Burley v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 16

Memorandum Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED, the Report and Recommendation is ACCEPTED, and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. This case is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Judge Bridget Meehan Brennan on 3/27/2024. (H,AR)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARIAH SHALANE BURLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 4:23-cv-00218
JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Jennifer Dowell Armstrong (“R&R”) (Doc. No. 12) recommending that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. Plaintiff filed her objections (Doc. No. 13) and Defendant
filed a response (Doc. No. 15). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s objections are
OVERRULED, the R&R is ACCEPTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
I. Background
On May 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits
(“SSI’) and Disability Income Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. No. 6 at 95-96, 203, 210.)1 This claim
was denied both upon initial consideration and reconsideration. (Id. at 132-42, 151-56.) Plaintiff
filed a Request for a Hearing, which was granted. (Id. at 140, 181.) On May 3, 2022, the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held Plaintiff’s requested hearing. (Id. at 58-66.) The ALJ
ruled against Plaintiff on May 23, 2022. (Id. at 40-51.) The Appeals Council declined to review
Plaintiff’s case on December 6, 2022. (Id. at 20.)

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For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document
and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
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Plaintiff timely commenced this action on February 5, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 15,
2023, Plaintiff filed her brief on the merits. (Doc. No. 7.) On July 21, 2023, Defendant filed its
brief on the merits. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff replied on August 5, 2023. (Doc. No. 11.) On
December 20, 2023, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R. (Doc. No. 12.) Plaintiff timely filed
her objections on January 3, 2024, (Doc. No. 14), to which Defendant responded (Doc. No. 15.)
II. Standard of Review
A district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)
(flush language); see Powell v. United States, 37 F.3d 1499 (Table), 1994 WL 532926, at *1 (6th
Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (“Any report and recommendation by a magistrate judge that is dispositive
of a claim or defense of a party shall be subject to de novo review by the district court in light of
specific objections filed by any party.”) (citations omitted). “A judge of the court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (flush language).
For present purposes, the Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
The impairment must prevent the claimant from doing the claimant’s previous work, as well as
any other work which exists in significant numbers in the region where the individual lives or in
several regions of the country. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In making a disability determination,
an ALJ engages in a five-step sequential evaluation:
1. If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled.

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2. If the claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity, her impairment must be
severe before she can found to be disabled. To be severe, the claimant must
have a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment, or a
combination of impairments, that must have lasted or be expected to last for at
least 12 months, unless it is expected to result in death.
3. If the claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity and is suffering from a
severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and her impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404, the claimant is presumed
disabled without further inquiry.
4. If the impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity and use it to determine if the
claimant’s impairment process prevents her from doing past relevant work. If
the claimant’s impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant
work, she is not disabled.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, she is not disabled if,
based on her vocational factors and residual functional capacity, she is capable
of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Quisenberry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 757 F. App’x
422, 426 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir.
1997)). During the first four steps, the claimant has the burden of proof. Walters, 127 F.3d at
529. The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Id.
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d
847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than
a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” McGlothin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 299 F. App’x 516, 521 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citation omitted)).
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If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding that the claimant is not
disabled, that finding must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter
differently. Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted). A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide
questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed even if the claimant’s position is also supported
by substantial evidence. Wallace v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 221 F.3d 1337 (Table), 2000 WL
799749, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230,
11233 (6th Cir. 1993)).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff raises two objections to the R&R.2 (Doc. No. 13 at 544.) The first challenges
whether the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff was limited to occasional interaction, not
superficial action. (Id.) The second challenges whether the ALJ properly excluded a limitation
requiring Plaintiff to have supervisory support. (Id. at 545.) Plaintiff says that because the ALJ
erred his treatment of these two limitations, the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by
substantial evidence. (Id.) As such, Plaintiff argues that the R&R’s findings to the contrary are
“harmful error” requiring remand. (Id.)
An ”ALJ is not required to discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s failure to cite
to specific evidence does not indicate that it was not considered.” Simmons v. Barnhart, 114 F.

