Zino, Jr. et al v. Whirlpool Corporation et al

Filing 360

Memorandum of Opinion and Order Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 332, is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Upon reconsideration, the Court maintains its rulings as to Subclasses A, C, and D for the reasons stated he rein. The Court reverses its bench trial ruling as to Subclass B. Specifically, the Court: (1) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs as to Subclass A, albeit for slightly different reasoning than articulated in its bench trial ruling; (2) ret urns to its initial finding and grants summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Subclass B; (3) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, resulting from Phase One of the bench trial, as it applies to Subclass C; and (4) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, resulting from Phase One of the bench trial, as it applies to Subclass D, in part, for different reasoning than articulated in its bench trial ruling. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 10/30/2015. (JLG)

PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSEPH ZINO, JR., et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 5:11CV01676

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION &
ORDER [Resolving ECF No. 332]

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 332.
Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its orders issued resolving the cross-motions for summary
judgment (ECF No. 191) and later held bench trial1 (ECF No. 310), in response to a subsequently
issued Supreme Court decision, Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 524 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 926,
190 L. Ed. 2d 809 (2015). The motion for reconsideration is opposed by Plaintiffs and fully
briefed. See e.g., ECF No. 339, ECF No. 340. Additionally, both sides have filed notices of
supplemental authority and responsive briefs. See e.g., ECF No. 347, ECF No. 349, ECF No.
350, and ECF No. 352. The Court is fully informed having reviewed the record and that
submitted by the parties.
For the reasons below, Defendants’ motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
I.

1

The Court segmented the trial. Only Phase One has been completed.

(5:11CV01676)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for motions for reconsideration. The
Sixth Circuit, however, has held that a motion to reconsider may be treated as a motion to alter or
amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, No.
1:08-CV-1892, 2009 WL 1565956, at * 1 (N.D. Ohio June 6, 2009) (citing Smith v. Hudson, 600
F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir.1979)). Nonetheless, such motions are disfavored and seldom granted
because they contradict notions of finality and repose. Id.; see also Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels,
No. 1:05-CV-2573, 2007 WL 3104760, at * 1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2007); Plaskon Elec.
Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Sigal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995). A court may grant
a motion to amend or alter judgment if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence
exists, an intervening change in controlling law occurs, or to prevent manifest injustice. See
Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is not the
function of a motion to reconsider either to renew arguments already considered and rejected by a
court or ‘to proffer a new legal theory or new evidence to support a prior argument when the
legal theory or argument could, with due diligence, have been discovered and offered during the
initial consideration of the issue.’” McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930
F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.
Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D. Ind. 1994))). Because the Supreme Court of the United States has
provided guidance not available prior to the Court’s earlier rulings, the Court reconsiders its prior
rulings in response to Tackett.

2

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Reconsideration is just that. It is not an automatic reversal or vacatur of prior rulings.2 As
explained below, the Court maintains its bench trial rulings as to Subclasses A, C, and D and
reverses its bench trial ruling as to Subclass B.
II.
This writing incorporates the factual and procedural background of the case provided in
the Court’s Memorandum of Opinion and Order resolving the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. See ECF No. 191; Zino v. Whirlpool, No. 5:11CV01676, 2013 WL
4544518 (N.D. Ohio August 27, 2013). Separately, in the Order issued after Phase One of trial,
the Court concluded:
1. The members of Subclass C were promised lifetime, company-paid health
benefits under the 1992-1995, 1995-2000, and 2000-2003 [Collective Bargaining
Agreements or] CBAs.
2. With respect to Subclass D: (1) the members of Groups 1 and 2 were promised
lifetime, company-paid health benefits under the same rules that applied to the members
of Subclass C; (2) as to some members of Group 3 and all members of Group 4–they
were not promised lifetime health benefits but they are entitled to company-paid health
benefits up to the age of 65 in accordance with the terms established in Exhibit 5; (3) with
respect to the members of Group 3 who are not entitled to company-paid health
benefits–they are nevertheless entitled to participate in “retiree healthcare” until the age

2

See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“When an action presents more than one claim
for relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated,
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any
time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights
and liabilities.”). While this opinion appropriately revisits rulings made on summary
judgment, the focus is ultimately on those rulings made following the Phase One bench
trial.
3

