Glenn v. Mohr et al

Filing 22

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12 ) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13 ) is granted. The Court hereby grants plaintiff's request for a declaration that the grooming policies as applied to him, violate RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act). Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing such policies against plaintiff only. The Court takes no position on whether the dreadlock ban is enforceable with respect to other inmates. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan(C,KA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Deon S. Glenn,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 4:18 CV 436
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
12) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13). This case arises under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). For the reasons that follow,
defendants’ motion is DENIED and plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. The Court hereby grants
plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the grooming policies as applied to him violate RLUIPA.
Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing such policies against plaintiff only. The Court
takes no position on whether the dreadlock ban is enforceable with respect to other inmates.
1

FACTS
Plaintiff, Deon S. Glenn, brings this action against defendants, Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) Director Gary C. Mohr and Trumbull Correctional
Institution Warden Charmaine Bracy. Plaintiff alleges that the inmate grooming policy
maintained by defendants, which prohibits dreadlocks, violates RLUIPA.
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Plaintiff is incarcerated at Trumbull
Correctional Institute (“TCI”) where he is serving a lengthy sentence for murder and attempted
murder. (ECF 12-1 at ¶ 5). Plaintiff is a “level 3” security risk, which corresponds to an inmate
requiring “close security.” (Id.) Since his incarceration at TCI, plaintiff has received 28 “cases,”
which resulted in guilty findings with respect to 39 rule violations. (ECF 12-1 at ¶ 6). Plaintiff
received seven violations for possession of contraband and one “weapons” violation. Id.
Plaintiff is a practicing Rastafarian and has been since 2012. (ECF 13-6 at ¶ 2). One of
the tenets of his faith includes the Nazarite vow, which prohibits the cutting of hair. According
to his affidavit, Rastafarianism requires that “hair should grow and ‘lock’ naturally without being
cut.” (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff’s hair naturally grows in tight curls. As it gets longer, “the curls
naturally coil together to form dreadlocks.” (Id. at ¶ 5). Braids are not an acceptable alternative.
(Id. at ¶ 22). Currently, plaintiff’s dreadlocks are “thinner than a wooden pencil and only extend
about three inches from [his] scalp.1” Id. at ¶ 23. He uses soap and water to keep his hair clean.
(Id.).
Ohio Administrative Code § 5120-9-25(D) governs the appearance of male prisoners. It
1

Plaintiff, however, does not seek to limit his hair to this status.
Rather, he seeks to grow his dreadlocks to whatever length and
thickness they naturally attain.
2

provides as follows:
D) Haircuts shall be provided as needed. Hair shall be kept clean. Braids may be worn
subject to the limitations of this rule. The following hairstyles or facial hair are not
permitted: Initials, symbols, dyes, multiple parts, hair disproportionately longer in one
area than another (excluding natural baldness), weaves, and dreadlocks. Other hairstyles
not specifically listed herein may be prohibited if they are determined to be either a threat
to security or contrary to other legitimate penological concerns, as determined by the
office of prisons. If approved by the warden, an inmate may wear a wig for medical
reasons or in conjunction with medical treatment.
In addition to this policy, defendant does not dispute that a November 30, 2014
memorandum (“Memorandum”) drafted by TCI regarding hair care provides that there are “no
religious exemptions” for dreadlocks. The Memorandum further defines a dreadlock as “a
narrow ropelike strand of hair formed by matting that cannot be taken down easily or
combed/brushed through.”
According to plaintiff, he wore his hair in dreadlocks without incident until September of
2016, at which point TCI informed him that he would be required to cut his dreadlocks. Plaintiff
refused on the basis that cutting his hair violated his religion. Defendant then disciplined
plaintiff, including placing him in “the Hole,” where he was unable to sleep for several days in a
row. Ultimately, plaintiff conceded to have his dreadlocks cut in order to avoid further
discipline.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed this one count complaint alleging that the grooming policy
violates RLUIPA. The parties cross-move for summary judgment and each opposes the other’s
motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the

3

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©); see also LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376,
378 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden of showing the absence of any such genuine issues of material
facts rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits,” if any, which it believes demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©). A fact is “material only if its resolution
will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Accordingly, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence” to demonstrate
that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip
Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party may not simply rely on
its pleading, but must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by
a jury.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
The evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial

4

does not establish an essential element of his case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d
937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Moreover, if the evidence is “merely
colorable” and not “significantly probative,” the court may decide the legal issue and grant
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
“Congress enacted RLUIPA...in order to provide very broad protection for religious
liberty.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015)(citations and quotations omitted). RLUIPA
provides, in relevant part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates
that imposition of the burden on that person–
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
RLUIPA employs a burden shifting analysis. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of
establishing that the grooming policy implicates his religious exercise. Id. at 862. Plaintiff must
further show that grooming policy substantially burdens this exercise. Id. In the event plaintiff is
able to meet these initial burdens, the burden shifts to the government to show that its refusal to
allow plaintiff to maintain his hairstyle furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and is the
“least restrictive means” of furthering such interest. Id.
The Supreme Court held that RLUIPA “contemplates a...focused inquiry and requires the
Government to demonstrate that the compelling test is satisfied through application of the
5

challenged law ‘to the person’–the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.” Id. at 863. The statute further requires courts to “scrutinize the asserted
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants and to look to the
marginal interest in enforcing the challenged government action in that particular context.” Id.
(Emphasis added)(citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the Court finds that plaintiff satisfies his burden of demonstrating that the “antidreadlock” policy implicates his religious exercise. To satisfy this test, plaintiff must show that
plaintiff’s dreadlocks are the result of a “sincerely held religious belief.” Plaintiff offers his own
affidavit in which he avers that he is a practicing Rastafarian and has been since 2012. One of
the tenets of his faith includes the Nazarite vow, which prohibits the cutting of hair. According
to his affidavit, Rastafarianism requires that “hair should grow and ‘lock’ naturally without being
cut.” Plaintiff’s hair naturally grows in tight curls. In addition, plaintiff indicates that his
dreadlocks are an outward expression of his beliefs and carry a religious significance. In
response, defendants argue that the biblical passage cited by plaintiff in his brief does not
specifically require locked hair. Rather, it requires only that a follower maintain the length of his
hair. Defendants’ policy, however, does not require that plaintiff cut his hair. In other words,
defendants argue that plaintiff’s desire to maintain “locked” hair does not stem from a sincerely
held religious belief. The Court rejects this argument. Plaintiff’s belief that Rastafarianism
requires dreadlocks is well-supported both by his detailed affidavit on the subject, as well as at
least one bible verse he quotes. Defendants’ cite no evidence to the contrary.2 The Court finds
2

“Congress defined religious exercise...to include any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious beliefs.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853, 860
6

no genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
The Court further finds that defendants’ grooming policy substantially burdens plaintiff’s
religious exercise. Plaintiff indicates that he was required to choose between cutting (or
removing) his dreadlocks and, because he refused, he was subjected to significant discipline.
This is sufficient to satisfy plaintiff’s burden. See, Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 862 (“[I]f petitioner...grows
his beard, he will fact serious disciplinary action. Because the grooming policy puts petitioner to
this choice, it substantially burdens his religious exercise.”).
Thus, this Court must determine whether the grooming policy as applied to the plaintiff in
this case furthers a compelling governmental interest. If defendants are able to establish that the
policy serves a compelling governmental interest, the Court must determine whether the
grooming policy as applied to plaintiff is the least restrictive means of enforcing the compelling
interest.
The least-restrictive means standard is exceptionally demanding and it requires the
government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party. If a less
restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government
must use it.
Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 864. (citations and quotations omitted). The government bears the burden of
proof on this issue. The Court may consider the policies of other prisons in assessing whether the
challenged policy satisfies the least restrictive means standard. Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 866. Although
not controlling, the policies that other well-run institutions employ are relevant in determining
the need for a particular restriction. Although RLUIPA does not “require that a prison grant a
particular religious exemption as soon as a few other jurisdictions do so,” it does require that a

(2015)(internal quotations omitted).
7

prison adequately explain why it “believes that it must take a different course” than other
institutions have taken. Id.
Assuming arguendo that the policy at issue serves the compelling governmental interest
of prison safety and security,3 the Court finds that defendants fail, as a matter of law, to
demonstrate that the policies at issue are the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. In
support of their position, defendants offer testimony from the Managing Director of Operations
for ODRC. He avers as follows:
•

Staff cannot conduct a thorough search of an inmate’s dreadlocks by simply
having the inmate run his fingers through his own hair because “it is impossible to
see or feel inside matted coils or knotted ropes of hair” once hair has become
locked;