Although Plaintiff brings two substantive objections, Plaintiff’s brief lists them under one
heading. (Doc. No. 13 at 544.) The Court reminds Plaintiff of its directives in its Initial Order,
which states that the parties’ arguments “shall be preceded by headings identifying the claimed
errors.” (Doc. No. 5 at 14.) The Court also notes the R&R’s footnote about this recurrent issue.
(Doc. No. 12 at 526.)
2

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App’x 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000)). The
key for the Court’s review is whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
A. Record before the ALJ
In May 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI and DIB, claiming she was disabled
due to morbid obesity, asthma, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. (Doc.
No. 6 at 43.) She says that she stopped working on December 11, 2020, because of her
conditions. (Id. at 236.)
Between April 2020 and March 2022, Plaintiff received mental health treatment through
virtual psychotherapy sessions with a counselor and medication management appointments. (Id.
at 344-421, 427-56.) The Court notes the thorough summaries of this evidence in the ALJ’s
decision (Doc. No. 6 at 46-48) and the R&R (Doc. No. 12 at 514-17.) Over that two-year period,
Plaintiff’s anxiety fluctuated, often due to external stressors. (Doc. No. 6 at 358, 365, 428, 431,
450.) Plaintiff did not take her medication consistently, although when she did take it, she felt
better and her mood improved. (Id. at 353, 358, 431.) Subsequent adjustments to her medication
management helped her mood further, as did lifestyle changes. (Id. at 397, 408, 431.) Plaintiff
continued to struggle with focus, concentration, and anxiety, which she worked to address with
her therapist. (Id. at 414, 450.) Treatment notes indicated that Plaintiff’s mental health was
adequately managed with outpatient therapy and medication. She was able to enjoy family
holidays, live with other people, and appeared alert and receptive at appointments.
On January 11, 2021, Lindsey Hoppel, N.P., completed a Mental Impairment
Questionnaire of Plaintiff, which consisted of a check-box survey rating the severity of
Plaintiff’s limitations in sustained concentration and persistence, understanding and memory,
social interaction, and adaption. (Id. at 457-58.) Nurse Hoppel opined that Plaintiff was

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severely limited, but not precluded3 in sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision,
interacting appropriately with the general public, getting along with coworkers or peers without
districting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, maintaining socially appropriate behavior,
and adhering to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. (Id.) Hoppel indicated that Plaintiff
was unable to meet competitive standards4 in accepting interactions and responding
appropriately from criticism with supervisors. (Id. at 458.)
On July 9, 2021, at the state agency’s request, Plaintiff underwent a consultative
psychological evaluation by Kenneth Gruenfeld, Psy.D. (Id. at 336-42.) Regarding Plaintiff’s
capacity to respond appropriately to supervision and to coworkers in a work setting, Dr.
Gruenfeld opined that Plaintiff “should be able to effectively work with others but will struggle
during times of high anxiety.” (Id. at 340-41.)
In August 2021, Aracelis Rivera, Ph.D., a state agency consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s
record at the initial level of consideration. (Id. at 97-105.) Dr. Rivera opined that Plaintiff had
no social interaction limitations. (Id. at 103.)
In November 2021, Cindy Matyi, Ph.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s record at the reconsideration
level. (Id. at 116-23.) Dr. Matyi opined that Plaintiff require a “relatively isolated workstation
and supervisory support when first learning job tasks” and that Plaintiff could “relate adequately