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of 65 but they are responsible for paying the full cost of the premiums; and (4) the
members of Groups 5 and 6, to the extent there are any, are neither entitled to lifetime
retiree health benefits nor are they guaranteed “access” to them beyond the expiration of
the 2003-2007 CBA.
3. The ambiguity within Item 6(c) regarding the duration for which the Company agreed
to fund retiree health benefits, and the conflict between Item 6(c) and the 1977 Welfare
Plan, are resolved by the evidence presented at trial proving that the Company and the
Union intended for the members of Subclass A to receive retiree health benefits for life.
4. The applicable Sub-Agreement Provisions carried the 1980 Contract Settlement
through to the 1983-1986, 1986-1988, and 1988-1992 CBAs, entitling the members of
Subclass B to retiree health benefits for life. In addition, Retirees’ motion for
reconsideration and/or relief from entry of summary judgment as to Subclass B is granted.
ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10213-10214.
A unanimous Court held that Tackett was decided in contravention with ordinary
principles of contract law. See Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926. The high Court “struck down the Sixth
Circuit’s ‘Yard-Man inference’ and the attendant contract interpretation principles adopted by
Yard-Man and its progeny,” creating an intervening change in controlling law. ECF No. 332 at
PageID#: 10326 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court determined that the Sixth
Circuit had incorrectly employed principles in tension with ordinary principles of contract law
when evaluating CBAs. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 937. It ordered courts to use ordinary principles of
contract law and first look to the language of CBAs to ascertain the intention of the parties, with
no “thumb on the scale” in favor of vesting. Id. at 935. The Supreme Court also rejected the
idea that a general durational clause in a CBA “says nothing about the vesting of retiree
benefits.” Id. at 934. Courts, therefore, must now consider general durational clauses when
construing CBAs. Id. at 936. The Supreme Court also stated that “[c]ontractual obligations will
cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining agreement” and “courts should
4

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not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises.” Id. at 930, 937. Additionally, the
Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s inference that the tying of retiree health benefits to the
receipt of a pension meant that parties intended the health benefits to last as long as the pension
benefits, i.e., for life. Id. at 937. The Supreme Court concluded that such “inferences [are]
inconsistent with ordinary principles of contract law.” Id.
In the concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg clarified by stating:
Today’s decision rightly holds that courts must apply ordinary contract
principles, shorn of presumptions, to determine whether retiree health-care
benefits survive the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. Under the
“cardinal principle” of contract interpretation, “the intention of the parties, to be
gathered from the whole instrument, must prevail.” [Citations omitted.] To
determine what the contracting parties intended, a court must examine the entire
agreement in light of relevant industry-specific customs, practices, usages, and
terminology. [Citations omitted.] When the intent of the parties is unambiguously
expressed in the contract, that expression controls, and the court’s inquiry should
proceed no further. [Citations omitted.] But when the contract is ambiguous, a
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of the parties.
[Citations omitted.]
Contrary to M&G’s assertion, [] no rule requires “clear and express”
language in order to show that parties intended healthcare benefits to vest.
“[C]ontraints upon the employer after the expiration date of a collectivebargaining agreement,” we have observed, may be derived from the agreement’s
“explicit terms,” but they may arise as well from . . . implied terms of the expired
agreement.”

Id. at 937-38. See American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
985 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Although Justice Brennan's concurrence in Yellow Transit is
not binding precedent, under the circumstances it is very persuasive."); Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of

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Educ., 958 F.2d 1339, 1351 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Here, as in Baesler, we find persuasive Justice
Powell's concurrence in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing . . . .").
III.
Given the Tackett decision, the Court abandons employment of the Yard-Man
presumption, related contract interpretation principles, and progeny, including any carried
forward effect, to the extent it relied on such directly or otherwise in reaching its or summary
judgment ruling, ECF No. 191, or bench trial rulings, ECF No. 310. The Court reconsiders its
prior rulings, as necessary, relying on ordinary principles of contract law to ascertain the meaning
of the CBAs at issue. 3
IV.
In support of their motion for reconsideration, Defendants argue that any intent to vest
retiree health benefits must be stated in “clear and express” language. Defendants mistakenly
contend that the Supreme Court in Tackett endorsed this standard because the majority opinion
cites to Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998), a case that stands
for the proposition that in order for healthcare benefits to vest for life under noncollectively
bargained contracts, vesting must be stated in clear and express language. See Tackett, 135 S.Ct.
at 937. Despite Defendants’ proffers of case law from other jurisdictions issued before and after
the Tackett decision in which courts have employed the “clear and express” standard, the