•

Requiring staff to conduct personal searches of dreadlocks increases the risk of
inmate-on-staff assault and increases tension between inmates and staff;

•

Staff dreadlock inspections expose staff to the risk of being cut by sharp objects
concealed in hair;

•

Metal detector searches of dreadlocks will not identify the presence of plastic
weapons or escape tools; nor will they detect contraband such as money or drugs;

3

Although defendants argue in passing that the dreadlock ban also
furthers their compelling interests in hygiene and preventing
disguise in the event of escape, the Court finds that defendants fail
to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists with
respect to these interests. Defendants simply fail to develop the
record sufficiently to allow the Court to find in defendants’ favor
as a matter of law. Moreover, defendants fail to establish that they
lack less restrictive means for achieving these goals.
8

•

Emergency transports increase the aforementioned risks because hair cannot be
quickly searched.

Giving defendants every benefit of the doubt, a careful review of this testimony
demonstrates that inmate and metal detector searches are not feasible means of searching
dreadlocks because these methods do not detect the presence of contraband. Therefore, this
evidence supports defendants’ position that a wholesale ban on dreadlocks is the “least restrictive
means.” With regard to staff searches of inmates’ hair, however, the affidavit simply avers that
risks are “increased.” Standing alone, this evidence does not speak to whether defendants’ antidreadlock policy is the least restrictive means. It simply notes that allowing dreadlocks increases
the risk associated with conducting staff searches of inmates’ dreadlocks. There is no indication,
however, that staff searches of hair increase risk more than staff searches of other parts of the
prisoner’s body.
Because the evidence speaks only of the risk in general terms, the Court will look to the
policies employed in other jurisdictions to determine whether those jurisdictions are able to
manage that risk.4 If so, these policies are strong evidence that Ohio’s wholesale ban on
4

The Court is aware of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hoevenaar v.
Lazaroff, 422 F.3d. 366 (6 th Cir. 2006), which reversed the district
court on the basis that it failed to give sufficient deference to prison
officials. Later, however, in Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554
(6th Cir. 2014), the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court for
deferring to the prison officials in light of the fact that the officials
did not consider the policies from other jurisdictions. In light of
Holt, it is not clear what level of deference courts must afford in
applying RLUIPA’s “exceptionally demanding” least restrictive
means test. What is clear from Holt and Haight, however, is that
the policies of other prisons are relevant to the least restrictive
means analysis and, if “so many” prisons are able to manage the
security concerns associated with accommodating religious
9

dreadlocks is not the least restrictive means of ensuring prison safety and security. According to
plaintiff, the majority of jurisdictions do not ban dreadlocks at all, let alone for all purposes.
Before comparing defendants’ policies to those of other jurisdictions, the Court must first
determine precisely what types of hairstyles Ohio bans. Defendants claim for the first time
during litigation that their policies ban only hair that “has become so matted and interlocked that
it cannot be undone and quickly or thoroughly searched.” (Doc. 14 at p.3). Simply put, this
narrower definition of “dreadlocks” appears nowhere in any ODRC or TCI policy. To the
contrary, the ODRC policy expressly prohibits all dreadlocks. The TCI policy prohibits “narrow
ropelike strand[s] of hair formed by matting that cannot be taken down easily or combed/brushed
through.5” And, in the affidavit provided by defendants in support of their briefing, defendants
indicate that dreadlocks are “interlocked coils of hair.” (Doc. 12-1 at ¶ 10). Neither the policies
nor the affidavit speaks to the searchability of the hair.6

requests, the defendant must be able to demonstrate why its prison
is different. For similar reasons, the Court does not find persuasive
the pre-Holt district court cases upholding dreadlock bans on
which defendants rely.
5

Defendants argue that the Court cannot consider the Memorandum
because TCI drafted it more than two years ago and, as such, a
Section 1983 claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.
As plaintiff points out, however, no such claim is pending in this
case. Moreover, there is no indication that this policy is not
currently in effect. Accordingly, the Court will apply TCI’s
interpretation of ODRC policy in its entirety in assessing plaintiff’s
RLUIPA claim.