The form defines “seriously limited, but not precluded” as the “ability to function in this area is
less than satisfactory, but not precluded in all circumstances.” (Doc. No. 6 at 457.) The form
explained that the individual would be limited in their ability to perform the specific activity
15% of the time. (Id.)
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The form defines “unable to meet competitive standards” as “[the] patient cannot satisfactorily
perform th[e] activity independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis in a
regular work setting.” (Doc. No. 6 at 457.)
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on a superficial basis in an environment that entails infrequent public contact, minimal
interaction with coworkers, and no over-the-shoulder supervisor scrutiny.” (Id. at 121.)
At the administrative hearing in May 2022, Plaintiff testified as to her medical and
mental conditions, personal history, and previous employment (Id. at 56-77.) A vocational
expert also testified at the hearing, opining that Plaintiff could not perform her past work, but
would be able to perform jobs like laundry laborer or candy factory helper. (Id. at 79-84.)
B. ALJ’s Conclusion
Based on the record, the ALJ made several findings. Specifically, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2020.” (Id. at
42.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of morbid obesity, asthma, depressive
disorder, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. (Id. at 43.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
“does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix I.” (Id.)
After reviewing Plaintiff’s medical record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 4041.1567(c) and
416.967(c)” with certain additional limitations. (Id. at 45.) Relevant here is the limitation found
by the ALJ that Plaintiff’s work must “be limited to occasional contact with coworkers and
supervisors. The claimant is capable of changes in the work environment, meaning changes in
work responsibilities or workplace, which are explained in advice of implementation and
implemented gradually over time.” (Id.)
In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered prior medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings in accordance with 20 CFR 404.1520c and 416.920c. The ALJ’s
discussion of the state agency consultants is as follows:

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“The undersigned has also considered the assessments of the State agency
consultants, which they supported with review of the claimant’s medical evidence
of record. Exhibits 3A, 4A, 6A, and 8A. While the assessments of the State agency
consultants were not entirely consistent, both opined the claimant has no more than
moderate “paragraph B” limitations throughout. At the initial level, the State
agency consultant opined the claimant had no limitations in her ability [to]
understand, remember, or apply information and in her ability to interact with
others and moderate limitations in her ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace and ability to adapt or manage oneself. Upon reconsideration, the State
agency consultant opined the claimant had moderate “paragraph B” limitations
throughout. The assessments of the State agency consultants, finding the claimant
had no more than moderate limitations, is consistent with the claimant’s treatment
records that indicate the claimant required no more than conservative mental health
treatment throughout. Additionally, the claimant reported improvement in her
conditions with medication. While the claimant has had some exacerbation of
symptoms, her treatment records indicate that with medication management the
depression and anxiety were generally ‘stable’ and that she was ‘doing very
well.’ Accordingly, the undersigned finds the assessments of the State agency
consultants were persuasive.”
(Id. at 49.)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, and jobs exist
in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform (id. at 49-50.) The ALJ
also determined that Plaintiff was between 18 and 49 years old with at least a high school
education. (Id.) Because the ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined
by the Social Security Act, transferability was not an issue. (Id. at 50-51.)
C. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
The R&R noted that its “review ‘is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.”
(Doc. No. 12 at 518 (quoting Olive v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No 3:06 CV 1587, 2007 WL
5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007).) Next, the R&R stated the five-step process that
ALJs must use to determine whether a claimant is entitled to SSI or disability insurance benefits.
(Id. at 520.) The R&R detailed and evaluated Plaintiff’s challenges to the Commissioner’s

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determination before concluding that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
(Id. at 520-41.)
Specifically, Plaintiff raised the following issues on appeal: “(1) [t]he ALJ erred when he
failed to evaluate the opinion of the treating source in accordance with 20 CFR 404.1520c and
416.920c; [and] (2) [t]he ALJ committed harmful error when he failed to properly apply the
criteria of Social Security Ruling 16-3pm and failed to find that the intensity, persistence, and
limiting efforts of the totality of Plaintiff’s symptoms precluded her from performing substantial
gainful activity on a full-time and sustained basis.” (Doc. No. 7 at 459.) The Magistrate Judge
also noted that “[a]lthough not identified by her assignment of error headings, [Plaintiff] raises [a
third] argument”—that the ALJ erred in concluding that the state agency consultants’ findings
for supervisory support and social interaction were persuasive, and then failing to incorporate
those limitations into the RFC findings. (Id. at 526-27.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s first issue on appeal, the R&R found that although Plaintiff
identified “aspects of the treatment notes that she argues may lead towards a different
conclusion, the ALJ offered ample reasoning when articulating why” that opinion “was not
supported by or consistent with the medical record,” and so complied with the regulations. (Id.
at 525.) In response to Plaintiff’s second challenge, the R&R concluded that “the ALJ’s
decision here reflects that he followed SSR 16-30’s procedure” and that Plaintiff’s arguments
amounted to her asking the Court to improperly reweigh evidence. (Id. at 536, 540.) Lastly, in
response to Plaintiff’s third unlabeled assignment of error, the R&R concluded that Plaintiff
“does not establish how the ALJ did not accommodate for the limitations that the state agency
consultant assessed.” (Id. at 529.) “[R]eading the decision as a whole and with common sense,