3

It should be noted that on May 6, 2014, after the Court had issued its summary
judgment ruling but prior to the bench trial, the Court asked the parties why it should not
stay the matter since the Supreme Court decided to hear the Tackett appeal. ECF No.
301. Parties recommended that the Court not stay the matter. ECF Nos. 304, 305.
6

(5:11CV01676)
Supreme Court simply did not adopt this standard for CBAs. The Supreme Court cited to
Sprague, which did not involve collectively bargained agreements, merely to demonstrate the
inconsistencies within Sixth Circuit jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of bargaining
agreements. Almost as if to prevent the error made by Defendants, the concurring opinion
clearly articulates that “no rule requires ‘clear and express’ language in order to show that parties
intended healthcare benefits to vest.” Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Both
the Tackett majority and concurring opinions cite to an earlier Supreme Court decision in which
the Supreme Court stated “‘[c]onstraints upon the employer after the expiration date of a
collective-bargaining agreement,’ we have observed, may be derived from the agreement’s
‘explicit terms,’ but they ‘may arise as well from ... implied terms of the expired agreement.’”
Id. (citing Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190,
203, 207 (1991)). Accordingly, despite Defendants’ urging and reliance on case law from other
circuits, the Court will not adopt the clear and express language standard.
In a notice of supplemental authority (ECF No. 347), Defendants argue that a recent Sixth
Circuit opinion, Board of Trustees v. Moore, 2015 WL 5010985 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015), a case
involving neither a CBA nor claims asserted under the Labor Relations Management Act, should
move the Court to revisit its determination that the Group Insurance Plans (“GIPs”) and the
Summary Plan Descriptions (“SPDs”) are not contractually binding provisions. In Board of
Trustees, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Plaintiff’s SPD was the
controlling welfare benefits plan, because Plaintiff, the Board of Trustees for a multi-employer
industry board, had failed to draft an actual welfare plan as authorized by Plaintiff’s Trust

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Agreement. Id. at *1. No other document set forth details regarding employee benefits. Id. at
*4-5. In the absence of a separate plan document and in light of the testimony of the plan’s
director, the SPD constituted a Welfare Plan under ERISA. Id. at *4-5.
In the matter before the Court, however, there were actual, collectively-bargained welfare
plans that governed the healthcare benefits of retirees. As the Court determined, the welfare
plans did not incorporate the SPDs or GIPs:

Whirlpool asserts that if the GIPs are not incorporated into the CBAs, Retirees
have no viable vesting claims because “[t]he GIPs (and SPDs when issued) are the
only documents containing a written description of the specific” healthcare
benefits . . . This claim is inaccurate. Retirement healthcare benefits are described
in § 2.06 of the Welfare Plans under the heading ‘Medical Insurance.’ . . . Though
the GIPs describe the health insurance benefits with greater detail than do the
Welfare Plans, which provide a general description of what retirees may receive,
they need not be incorporated into the CBAs in order for Retirees' to have valid
contractual claims.
ECF No. 191 at PageID#: 6324, n. 15. In its bench trial order, the Court reviewed the GIPs and
SPDs. The Court ultimately determined that the reservations of rights language contained in the
GIPs and SDPs did not contradict the conclusion that retirees were promised lifetime health
benefits. See ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10192-10193. The Court finds the matter at issue
distinguishable from the Board of Trustees.4
V.

4

As indicated earlier, several notices of supplemental authority and responses have
been filed. The Court will not discuss each because they are not dispositive and are
occluded by Tackett.
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(5:11CV01676)
Upon reconsideration, in light of Tackett, and with due consideration to the general
durational limits in the CBAs, for the following reasons, the Court maintains the results of its
bench trial decision with respect to Subclasses A, C, and D, but reverses its bench trial decision
with respect to Subclass B. Below, the Court examines both its summary judgment and bench
trial decisions.
A.

