Patterson v. Smith

Filing 9

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7 ) is granted. This Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that an appeal from this action could not be taken in good faith and therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Judge Jack Zouhary on 5/31/11. (C,D)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Juvalian Calvin Patterson,
Petitioner,

Case No. 5:10 CV 1825
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

-vsJUDGE JACK ZOUHARY
Keith Smith, Warden,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Petitioner Juvalian Patterson’s Petition for
Federal Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1). On August 18, 2010, Petitioner was
released from Mansfield Correctional Institution to the supervision of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority
on “transitional control” (Doc. No. 8-3 at 102). Respondent, Warden Keith Smith, moved to dismiss
the Petition as moot (Doc. No. 7 at 10). For the reasons described below, the Court grants the Motion.
BACKGROUND
In November 2001, Petitioner was charged with aggravated burglary (with firearm
specification), robbery, and carrying concealed weapons in the Stark County, Ohio Court of Common
Pleas (Doc. No. 1 at 19). In February 2002, Petitioner pled guilty to all counts (Doc. No. 8-1 at 8).
Petitioner was sentenced to three years for aggravated burglary, a consecutive three-year sentence for
the firearm specification, and three years for robbery to be served concurrently with the aggravated
burglary sentence (Doc. No. 8-1 at 19–21). For carrying a concealed weapon, Petitioner was

sentenced to eleven months in prison, to be served concurrently with the aggravated burglary and
robbery sentences (Doc. No. 8-1 at 21–22).
In March 2002, Petitioner was given 90 days credit for time served for aggravated burglary
(with gun specification), robbery, and carrying concealed weapon conviction (Case No. 2001CR1623)
(Doc. No. 8-1 at 28). Petitioner was also given 34 days credit for time served for complicity to
aggravated robbery (with gun specification) (Case No. 2002CR0100) (Doc. No. 8-1 at 29).
In August 2010, Petitioner was released from Mansfield Correctional Institution to the
supervision of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority on “transitional control” (Doc. No. 8-3 at 102), and
filed the pending Petition the same day.
In December 2010, Petitioner was resentenced pursuant to State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St. 3d.
173 (2009), and ordered to serve a mandatory five-year term of post-release control on his release
from prison (Doc. No. 8-3 at 97).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a federal habeas claim has been adjudicated by the state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
provides the writ shall not issue unless the state decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.” A federal court may grant habeas relief if the state court arrives at a decision
opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court of the United States on a question of law, or if the state
court decides a case differently than did the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). The appropriate measure of whether or not a
state court decision unreasonably applied clearly established federal law is whether that state
adjudication was “objectively unreasonable,” and not merely erroneous or incorrect. Williams, 529

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U.S. at 409–11; see also Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 953 (6th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), findings of fact made by the state court are presumed correct, and rebuttable only
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 493–494 (6th Cir.
2004).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner disputes his sentence but does not contest his conviction (Doc. No. 1 at 3, 8, 12).
Since filing the Petition, Petitioner has been released (Doc. No. 8-3 at 102). Respondent has moved
to dismiss, arguing Petitioner’s sole claim for relief, seeking additional jail time credit, is moot (Doc.
No. 7 at 9–11). Petitioner has not filed any opposition.
A petition is moot when there ceases to be a case or controversy between the parties and
deprives the court of jurisdiction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998). Generally, a criminal
conviction carries sufficient collateral consequences to present a live case and controversy despite the
petitioner’s release from custody. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). “[A]n inmate who
is challenging his conviction, where his petition was filed while incarcerated, continues to have a case
or controversy after release because there are collateral consequences from his conviction such as
having lost the right to vote, serve on a jury, hold public office or having future sentence enhanced.”
Id. at 237–38 (emphasis added). An individual attacking his sentence, but not the conviction, cannot
seek habeas corpus relief where the sentence has been fully served and there are no collateral
consequences that could be eliminated by a successful attack on the sentence. Lane. v. Williams, 455
U.S. 624, 632 (1982).
Here, Petitioner is not contesting his conviction, but is requesting an adjustment in the
calculation of his sentence (Doc. No. 1 at 9–12). Specifically, Petitioner argues the court violated his

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Equal Protection Rights by misapplying jail time credit -- by not applying 90 days of credit towards
each term (Doc. No. 1 at 9). Petitioner’s sentence of imprisonment has expired. The calculation of
jail time credit to a sentence already served is not a collateral consequence -- Petitioner’s post-release
control status is irrelevant because the length of his sentence of imprisonment does not influence the
length of his post-release control, which is mandated by state statute. The state court imposed five
years of post-release control because Petitioner was convicted of at least one first-degree felony
subject to a mandatory five-year period of post-release control.
Petitioner has not presented facts demonstrating his conviction was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,
or resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7) is granted.
Furthermore, this Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), that an appeal from this action could not
be taken in good faith and therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Jack Zouhary
JACK ZOUHARY
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE
May 31, 2011

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