Cooper v. City Yellow Cab
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion that the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, and in the alternative, Plaintiff failed to prove a genuine issue of materi al fact as to whether Defendant's decision not to rehire him was based on discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment. Related document 11 . Signed by Judge David D. Dowd, Jr. on 6/13/2011. (S,He)
DOWD, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Roderick Cooper,
Plaintiff,
v.
City Yellow Cab Co.,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 5:10 CV 1665
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff Roderick Cooper filed a pro se complaint with this Court
against Defendant City Yellow Cab Company (“CYC”). Plaintiff alleges CYC discriminated
against him based on his religion. ECF No. 1. He alleges that when he applied to drive a cab for
CYC, Office Manager Mark Posten said “he did not want [Plaintiff] back because of my
religion.” CYC submitted a motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2011. CYC’s motion
for summary judgment was served on Plaintiff, but no opposition to Defendant’s motion has
been filed.
For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff drove CYC vehicles as an independent contractor under a Taxicab Lease
Agreement from September 21, 1999 until April 13, 2001. During that time Plaintiff was
involved in four accidents, two of which were his fault. He was also repeatedly argumentative
with dispatchers and warned about stealing when he was caught pulling a fuse. Furthermore,
supervisors wrote him up three times including a customer complaint, his failure to return a cab
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on time, and his improper usage and payment of gasoline. After his license was suspended in
2000, Plaintiff left owing over $60 in unpaid lease fees. ECF No. 11.
In August 2009, Plaintiff filed an application for rehire with CYC. Posten reviewed
Plaintiff’s recent driving history and found numerous violations between 2000 and 2007.
Therefore, Posten decided not to rehire Plaintiff based on his previous work performance and
driving infractions. ECF No. 11.
On October 6, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination in Employment with the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”). In this charge, Plaintiff indicated that he believed he
was discriminated against based on “Race/Color” and indicated his race as “African-American.”
Additionally, in the space available for a brief but detailed statement of facts Plaintiff described
his discrimination:
I believe I have been unlawfully discriminated against due to my race for the
following reasons: A. I previously worked for the above-named company in 1995
and 1996 as a Cab Driver. I quit in 1996 with a good work record. On August 20,
2009 I applied to be a cab driver and was denied by Mark [Posten], Manager. B.
Caucasians who have been terminated for performance reasons have been rehired by
the above-named company.
ECF No. 11-1 (emphasis added).
The OCRC issued its Letter of Determination on January 7, 2010, finding no probable
cause to believe Defendant engaged in unlawful racial discrimination. ECF No. 11-2. On May
3, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) adopted the OCRC’s
findings and issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. ECF No. 11-3. The EEOC based its
administrative proceedings and investigation on Plaintiff’s allegations of racial, not religious,
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discrimination. However, Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on his religion in his July 2010
complaint.1
II. Law and Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The United
States Supreme Court redefined the principles governing motions for summary judgment in a
trilogy of 1986 cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986). The Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the Supreme Court trilogy in Street v.
J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir. 1989).
To receive summary judgment, the moving party must first demonstrate to the Court that
there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the
moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a material fact that remains for trial. Id.
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine issue
for trial exists, unless “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
1
“I put in applicatone [sic] in at City Yellow Cab drive a cab I was not be able to drive because
[Mark Posten] said he did not want me back. I asked why. He said he did not want back
because of my religion.” ECF No. 1.
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for the non-moving party.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Furthermore, in Anderson, the
Supreme Court held:
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will
be insufficient; there must he evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable
jurors could find by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict. . . .
477 U.S. at 252. Thus, the “mere possibility” of a factual dispute is not enough. Gregg v. AllenBradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986). Rather, in order to defeat summary judgment a
plaintiff “must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support [his] claim than would
otherwise be necessary.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Where the defendant demonstrates that
after a reasonable period of discovery the plaintiff is unable to produce sufficient evidence
beyond the bare allegations of the complaint to support an essential element of his case,
summary judgment should be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325-26; see also Street, 886 F.2d at
1478-80.
In sum, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is
the need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. This Court must determine “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52; see also Wexler v. White’s Fine
Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 578 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[t]he conflicting proof and the inferences
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that can be drawn therefrom raise genuine issues of material fact that preclude the grant of
summary judgment”).
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Plaintiff’s OCRC and EEOC charge states CYC discriminated against him based on his
“Race/Color” during the rehiring process. Neither mentions any discrimination against Plaintiff
because of his religion. ECF No. 11-1 and 11-2. It is not until Plaintiff’s pro se complaint that
he claimed religious discrimination. ECF No. 1.
“A person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . may not maintain a suit for redress in federal district court until he has first
unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential administrative relief.” Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972). The Sixth Circuit has held that a Title VII assertion of discriminatory
conduct is “limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of
the charge of discrimination.” EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F.2d 1232, 1235 (6th Cir.
1980); see also Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971);
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir. 1975); McBride v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 551 F.2d 113, 115 (6th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir.