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the ALJ articulated substantial evidence supporting his conclusion,” which was contrary to
Plaintiff’s preferred conclusion. (Id. at 525.)
In sum, the R&R recommended that the Court overrule Plaintiff’s objection and affirm
the Commissioner’s decision. (Id. at 541.)
D. De Novo Review
In her objection to the R&R, Plaintiff claims that the R&R erred in finding that (1) the
ALJ properly found that she was limited to occasional, rather than superficial, interaction; and
(2) the ALJ did not err by omitting discussion of special supervisory support were not supported
by the record. (See Doc. No. 13 at 544-45.) Although presented under one heading, the Court
addresses these two distinct objections separately.
1. Separate Versus Occasional Interaction
Plaintiff argues that the R&R erred by finding that the ALJ properly found that she
required only superficial interactions with others. (Id. at 544.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
the ALJ’s limitation of “occasional” interactions was not supported by substantial evidence, as
the state agency consultant limited her to “superficial.” (Id.) Plaintiff cites to Hutton v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-339, 2020 WL 3866855, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2020), and Metz v.
Kijakzai, No. 1:20-cv-2202, 2022 WL 4465699, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2022) for the
proposition that occasional and superficial interaction are substantively different. (Id.) Because
of the difference between occasional and superficial interaction, Plaintiff says, the state agency
consultant placed a greater restriction on her than the ALJ set forth in the RFC, requiring
remand.
In Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth
Circuit examined whether an ALJ gave appropriate weight to psychologists’ evaluation that a
plaintiff was able to relate on a “superficial basis” when the ALJ limited the plaintiff to
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“occasional interaction.” The Sixth Circuit found that the “occasional” limitation in the RFC
was “not inconsistent” with the psychologists’ “superficial” limitation, and that “[e]ven when an
ALJ provides ‘great weight’ to an opinion, there is no recommendation that an ALJ adopt a state
agency psychologist’s opinions verbatim; nor is the ALJ required to adopt the state agency
psychologist’s limitations wholesale.” Id. (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has not revisited “occasional” versus “superficial” since its unpublished
opinion in Reeves. Plaintiff cites to Hutton, 2020 WL 3866855, at *4, a Southern District of
Ohio case that adopts a “fixed vocational definition of ‘superficial’ interactions . . . , which [] is
presumed to be qualitatively inconsistent with ‘occasional’ interactions.” See Stephen D. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-cv-00746, 2023 WL 4991918, at *7 (S.D. Ohio. Aug 4, 2023)
(gathering cases). Southern District of Ohio courts agree that “’superficial’ is readily
understood . . . to refer to the ‘quality’ of social interaction, while the term ‘occasional’ describes
only the ‘quantity’ of ‘social interaction.’” Id. (citing Hutton, 2020 WL 3866855, at *4-5).
The Court declines to adopt our sister District’s approach distinguishing superficial and
occasional interaction. Courts in this District have noted that “there is no definition for the term
‘superficial interaction’ in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:22-CV-02272, 2023 WL 8283922, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2023) (citations
omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 8281461 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2023).
See also James v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-1915, 2023 WL 4172932, at *20 (N.D.
Ohio June 5, 2023) (noting no supporting authority for a specialized definition of “superficial
interaction”).5 Plaintiff points to no binding legal authority that imposes such a distinction.