Subclass A: 1980-1983 Retirees
Subclass A is comprised of persons who retired between April 18, 1980 and April 19,

1983 are covered by the 1980-1983 CBA. The Court denied Defendants summary judgment for
Subclass A and ruled in favor of Plaintiffs for that class in its bench trial order. The Court relied
upon techniques now disavowed in its summary judgment ruling and carried that analysis
forward (for Subclass A) in its bench trial ruling. Here, the Court eschews that which is no
longer permitted and still finds in favor of Plaintiffs for Subclass A.
Defendants’ argument against vesting for this group relies heavily on the absence of
contractual language that affirmatively declares the Subclass A retirees have a vested right to
healthcare benefits, and the existence of a general duration clause. Defendants are incorrect in
understanding Tackett to require a CBA to contain clear and express language for a
determination that healthcare benefits vested for life. And, as Plaintiffs retort, “[t]he so-called
‘General Duration’ clause here does not unambiguously negate all other contractual indicia of
ambiguity.” ECF No. 339 at PageID#: 10424.
At issue for Subclass A is language in Item 6(c) of the 1980 Contract Settlement that
amended the 1977-1980 CBA. That language states “[t]he Hoover Company assumes
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responsibility for paying premiums to the insurance carrier for future retiree’s medical insurance
in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Plan.” ECF No. 108-12 at PageID#: 1601.
The Court no longer relies on Item 6(c)’s silence on duration as evidencing an intent to
vest. See ECF No. 310 at PageID#:10203. Nevertheless, ambiguity still exists. Ambiguity
surrounds the term “future retiree’s medical insurance” in Item 6(c) and prevents discernment of
what “Plan” the 1980-1983 CBA was referencing. Defendants’ post-expiration practices fuel
that ambiguity.5 That ambiguity prevented summary adjudication with respect to Subclass A,
even in light of Tackett. As earlier indicated, Defendant also hinges its hopes for prevailing on
the Contract Settlement’s durational clause which is no model of clarity, lending itself to varying
articulations as indicated by Plaintiffs. See ECF No. 339 at PageID#: 10425-10426.
Following the bench trial, the Court relied largely on the credible testimony of Schiltz to
determine that Item 6(c) of the 1980 Contract Settlement granted the 1980-1983 retirees a
lifetime entitlement to company-paid health benefits. ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10202. The
Court further stated that “while the application of the Yard-Man inference further bolsters the
Court’s finding by acting like ‘a thumb on the scales’ in favor of vesting . . . that inference
supports but is not necessary to the finding made by the Court.” ECF No. 310 at PageID#:
10204. The Court also eschwed the tying inference. Id. Overall, evidence presented at trial

5

“The 1980-1983 Retirees’ continued receipt of company-paid health benefits
beyond the expiration of the 1980-1983 CBA is evidence of their lifetime right to receive
such benefits. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676 n. 6.” ECF No. 191 at PageID#: 6299. In
Weimer, the Sixth Circuit noted that continued retiree benefits after the expiration of a
CBA could be evidence of the parties’ intent. Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, 773 F.2d 669, 675
(6th Cir. 1985).
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resolved the conflict between Item 6(c) and the 1977 Welfare Plan such that Plaintiffs proved
that Defendants intended Subclass A to receive retiree health benefits for life. See also ECF No.
310 at PageID#: 10203-10205.
For the reasons given, the Court maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs as to Subclass
A, albeit for slightly different reasoning than articulated in its bench trial ruling.
B.

Subclass B: 1983-1992 Retirees
The Court granted summary judgment to Defendants regarding Subclass B, finding that

retirees who retired after April 18, 1983, but before January 1, 1993, were not promised
company-paid health benefits under any of the applicable Welfare Plans. ECF No. 191 at
PageID#: 6302. Healthcare benefits terminated upon retirement, unless retirees elected to
continue benefits at “their own expense.” ECF No. 156 at PageID#: 4896; ECF No. 123-2 at
PageID#: 2752, 2759, 2803.
After the bench trial, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and/or relief from the
Court’s entry of summary judgment with respect to Subclass B. See ECF No. 261. In its bench
trial decision, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration based on the testimony of
Schiltz and the testimony of former union representatives. ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 1020810209. The Court determined that the 1980 Contract Settlement was a Sub-Agreement that was
carried forward to the 1983-1986, 1986-1988, and 1988-1992 contract cycles. “Gensley, Repace,
and Schiltz all considered the 1980 Contract Settlement to be a Sub-Agreement. Their
testimonies are strong extrinsic evidence of the parties’ understanding of the term.” ECF No.
310 at PageID#: 10211. Unlike with Subclass A, however, the Court did not find ambiguity on

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the face of any of the Welfare Plans in Subclass B that would permit the use of extrinsic
evidence. See UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
529 U.S. 1067, 120 S. Ct. 1674, 146 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2000) (stating that if there is ambiguity in a
provision of a CBA, a court may resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain whether the parties
intended for the benefits to survive the agreement); see also Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg,
J, concurring) (“If, after considering all relevant contractual language in light of industry
practices, the Court of Appeals concludes that the contract is ambiguous, it may turn to extrinsic
evidence–for example, the parties’ bargaining history.”). In the shadow of Tackett, and given the
lack of ambiguity on the face of the relevant Welfare Plans, the Court’s bench trial ruling in favor
of Plaintiffs becomes untenable.
The Court therefore returns to its initial finding and grants summary judgment to
Defendants with respect to Subclass B.
C.