1977); Jackson v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 555 F. Supp. 80, 83 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Plaintiff did not seek an administrative remedy from his claim of discrimination based on
religion. Further, Plaintiff did not claim religious discrimination as a part of his race
discrimination charge with the OCRC. Since “there was no such common source of
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discrimination,” this Court has no jurisdiction to hear his claim. EEOC v. Bailey, 563 F.2d at
451.
The purpose of the administrative exhaustion requirement is to permit the EEOC to
investigate and secure voluntary compliance with Title VII. This salutory purpose
is thwarted when a plaintiff fails to present the full scope of her alleged claims to that
agency. See, e.g., Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545-546 (6th Cir.
1991), confirming the rule that a judicial complaint is limited to “the scope of the
EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Plaintiff's OCRC charge is plainly based on [his] race, and nothing
in the charge would support a reasonable expectation that the OCRC or EEOC would
also investigate other claims.
Therefore, the only claims that are properly before the Court are claims for racial
discrimination. . . . Plaintiff's [religious] claims, based on events that occurred prior
to the filing of [his] OCRC/EEOC complaint, are therefore dismissed.
Anderson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67317, at *6-7 (S.D.
Ohio 2006).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim
of religious discrimination since his OCRC/EEOC complaint addressed racial discrimination.
Therefore, Plaintiff did not pursue the requisite administrative channel first with respect to his
religious discrimination claim, which is the bases for this complaint.
C. Failure to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
However, should it be determined that Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim grew out
of the OCRC/EEOC investigation, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment still will be
granted, because the undisputed facts show that there is no prima facie case of discrimination.
Title VII employment discrimination cases require three stages of proof. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
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Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). First, Plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Second, if Plaintiff
establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to “articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.” Id. (quoting McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). Third, if Defendant carries this burden, Plaintiff must prove that the
proffered reasons were pretextual. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). “Pretext is
established by a direct showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or by an indirect showing that the employer's explanation is not credible.” Kline v. TVA, 128
F.3d 337, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252).
Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination either: “[1] by
introducing direct evidence of discrimination or [2] by proving inferential and circumstantial
evidence which would support an inference of discrimination.” Kline, 128 F.3d at 348 ;see also
Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1995) (“a plaintiff may
establish a prima facie case of discrimination either by presenting direct evidence of intentional
discrimination by the defendant, or by showing the existence of facts which create an inference
of discrimination” (internal citations omitted)).
When construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the undisputed facts in the
record advanced by Defendant in support of summary judgment demonstrate that Plaintiff
established a prima facie case. First, there exists no direct evidence of discrimination in the
undisputed facts. Second, under the circumstantial evidence approach, the McDonnell Douglas-
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Burdine test2 shows that Plaintiff was not qualified for the job for which he applied. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. 792; Burdine, 450 U.S. 248. Additionally, there is no evidence that
demonstrates CYC treated members of a protected class any differently from members of an
unprotected class. Although Plaintiff alleges CYC rehired Caucasians with records less
favorable than his in his Charge of discrimination to the OCRC (but not in his complaint to), the
record shows no evidence beyond Plaintiff’s mere speculation.3 Defendant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact in either direct or circumstantial evidence to prove
Plaintiff was the subject of discrimination. Thus, a prima facie case of discrimination was not
established and Defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Furthermore, CYC provided legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring
Plaintiff. Between Plaintiff’s poor driving history and his unsatisfactory prior work record,
Defendant has shown that through the normal rehiring procedure, Plaintiff was not qualified.
CYC has articulated reasons for not rehiring that have been historically recognized as legitimate
and non-discriminatory, and Plaintiff has offered no evidence of pretext to rebut these legitimate
2
Plaintiff (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was qualified for the
position, and (4) was replaced by a person outside the class or a comparable non-protected
person was treated better. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1992).
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“Because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient affirmative evidence to establish that the nonminority employees with whom she compares her treatment were ‘similarly situated in all
respects,’ or that their conduct was of ‘comparable seriousness’ to the conduct for which she was
discharged, no claim for discrimination can be based upon a comparison of Plaintiff's and their
treatment.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584.
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reasons. Adams v. Tennessee Dept. of Finance and Administration, 179 Fed. App’x 266, 274
(6th Cir. 2006).4
III. Conclusion
For the reasons contained herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case, and in the
alternative, Plaintiff failed to prove a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant’s
decision not to rehire him was based on discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Defendant is entitled as a matter of law to summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 13, 2011
Date
s/ David D. Dowd, Jr.
David D. Dowd, Jr.
U.S. District Judge
4
See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1085 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding an
employee's combative and obnoxious attitude a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an
employer to terminate employment); Gregory v. Chrysler Corp., No. 97- 4442, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8025, at *12 (6th Cir. April 28, 1999) (finding a plaintiff's inability to work well with
others to be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the defendant to take adverse employment
action).
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