Miller v. Rural Metro
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2 ) is granted but, for the reasons stated above, his action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 12/15/2017. (JLG)
PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
RURAL METRO,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 4:17CV1103
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER [Resolving ECF No. 2]
Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF
No. 2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted but, for the
following reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed.
I. Background
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, d-6, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e against Defendant Rural Metro. ECF No. 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
he overdosed on opiates, and became ill while getting off an elevator in an apartment building.
Id. at PageID#: 1. Plaintiff alleges that an emergency medical service provider responded. Id.
Plaintiff contends that while he was regaining consciousness he heard a paramedic, who is
allegedly employed by Defendant, disclose the nature of his illness to a neighbor, who inquired
about Plaintiff’s condition. Id. at PageID#: 1–2. Plaintiff asserts that he felt ashamed when he
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heard the paramedic make this statement to his neighbor. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff indicates
that when he arrived at the emergency room, the same paramedic was disrespectful to him. Id.
Plaintiff became angry, confronted the paramedic and, as a result, the confrontation made him
feel more ashamed. Id. at PageID#: 2. At that point, Plaintiff left the emergency room. Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in the amount of $100,000.00 against Defendant, who allegedly
employs the paramedic who committed violations of HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VII.
Id.
II. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a
defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which
clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Furthermore, an action has no arguable factual
basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly
incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept
all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains “enough fact to state
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a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). The plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant acted unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
III. Analysis
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
finds that it fails to meet minimum pleading requirements or contain allegations reasonably
suggesting Plaintiff has a plausible federal civil rights claim in this case. In his Complaint,
Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his rights under HIPAA. ECF No. 1. The HIPAA
statute, however, does not provide a private right of action. HIPAA “focuses on regulating
persons that have access to individually identifiable medical information and who conduct
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certain electronic health care transactions.” Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1). Although HIPAA includes civil and criminal penalties for improper
disclosure of medical information, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, d-6, it “limits enforcement of the
statute to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.” Id.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must assert that a person acting
under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Plaintiff’s claim does not meet
either of these criteria. Generally, to be considered to have acted under color of state law,
Defendant must be a state or local government entity or official. See id. Plaintiff does not allege
facts suggesting Defendant is a government entity. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to identify a
constitutional right that was violated by Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met the basic
pleading requirements for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a viable claim under Title VII. Title VII
addresses discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Plaintiff’s action does not concern employment nor discrimination based
on any of the above-mentioned prohibited criteria. Accordingly, Title VII is not applicable to
this case.
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IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted but, for the
reasons stated above, his action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
December 15, 2017
Date
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