 nondocument Order.
In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that Ohio’s four-year statute of limitations, O.R.C. §
2305.09(D), is the proper statute of limitations in § 1983 cases. ECF No. 73.
II. Law and Analysis
In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the Supreme
Court “directed federal courts to apply the single most analogous state personal injury statute of
limitations to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ross v. Ross, 1997 WL 693081, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1997). “In Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594
(1989), the Supreme Court further clarified that when a state has multiple statutes of limitations
for different categories of personal injury actions, the residual personal injury statute of
limitations applies.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 1997).
Following Wilson and Owens, the Sixth Circuit, in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th
Cir. 1989), held that the “limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Ohio is the two-year
period in Ohio Revised Code (“O.R.C.”) § 2305.10.” Id. Accordingly, since Browning, it is
well-settled that, O.R.C. § 2305.10 is the appropriate statute of limitations in § 1983 cases. See
Ross, 1997 WL 693081, at *1 (“Ohio’s two year statute of limitations contained in Ohio
Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 . . . is to be applied to civil rights claims arising in Ohio.”); LRL
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(4:17CV101)
Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
the Sixth Circuit “squarely addressed this issue in Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989 (6th
Cir.1989) (en banc), and definitively held that “the appropriate statute of limitations for 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions arising in Ohio ... requires that actions ... be filed within two
years after their accrual.”); Fuller v. Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth., 2007 WL 987309, at * 3
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2007) (citing Browning for the proposition that, “the statute of limitations for
filing a federal § 1983 claim is determined by state law; in Ohio, the period is two years”).
The Court finds Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 68-1) to be well-taken. Plaintiffs filed
their Intervening Complaint on March 27, 2017. ECF No. 16. It is undisputed that Counts One,
Two, and Eight, of Plaintiffs’ Intervening Complaint, are based on Defendants’ termination of
Plaintiffs’ housing voucher in October 2014. See ECF Nos. 68-1 at PageID#: 2316; 73 at
PageID#: 2474. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations
applicable to § 1983 claims, and therefore, dismissed. Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10; Browning v.
Pendleton, 869 F.2d at 992; Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(explaining that the Supreme Court in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987), addressed the use of § 1983 in
conjunction with the United States Housing Act, and found a private right of action in the
Housing Act); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
“Section 1983 is the proper means by which a public housing tenant may challenge the action of
a state public housing agency that violates the United States Housing Act.”).

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(4:17CV101)
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Supplemental Brief to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68-1) is granted.1 The case is closed. A separate judgment entry
will issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 17, 2018
Date

/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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On May 10, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ partial Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 56) as to Counts Three, Four, Five, Nine, Fourteen, and Fifteen.
ECF No. 70.
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