Yeager v. State of Alabama, et al

Filing 10

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Plaintiff's motion to proced in forma pauperis (Doc. # 2 ), Denying Plaintiff's motion to expedite review (Doc. # 3 ), motion for communication (Doc. # 5 ), motion to enter judgment (Doc. # 7 ), and motion (mandamus) forthwith for judgment entry (Doc. # 8 ). Further, dismissing this matter with prejudice. An appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 4/19/12. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ANN M. YEAGER,
Plaintiff,
v.

THE STATE OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:12 CV0426
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Ann M. Yeager’s above-captioned in forma
pauperis Complaint naming all fifty States in the United States and the District of Columbia, "(in
care of the Attorney General and Governor),” as Defendants. She claims the Defendants have
exceeded the scope of their authority by enacting legislation that restricts her right to seek the Office
of United States President. Moreover, she complains the Defendant have “restrained and injured”
her from seeking Federal Executive office “by enacting invidious statutes.”

Background
Ms. Yeager describes herself as a 45 year old natural born citizen of the United States
with “high mental acumen.” (Compl. at 512.) Based solely on these facts, she believes she meets

all of the Constitutional requirements to be eligible for Federal Executive office. Thus, she is seeking
recognition as a candidate for President of the United States in each of the 50 states, as well as the
District of Columbia.
Questioning each State’s authority to enact laws placing any restriction on candidacy
for President, Ms. Yeager attacks each State’s legislation setting out the requirements for placement
on the ballot to run for the Office of President. She argues that it is only the United States
Constitution that can restrict the qualifications a citizen must meet to run for U.S. President.
Therefore, any qualifying statutes a State enacts are beyond the scope of its “authority [and] . . .
intrude upon said Federal office.” (Compl. at 510.) She complains the Defendants’ qualifying
statutes would force her to file 51 Declarations of Candidacy, secure 51 nominating petitions “with
invidious and various percentages of Defendants’ electors signatures affixed thereupon and
witnessed thereto — merely—to be recognized as a candidate on the general ballot in each of the
50 States and District of Columbia.” (Compl. at 510-11.) Moreover, Ms. Yeager claims that some
States also require a filing fee to obtain ballot access, which “inflict[s] a property qualification” for
candidacy in violation of the Constitution. As written, these statutes have allegedly restrained her
right to travel and freely associate, given the “enormity of this invidious, arbitrary, and burdensome
task.” (Compl. at 511.)
Ms. Yeager seeks permanent injunctive relief declaring that each Defendants' laws,
qualifying a person to run for the Office of the President of the United States, are:
A) Violative [sic] superior Constitution
B) Repugnant to republican character of Federal Government;
C) Violation on-person one vote principle;

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D) Efface Plaintiff's:
1. right to associate;
2. right to seek profession
3. Right to travel (by interstate ballot)
E) Burdensome, discriminatory, and grossly invidious to Plaintiff as class and
political preference — and therefore declared void.
(Compl. at 627.) She seeks an order of mandamus directing each Defendant’s Secretary of State
to mandate the inclusion of her name and the name of her Vice Presidential choice on the ballot of
each state.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is
required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.1 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1915(e).
Res Judicata
Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of a claim precludes a party from

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A claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without
service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section
1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set
forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte v.
Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v.
Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).
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bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat the prior
judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th
Cir.1990). It bars relitigation of every issue actually brought before the court and every issue or
defense that should have been raised in the previous action. Id. Thus, a plaintiff cannot avoid
application of the doctrine simply by selecting a different legal theory of recovery in a subsequent
suit. Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir.1978).
By her own admission, Ms. Yeager filed a prior complaint last year in this Court
against the same Defendants. The first complaint contained conclusory allegations that
(unidentified) “qualifying criteria laws for Executive Office in each State of the United States are
facially unconstitutional.” See Yeager v. Alabama, et al., No. 11cv1617 (N.D. Ohio)(ECF No. 1.)
On November 11, 2011, this Court dismissed the complaint for lacking an arguable basis in law or
fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e).
A claim is barred by the res judicata effect of prior litigation if all of the following
elements are present: (1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a
subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the subsequent action
which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the
causes of action. Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 578 (6th Cir.2008);
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771–72 (6th Cir.2002).
Generally, the dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) is not considered a
dismissal on the merits. Considering Ms. Yeager’s pro se status, her lack of standing, and the fact
that she did not identify a single statute or an assertion of any injury resulting from it, this Court
could not arrive at a decision on the merits. Consequently, without a prior dismissal on the merits
a critical component is lacking to defeat res judicata effect, except as to frivolousness
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determinations for future in forma pauperis complaints. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir.1999). Claim preclusion and collateral
estoppel only arise where the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits. Schreiber v. Philips
Display Components Co., 580 F.3d 355, 367 (6th Cir.2009); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811,
819 (6th Cir.2003). Thus, Ms. Yeager’s current Complaint is not barred by res judicata and the
Court will, therefore, address it on the merits.
Improper Venue
Personal jurisdiction "is an essential element of district court jurisdiction, without
which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 584 (1999). As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia: “We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution.” 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). To that
end, a judgment entered against a party over whom a court lacks personal jurisdiction may be
rendered void. See FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(4); In re Penco Corp., 465 F.2d 693, 694 n. 1 (4th Cir.1972).
Typically, personal jurisdiction is a question decided in advance of venue, which is
primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum. See generally C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3801, pp. 5–6 (1976). The Supreme Court has provided, however,
that “when there is a sound prudential justification for doing so, . . .a court may reverse the normal
order of considering personal jurisdiction and venue.” Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
Justification exists in this case. Fifty of the fifty-one defendants named in this action
are nonresidents of Ohio. A thorough reading of the Complaint does not reveal any context within

