Kraynack-Simon v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 13

Memorandum Opinion and Order. For the reasons stated, the 10 Report and Recommendation is not accepted. Finding no error in the Commissioner's underlying determination, the decision of the Commissioner, therefore, is AFFIRMED. Judge David A. Ruiz on 9/24/2024. (G,CA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

THERESA KRAYNACK-SIMON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

CASE NO. 4:23-CV-00835
JUDGE DAVID A. RUIZ
MAGISTRATE JUDGE ARMSTRONG

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant Commissioner’s objection (R. 11) to the Report and
Recommendation (R&R) of Magistrate Judge Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong (R.10) which
recommends that the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits to Plaintiff Theresa KraynackSimon be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Plaintiff has replied to the
objection. R. 12. For the following reasons, the R&R is not accepted, and the decision of the
Commissioner is affirmed.
FACTS
The sole issue here is whether the R&R erred by finding that the ALJ failed to identify
substantial evidence to support a finding of residual functional capacity (RFC) 1 with no mental
limitations. R. 11, Page ID # 998.

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A claimant’s residual functional capacity is defined as “the maximum degree to which the
individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physical-mental requirements of
jobs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, §200.00 (c).
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Initially, the relevant portion of the factual record cited in the R&R and developed
before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) shows that the claimant, Theresa Kraynack-Simon,
born in 1961, testified that she has been treated for mental health conditions for many years, and
that despite taking prescribed medication and receiving regular treatment from both a
psychologist and a psychiatrist, she can no longer work, walk for more than ten minutes nor
care for herself, but instead naps or spends time online. R. 10 (R&R), Page ID # 977-78.
Dr. Ronald Lewellyn, Ph.D., the claimant’s psychologist, testified during the underlying
administrative hearing before the ALJ (id., Page ID#: 978) and submitted medical opinion
letters in February and September of 2021 (id., Page ID#: 981-82). His opinion was that the
claimant has multiple psychological conditions such as PTSD, general anxiety disorder and
bipolar II disorder, and that these conditions manifest themselves as poor memory, poor
concentration, poor focus, inability to follow through with basic instructions and a persistent
depressed mood and affect. Id. Dr Lewellyn’s treatment records document both mental status
findings of some mood and affect abnormalities along with evidence that the claimant did not
present a disheveled or unkempt appearance, did not have poor hygiene, did not display
confusion, short-term or remote memory loss or other cognitive abnormalities, but was fully
oriented. Id., Page ID#: 983.
These findings were consistent with earlier mental status examinations in 2020 that
showed normal speech, coherent and logical thought, stable appetite, and normal sleep. Id.
Similar normal mental status report findings were documented at exams occurring in March,
August and November of 2021. Id. While there was some worsening of panic attacks and
anxiety in early 2022, the claimant’s mental status examination findings “returned to normal” a
few months later. Id.
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A psychological consultative examination in 2021, conducted by Dr. Kenneth
Gruenfeld, Ph.D., concluded, inter alia, that although Plaintiff’s appearance and cognition were
normal, she might have problems with focus, concentration, completion of complex tasks and
interaction with supervisors if she were stressed or her PTSD symptoms were triggered. Id.,
Page ID#: 980-81.
Dr. Carl Tishler, Ph.D. performed the initial state agency review of the record relevant
to Plaintiff’s mental symptoms, in 2021, and found that all of Plaintiff’s mental symptoms were
“mild” under the paragraph B criteria of section 12.04 and 12.15 of the ratings, and that the
functional opinion of the consultative examiner “overstated” Plaintiff’s mental limitations and
was not supported by the totality of the evidence. R. 5, Page ID#: 108-09. Similarly, a
reconsideration of that state agency determination later that same year by Courtney Zeune,
Ph.D., found that the initial finding of the state agency reviewer, stated above, was “supported
by evidence, no changes have been made on recon[sideration].” Id., Page ID#: 116. Further, the
state agency reviewers explicitly found that no mental residual functional capacity elements
were required in the RFC. Id. Page ID#: 110.
From this, the ALJ determined at Step Two of the sequential evaluation process that
Plaintiff had mild mental limitations but did not find that these limitations were a severe
impairment. Id., Page ID#: 985.
The ALJ considered the opinion evidence in fashioning the RFC and found unpersuasive
the opinions from Dr. Lewellyn and Dr. Gruenfeld. Id., Page ID#: 992. To that end, the ALJ
reasoned that “[t]he opinions were inconsistent with the medical record as a whole,” which
included “plaintiff’s positive response to her counseling sessions at [sic] psychotropic
medications, without evidence of psychiatric hospitalizations in the record, and her mostly
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unremarkable reported symptoms to providers and Dr. Gruenfeld, without evidence of
hallucinations, delusions, obsessions, compulsions, cognitive disorder, current
suicidal/homicidal ideations, or other serious issues. Moreover, these opinions were largely
based on the claimant’s self-report/allegations, which are not fully consistent with the record for
the reasons listed above.” Id., Page ID#: 992 (enumeration added).
Accordingly, the ALJ then further found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform work at
the light exertional level with some restrictions, although with no mental limitations or
restrictions. Id. The ALJ finally concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past
relevant work as an advertising manager. Id, Page ID#: 985.
Plaintiff argued to the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ erred by not considering her mental
limitations when formulating the RFC. Id., Page ID#: 987. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that
substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion as to the severity and impact of