6

Defendants’ affidavit provides that dreadlocks may be formed by
making braids, which are permitted, provided the braids “remain
unlocked, can be undone, and can be quickly and thoroughly
searched.”
10

Furthermore, there is no indication that the narrower definition defendants now offer is
the definition that Ms. Fisher, a cosmetologist, applied in determining that plaintiff’s hair did not
comply with OAC § 5120-9-25(D). (Doc. 13-6 at ¶7). Nor is it clear which definition
defendants relied on in determining that plaintiff is in violation of the grooming regulations.
Accordingly, defendants’ argument that only “unsearchable” dreadlocks are prohibited is simply
a post hoc rationalization made in an effort to narrow defendants’ policies. Such actions,
however, are disfavored in this Circuit, specifically in the context of RLUIPA. See, Haight v.
Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2014). Moreover, defendants present absolutely no
evidence suggesting that plaintiff’s hair “has become so matted and interlocked that it cannot be
undone and quickly or thoroughly searched.” Thus, even if this post hoc definition applied, there
is nothing to suggest that plaintiff’s hair meets this definition, as opposed to a generic dictionary
definition of “dreadlock.” Because ODRC’s policy expressly prohibits all “dreadlocks,” the
Court will look to whether other jurisdictions impose a complete ban in order to ensure prison
safety and security.
The Fifth Circuit recently addressed a case involving a prohibition on dreadlocks. In
Ware v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corrections, 866 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2017), the court determined that
the grooming policy, which prohibited dreadlocks, was not the “least restrictive means” of
achieving its stated objective. At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence that 39 other
jurisdictions, including the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, would either outright allow dreadlocks or
afford plaintiff the opportunity to apply for a religious accommodation. Only six jurisdictions
would not permit dreadlocks under any circumstance. The court noted that the defendant failed
to offer sufficient evidence indicating that it was in a “unique” position compared to the vast
11

majority of jurisdictions that either allowed dreadlocks or offered a procedure for obtaining a
religious accommodation. In all, the defendant failed to offer persuasive reasons why it believed
that it had to take a course different than “so many prisons.” As such, defendant’s policy was not
the least restrictive means. Ultimately, the court of appeals entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff.
Upon review, the Court finds this case to be virtually indistinguishable from Ware.
Although defendants point out that certain policies relied on by the Ware court are in actuality
less restrictive than the court indicated, the fact remains that the vast majority of policies are in
fact less restrictive that the ones at issue in this case. Some states expressly allow dreadlocks,
i.e., California, New York, and Oregon. Defendants argue that those polices, however, would
not allow “unsearchable hair.” Maybe so. But, again, Ohio’s policy is not written in those terms.
By way of example, New York’s policy provides as follows:
The dreadlock hairstyle is allowed. When worn, dreadlocks must extend naturally from
the scalp and may not be woven, twisted, or braided together forming pockets than cannot
be effectively searched.
Thus, New York’s policy allows dreadlocks provided the hair has not become “woven,
twisted, or braided together forming pockets that cannot be effectively searched.” Generally
speaking, dreadlocks are allowed with certain exceptions. Although New York may prohibit
certain types of dreadlocks, its policies do not amount to a wholesale dreadlock ban.
Defendants correctly note that a handful of policies ban dreadlocks under all
circumstances. The vast majority of policies, however, do not expressly address dreadlocks at
all. Rather, those policies permit freedom in hairstyle provided hygiene and/or security concerns

12

are met. Some are understandably directed at searchability.7 Nothing on the face of those
policies, however, indicates that these prisons would ban all dreadlocks. Defendants argue that
these polices “generally” reserve the right of the prison to prohibit “unsearchable” hair. But this
is precisely the reason they are less restrictive. Pursuant to these policies, some dreadlocks may
pass muster while others may not. See, Holmes v. Engleson, 2017 WL 3421499 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
9, 2017)(noting that policy allowing freedom in hair length provided hair does not create a
security risk resulted in prison with some inmates wearing dreadlocks while those whose
dreadlocks posed a security risk could not). Regardless, the policies require the prison to analyze
each prisoner to determine whether a particular hairstyle is allowed. There is no indication that
defendants conducted any particularized inquiry in this matter. This is so because ODRC’s
policy bans all dreadlocks and TCI’s policy expressly prohibits inmates from applying for a
religious exemption. As such, while the Court acknowledges that all states have security
interests in the searchability of inmates’ hair, the Court wholly agrees with the Ware court’s
conclusion that the vast majority of states have less restrictive means of enforcing those interests.
There is simply no evidence that any defendant concluded that plaintiff’s hair is not capable of
being searched or otherwise creates a risk to prison safety or security. In fact, there is no
7