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Plaintiff’s citation to Metz does not persuade the Court otherwise. In Metz, the court reasoned
that even though the ALJ limited to the plaintiff to “superficial,” rather than “brief” interactions,
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Moreover, even when an ALJ finds a medical opinion persuasive, as the ALJ did here
with the state agency consultant opinion, there is no requirement that the ALJ adopt that opinion
verbatim. See Reeves, 618 F. App’x at 275. “The more relevant inquiry is whether the facts in
this case demonstrate that the RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence.”
Johnson, 2023 WL 8283922, at *1 (citing Daniels v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-02946,
2020 WL 6913490, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2020).
Here, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how the ALJ’s limitation of “occasional” interaction
was not supported by substantial evidence. In considering the record, the ALJ noted that
although the Plaintiff alleges that she has difficulty engaging in social activities, she can shop,
spend time socially with others, and live with others. (Doc. No. 6 at 44.) The ALJ also noted
that the consultative examination showed that the Plaintiff was able to consistently remain on
topic, elaborate when requested, and did not appear nervous during her evaluation. (Id.) During
Plaintiff’s psychotherapy appointments, she consistently appeared alert, receptive, and engaged,
despite her mood and anxiety. These findings support a limitation of occasional interaction with
others.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment of an RFC with a limitation to “occasional
interaction” with supervisors and coworkers is supported by substantial evidence.
2. Supervisory Support Limitation
Plaintiff also argues that that the R&R erred by finding that the ALJ was not required to
include a supervisory support limitation in the RFC. (Id. at 545.) Specifically, Plaintiff takes

as recommended by the state agency psychologists, there was no prejudice. Metz, 2022 WL
4465699 at *9.
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issue with the R&R’s finding that only one medical opinion, Dr. Matyi’s, assessed this limitation
and says that Nurse Hoppel also determined that she would need special supervision.
Plaintiff’s arguments are not well-taken. Plaintiff refers to her January 11, 2021
evaluation by Nurse Hoppel, as the second medical opinion that supports a supervisory support
limitation. In the record is Nurse Hoppel’s Mental Impairment Questionnaire, where Hoppel
checked off that Plaintiff is unable to meet competitive standards in “[a]ccept[ing] instructions
and respond[ing] appropriately to criticism from supervisors.” (Id. at 457-58.) The ALJ found
that this evaluation provided “limited support for the assessed limitation, generally completing a
simple check box form with the only other notations being a list of the claimant’s diagnoses,
medications, and medication side effects.” (Id. at 49.) Because of this, the ALJ determined that
the severity of the limitations assessed by Hoppel were unpersuasive and that the limitations
were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s treatment history. (Id.)
Given that the ALJ was not persuaded by Nurse Hoppel’s limitations, it is reasonable that
the ALJ did not adopt Hoppel’s opinion when considering the RFC. And this Court may not
“review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, nor weigh the evidence” and find
that Hoppel’s limitations are so persuasive as to require verbatim incorporation in the RFC. Van
Winkle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 29 F. App’x 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Brainard v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989)).6

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Plaintiff’s citation to Kreze v. Berryhill, Case No. 1:17-cv-01254, 2018 WL 3045097, at *8
(N.D. Ohio June 7, 2018) is not persuasive. Plaintiff argues that because here, like in Kreze, two
medical opinions gave her a supervisory support limitation, the ALJ’s failure to include that
limitation was harmful error. However, in Kreze, the ALJ gave significant weight to the two
medical experts’ opinions, finding them consistent with the record as a whole. Here, the ALJ
found Hoppel’s limitations unpersuasive and not supported by the record as a whole.
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Further, the ALJ’s omission of the supervisory support limitation is reasonable, given the
record evidence. In finding the state agency consultants’ opinion persuasive, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had only moderate limitations on her ability to understand, remember,
or apply information, in concentrating generally, focusing generally, and completing tasks. (Id.)
The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was capable of tolerating changes in the workplace, as long as
they are explained in advance and implemented gradually. (Id. at 45.) Although one state
agency consultant used the term “supervisory support,” again, the ALJ was not required to adopt
this limitation verbatim. See Reeves, 618 F. App’x at 275
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that the
recommendations in the R&R are supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED, the R&R is
ACCEPTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. This case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 27, 2024

_________________________________
BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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