Plaintiff’s mental impairments because the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of Dr.
Lewellyn, Plaintiff’s treating psychologist, and Dr. Gruenfeld, the consultative psychologist.
Id., Page ID#: 991.
The Magistrate Judge agreed with the Plaintiff, stating that her arguments were welltaken. Id. In particular, the Magistrate Judge stated that the ALJ’s explanation of why these two
opinions were unpersuasive did not comply with the regulations because the ALJ reasoning was
“largely based” on the fact that the Plaintiff self-reported her symptoms, which the Magistrate
Judge determined was “an inappropriate rationale to discount the opinion’s [sic] supportability.”
Id., Page ID#: 992.
In addition, the R&R found that the ALJ’s explanation for why these opinions were
inconsistent with the medical record as a whole did not sufficiently show how the opinions were
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inconsistent. Id., Page ID#: 993. While the Magistrate Judge acknowledged that the ALJ
provided “some explanation” of the inconsistency in citing the list of factors such as Plaintiff’s
positive response to medications at the counseling sessions without evidence of hospitalizations
and her mostly unremarkable reported symptoms to Dr. Gruenfeld, the R&R concludes by
finding that the ALJ erred by offering no clear path showing how these facts are substantial
evidence for the conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental limitations do not impact her RFC. Id., Page
ID#: 993-94. Finally, the R&R rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the opinions of the
two state agency reviewers should be seen as evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Id.,
Page ID#: 995. The R&R stated in that regard that it is the ALJ, not the state agency, ultimately
responsible for determining disability. Id.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review – Judicial review of Report and Recommendation
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) states:
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.
In conducting judicial review of Social Security cases, the reviewing court is limited to
ascertaining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and/or
whether the Commissioner employed the correct legal standard. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 390, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(internal quotation and citation omitted). A decision supported by substantial evidence will not
be overturned even though substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). “The substantial-evidence standard ...
presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way,
without interference by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.
1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, a court
must defer to that finding “even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have
supported an opposite conclusion.” Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). Put
another way, it is well-established that “the Commissioner’s position cannot be overturned if
substantial evidence, even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position so
long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” O’Brien v.
Commissioner, 819 Fed. Appx. 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation
omitted).
Application of standard
The sole issue here is whether the R&R erred by finding that the ALJ committed
reversible error by not identifying substantial evidence to support an RFC with no mental
limitations.
Here, as noted above, the two state agency reviewers expressly found that Plaintiff’s
mental symptoms were “mild,” that the functional limitations set forth by both Plaintiff’s
treating psychologist and subsequently by the consultative psychologist “overstated” Plaintiff’s
mental limitations, and the opinions were not supported by the totality of the evidence. They
also found, as noted above, that no mental functional limitations were needed in the RFC. It is
apparent that the ALJ adopted the state agency reviewers’s positions both in fashioning the RFC
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and as support for finding unpersuasive the opinions from Drs. Lewellyn and Gruenfeld.
Consequently, the RFC rests on specific stated conclusions from the state agency as to: (1) the
absence of mental limitations in the RFC and (2) why that functional conclusion was reached,
i.e, that the Plaintiff’s mental symptoms are mild.
The R&R, however, erred initially by stating that the ALJ’s functional conclusions
could not be supported by the unchallenged findings of the two state agency psychologists—
reasoning that it is the ALJ, not the state agency consultants, who ultimately make the disability
determination. While this is true that the ALJ makes the final determination as to an RFC and
underlying disability determinations, it is also true that the functional findings of state agency
reviewers—when adopted by an ALJ—can constitute substantial evidence in support of an
ALJ’s determination of an RFC. Quinn v. Comm, of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 183960, at *8 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 17., 2024) (citation omitted); Maldonado o/b/o A.C. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 361038, at
*6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2022) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
356557 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2022).
Further, while the R&R properly notes that it is incumbent on the ALJ to provide a
logical path connecting symptoms to any functional limitations, that path was clearly provided
here by the state agency reviewers who provide the reasoned link—adopted by the ALJ—
between Plaintiff’s mild psychological symptoms and an RFC with no mental limitations. The
“Commissioner’s position cannot be overturned…so long as substantial evidence supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.” O’Brien, 819 Fed. Appx. at 416. When substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision, a court must defer to that finding “even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.” Key v. Callahan,
109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Report and Recommendation is not accepted. Finding no
error in the Commissioner’s underlying determination, the decision of the Commissioner,
therefore, is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ David A. Ruiz
David A. Ruiz
United States District Judge

Dated: September 24, 2024

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