Defendants note in their brief in opposition that “at least 31
jurisdictions prohibit inmates from wearing hair styles that are not
searchable regardless of the inmate’s religious beliefs.” This may
be true and the Court is by no means suggesting that a prison must
allow “unsearchable hair” as a religious accommodation.
Defendants’ logic, however, is misguided because ODRC’s policy
is not directed at searchability. Rather, it simply prohibits all
“dreadlocks.” Defendants offer no evidence that all of these
jurisdictions would consider each and every prisoner wearing
dreadlocks to have “unsearchable” hair. And, on the face of the
policies, these jurisdictions do no such thing.
13

indication that any employee even conducted any such assessment before determining that
plaintiff cannot wear the hairstyle he seeks.8 Thus, the majority of the policies relied on by
defendants are not helpful because they require prison staff to assess a particular inmate’s hair
and are, therefore, less restrictive means.
Defendants argue that their policies are functionally no different because they simply
“pre-identify” hairstyles that cause security risks. This Court disagrees. Once again, the Court
notes that defendants’ current definition, i.e., “hair that has become so matted and interlocked
that it cannot be undone and quickly or thoroughly searched,” is not the definition set forth in the
policies. Rather, the ODRC ban applies simply to “dreadlocks.” Thus, the Court cannot say that
ODRC’s policy is “functionally equivalent” to those of states maintaining general grooming
policies subject to hygiene and security concerns. Even TCI’s arguably narrower definition, i.e.,
narrow ropelike strand[s] of hair formed by matting that cannot be taken down easily or
combed/brushed through,” is not directed at searchability and expressly prevents a prisoner from
applying for a religious exemption. Defendants’ policies are undoubtedly more restrictive than
the majority of the policies from the jurisdictions that address hairstyle and security on a case-bycase basis.
The Court is mindful of the difficulties faced by prison staff and is aware that prisons are
unique institutions with serious safety concerns. Nor does the Court mean to suggest that
defendants cannot ban unsearchable hair. The problem defendants now face, however, is that the

8

Defendants note that plaintiff is the subject of a number of
contraband violations and one weapons violation. Defendants do
not suggest, however, that they considered these facts in denying
plaintiff the ability to wear dreadlocks.
14

policies before the Court are not so drafted. These policies are much more restrictive than those
of the vast majority of other states. And “in the face of evidence that many prisons offer an
accommodation, a prison must, at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes it must
take a different course.” Ohio has not done so in this case.9 As such, the Court finds that
because the vast majority of jurisdictions are able to manage the risk associated with dreadlocks
short of a complete ban, defendants’ policies as applied to plaintiff are not the least restrictive
means as a matter of law.
Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor. The
Court hereby grants plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the grooming policies as applied to
him, violate RLUIPA. Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing such policies against
plaintiff.10
The Court, however, declines plaintiff’s request to grant relief to prisoners not before this
Court. Plaintiff filed this statutory claim on behalf of himself alone. In analyzing RLUIPA
claims, this Court must conduct an individualized inquiry and assess whether defendants’

9

Defendants provide evidence that, at one unidentified point in time,
a shank was discovered in a prisoner’s dreadlocks. As defendants’
own citations point out, however, contraband has been located in
dreadlocks and/or hair in other jurisdictions as well. Therefore,
this one isolated incident does not make Ohio unique.

10

In addition to demonstrating success on the merits, the Court finds
that plaintiff demonstrates that he has no adequate remedy at law in
that defendants’ policies create an undue burden on his religious
freedom. In addition, the Court finds that the public interest is
served by enforcing the rights afforded under RLUIPA. An undue
hardship on defendants will not be created because less restrictive
means are available for enforcing their interest in maintaining
prison security.
15

application of the grooming policies to plaintiff furthers a compelling governmental interest and
is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. See, e.g., Holt, 135 S.Ct. 853, 863
(2015)(RLUIPA requires a “more focused” inquiry and courts must look to whether it is proper
to grant a religious exemption in the “particular context”); Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975 (11 th
Cir. 2017)(“Holt calls for an individualized, context-specific inquiry.”). As such, the Court
cannot grant relief with respect to claimants not before it.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) is
DENIED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is GRANTED. The Court
hereby grants plaintiff’s request for a declaration that the grooming policies as applied to him,
violate RLUIPA. Defendants are hereby enjoined from enforcing such policies against plaintiff
only. The Court takes no position on whether the dreadlock ban is enforceable with respect to
other inmates.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Chief Judge

Date: May 14, 2018

16