Subclass C: 1993-2003 retirees
Health benefits for Retirees who retired after December 31, 1992, but before December 8,

2003, are governed by the 1992-1995, 1995-2000, and 2000-2003 CBAs. These CBAs, unlike
their predecessors, formally established that such retirees “shall have the opportunity to continue
elements of the medical insurance . . . .” ECF No. 123-2 at PageID#: 2804, 2815, 2824, 28322833 (emphasis added). In its summary judgment ruling, the Court examined these CBAs under
Yard-Man principles (ECF No. 191 at PageID#: 6306-6309), now disavowed by Tackett. And,
finding the use of “opportunity” ambiguous, the Court also examined its definition. ECF No.
191 at PageID#: 6311-6312. Having found that sufficient ambiguity existed, i.e., that there were

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differing reasonable interpretations of whether healthcare benefits vested for life, a position the
Court maintains even in light of the general durational clauses, the Court applied the basic
contract rule that “‘[w]here a contractual provision is subject to two reasonable interpretations . .
. that provision is deemed ambiguous and the court may look to extrinsic evidence–additional
evidence that reflects the intent of the contracting parties–to help construe it.’” Id. (quoting In re
AmTrust Financial Corp., 694 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2012)). Furthermore, as the Court stated
in its summary judgment ruling:
Section 3.01(c)(iii)(F) of the 2000-2003 Welfare Plan gave Retirees the option of
enrolling in an Alternative Medical Plan instead of receiving coverage through the
Basic and Major Medical Plan or the Comprehensive Plan. ECF No. 108-8 at 30.
Alternative Medical Coverage provides coverage through Health Maintenance
Organizations (“HMOs”) and Preferred Provider Organizations (“PPOs”). ECF
No. 108-8 at 22. The 2000-2003 Welfare Plan explicitly states that “the Company
may cease offering the Alternative Medical Coverage on the annual re-enrollment
date.” ECF No. 108-8 at 22. In contrast, there is no language in the 1992-1995,
1995-2000, and 2000-2003 CBAs stating that the Basic and Major Medical and
Comprehensive coverages for Retirees may be terminated by the Company.”
ECF No. 191 at PageID#: 6305. The ambiguity surrounding the word “opportunity” and the
alternative language in the 2000-2003 Welfare Plan provided sufficient ambiguity for the Court
to turn to extrinsic evidence and preclude summary adjudication with respect to Subclass C.
That ambiguity continues to be sufficient reason to preclude summary adjudication, even after
the Court gives due weight to the general durational clause of each CBA.
In its bench trial order based largely on the credible testimony of Schiltz, the author of §
3.01 (c)(iii) in the 1992-1995, 1995-2000, and 2000-2003 Welfare Plan, and the credible
testimony of Union representatives, the Court determined that the members of Subclass C were
promised lifetime, company-paid health benefits under the 1992-1995, 1995-2000, and 200013

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2003 CBAs. The Court explicitly stated “[a]lthough application of the Yard-Man inference
further strengthens this conclusion, that inference is not needed for the Court to arrive at its
conclusion.” ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10190.
The Court maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, resulting from Phase One of the
bench trial as it applies to Subclass C.
D.

Subclass D: 2003-2007 Retirees6
In 2003, the Union and Defendants negotiated a new Welfare Plan with different

language controlling the distribution of retiree health benefits. Section 3.01(c)(iv) of the 20032008 Welfare Plan provides: “With regard to qualifying employees who retire subsequent to
December 9, 2003, the available medical benefits shall be those summarized in Exhibit 5.” ECF
No. 108-9 at PageID#: 1552. In its summary judgment ruling, the Court stated:
Exhibit 5 is written using informal shorthand expressions, rendering it difficult if
not impossible for the Court to properly evaluate the language and terms in the
absence of a more complete record. For example, it is unclear what “access” to
“retiree healthcare” means. Should the Court interpret the language with
reference to the preceding Welfare Plans, or is the Court to give fresh review of
the terms of Exhibit 5? The parties do not inform the Court one way or another.
The Court has not been given an opportunity to engage in a proper evaluation of
the issues as they pertain to this subclass. Although different rules ostensibly
apply to different groups within the subclass, the parties do not provide the Court
with any means to make the appropriate distinctions or to assess the less-thanlucid terms. The claims of the 2003-2007 Retirees will not, therefore, be resolved
through summary adjudication.
ECF No. 191 at PageID#: 6319. In its bench trial order, the Court relied on the testimony of Jim
Repace, the President and Chief Spokesman of the Union from 1993 to 2008, and Schiltz to