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which this would be the proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The statute provides in relevant
part:
(b) Venue in general.--A civil action may be brought in-(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All of the nonresident defendants reside in different States. Only the
plaintiff and one defendant are in Ohio. As the Court noted, “the purpose of statutorily specified
venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient
place of trial. For that reason, Congress has generally not made the residence of the plaintiff a basis
for venue in nondiversity cases.” Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. at 183-84.
Thus, while it may be more convenient for Ms. Yeager to attack all fifty states and
the District of Columbia in one forum, the general venue statute does not authorize her reliance on
that reasoning to justify this Court as the proper venue for the majority of defendants named.
Finally, Ms. Yeager has not alleged that her claims are being brought in “the judicial
district . . . in which the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. §1391. Even if this were that “unusual case in
which it is not clear that the claim arose in only one specific district, a plaintiff may choose between
those two (or conceivably even more) districts that with approximately equal plausibility—in terms
of the availability of witnesses, the accessibility of other relevant evidence, and the convenience of
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the defendant (but not of the plaintiff)—may be assigned as the locus of the claim.” Great Western
United Corp., 443 U.S. at185.
This an action taken by an Ohio resident, regarding the enactment of several State
statutes by their respective legislatures, seeking a future action that may be taken in these States by
their officials, that forms the basis for Ms. Yeager’s federal claim. Federal judges sitting in their
respective districts within their States are better qualified to construe their laws, and to assess the
character of their States' enforcement of that law, than this Court sitting in Ohio. This would restrict
the venue of this Court solely to Ms. Yeager’s claims against Ohio.
"[B]efore a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there must be
more than notice to the defendant...." Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,
104 (1987). There must also be "a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State
to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum." Kulko v.Super. Ct. of California in and
for City of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 91(1978). Given the claims advanced by Ms. Yeager against
the nonresident defendants, she cannot establish venue in this Court. Accordingly, this Court lacks
both venue and personal jurisdiction over all nonresident States, its Governors and its Attorneys
General for acts that take place in Ohio. See Great Western., 443 U.S. at 185-87. For the reasons set
forth below, transfer of this matter to another district court would not cure any of the deficiencies
in plaintiff's pleading.

Therefore, all defendants, except the State of Ohio are dismissed.
Failure to State a Claim

The United States Constitution entrusts states with the responsibility of establishing
election regulations for presidential electors. U.S. CONST.

ART.

II, § 1, cl. 3. For presidential

candidates, this authority is contained in Article II of the Election Clause, which gives each state's

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legislature the power to decide how federal elections are run in each state. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S.
67, 69 (1997).
With respect to the Constitution, each State must "observe the limits established by
the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens," Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S. 208, 217 (1986)), including "the right of citizens to associate and to form political parties for
the advancement of common political goals and ideas," Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,
520 U.S. 351, 357 (citing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996)); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992); Tashjian, 479
U.S. at 214).
Ms. Yeager's Complaint is premised on the belief that no State has the authority to
impose qualifying laws for a Presidential candidate to be placed on the ballot. The claim is neither
supported by the Constitutional nor statutory authority. The generic claims she raises, attacking
each state’s Presidential ballot access statute as onerous or invidious, presupposes that any burden,
beyond the age and citizenship requirement for Presient set forth in the Constitution, establishes a
per se violation of the Constitution. It does not.
The complaint completely disregards any State interest in regulating the number of
candidates on a ballot in order to avoid voter confusion and frustration of the democratic process.
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974).

Where restrictions to access exist, they must be

reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate state interest. Id. at 716. Therefore, states may
require candidates to demonstrate sufficient public support in order to prevent the ballot from
becoming a laundry list of candidates, not all of whom are serious contenders. Id. at 715. The

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purpose is not bar potential candidates, but to protect the integrity of the political process. See
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782-83 (1974).
Constitutional challenges to state election procedures are governed by the following
method of inquiry: “[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). Here, Ms. Yeager’s sweeping
challenges to State fees, signature requirements, and other procedural requirements to qualify to
appear on the ballot do not suggest in what State action Ohio engaged that caused her injury.
Most of Ms. Yeager’s claims regard an unfounded belief that each State requires she
personally secure a sufficient number of signatures for placement on a ballot. States may, however,
impose a precondition of demonstrating the existence of some reasonable quantum of voter support
by requiring that the party file petitions for a place on the ballot signed by a percentage of those who
voted in a prior election. See American Party, 415 U.S. at 783. Although she complains, in general,
that she cannot travel to secure the requisite number of signatures, there is no statutory requirement
in Ohio that excludes any qualified elector from securing those signatures on her behalf.
A careful reading of over 500 pages of text supporting her complaint provided no
more than legal conclusions. This is not sufficient to present a valid claim. Morgan v. Church's
Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). This Court is not tasked to accept unwarranted
factual inferences. Id.; see Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1971) (A pleading will
not be sufficient to state cause of action under Civil Rights Act if its allegations are but conclusions).
To set forth a valid claim, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 129 S.

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Ct. 1937, 1949(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.2010)("dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim" under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Even liberally construed, Ms. Yeager has failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Ms. Yeager’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc.
No. 2) is granted, her Motion to Expedite Review (Doc. No. 3), Motion (Request) for
Communication from Court (Doc. No. 5), Motion to Enter Judgment - on Timely Subject Matter
(Doc. No. 7), and Motion (Mandamus) Forthwith for Judgment Entry (Doc. No. 8) are denied. The
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that
an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/19/12

/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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