6

Subclass D includes Groups 1-6. Each is addressed herein.
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clarify the ambiguity surrounding Exhibit 5. ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10197. From their
testimony, the Court determined that “the 2003-2007 Retirees belonging to Groups 1 and 2 were
promised lifetime, company-paid health benefits under the 2003-2008 Welfare Plan, in
accordance with the rules applicable to the members of Subclass C.” ECF No. 310 at PageID#:
10198. The Court did not rely on Yard-Man in drawing this conclusion. It therefore stands.
As Plaintiffs conceded, members of Group 3 and 4 were not promised retiree health
benefits for life. ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10199. The Court recognized that “the members
belonging to Groups 3 and 4 received substantially less favorable benefits” compared to Groups
1 and 2, but cited the now disavowed tying inference as the basis for its determination that “the
members of Groups 3 and 4 who are entitled to company paid health benefits are entitled to
receive those benefits beyond the expiration of the 2003-2007 CBA up to the age of 65 under the
terms of Exhibit 5.” ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10199. Tackett rejected the tying principle,
which the Sixth Circuit had used to infer that the tying of retiree health benefits to the receipt of a
pension meant that the parties intended the healthcare benefits to last for life, similar to pensions.
Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 937. Therefore, the Court may no longer ground its conclusion in the tying
inference.
In its bench trial order, however, the Court also cited to Repace’s testimony, which
resolves the ambiguity surrounding Exhibit 5 as it pertains to Groups 3 and 4. See ECF No. 310
at PageID#: 10198-10199. In reconsidering its prior ruling, the Court now revises its reasoning
and relies on the credible testimony of Repace to make its determination as to Groups 3 and 4.
As the Court stated in its bench trial order, Repace testified that members of Group 3 were “not

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entitled to post-65 healthcare, just pre-65,” and that members of Group 4 “were entitled to the
Comprehensive Plan up to the age of 65 . . . .” ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10198-10199. This
testimony supports the Court’s conclusions that (1) “the members of Groups 3 and 4 who are
entitled to company-paid health benefits are entitled to receive those benefits . . . up to the age of
65 under the terms of Exhibit 5,” and (2) “members of Group 3 who are not entitled to companypaid health benefits are nevertheless entitled to participate in “retiree healthcare” . . . until the age
of 65, but they are required to pay the full cost of premiums.” ECF No. 310 at PageID#: 10200.
Accordingly, that portion of the Court’s ruling with respect to Groups 3 and 4 stands.
In its bench trial order, the Court determined that “the members of Groups 5 and 6, to the
extent there exist any, are neither entitled to lifetime retiree health benefits nor are they
guaranteed ‘access’ to those benefits beyond the expiration of the 2003-2007 CBA.” ECF No.
310 at PageID#: 10200. That portion of the Court’s ruling with respect to Groups 5 and 6 also
stands.
In summary, regarding Subclass D, members of Groups 1 and 2 of Subclass D are entitled
to lifetime health benefits; members of Groups 3 and 4 are entitled to benefits up to age 65; and
members of Groups 5 and 6 are not entitled to health benefits beyond the expiration of the 20032007 CBA.

IV.
In conclusion, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider in part, and denies the
motion in part. Upon reconsideration, the Court maintains its rulings as to Subclasses A, C, and

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D for the reasons stated herein. The Court reverses its bench trial ruling as to Subclass B.
Specifically, the Court:
(1) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs as to Subclass A, albeit for slightly different
reasoning than articulated in its bench trial ruling;
(2) returns to its initial finding and grants summary judgment to Defendants with respect
to Subclass B;
(3) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, resulting from Phase One of the bench trial,
as it applies to Subclass C; and
(4) maintains its ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, resulting from Phase One of the bench trial,
as it applies to Subclass D, in part, for different reasoning than articulated in its bench trial
ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 30, 2015
Date

/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge

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