Broadcast Music, Inc. et al v. Meadowlake, Ltd. et al

Filing 53

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted; defendant Roy E. Barr's motion to deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion to dismiss the case is denied; judgemen t is granted against defendant, and defendant is permanently enjoined from further acts of infringement; further, plaintiffs are awarded judgment for statutory damages in the amount of $10,800.00 plus interest from this date; further, plaintiffs are awarded costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $17,315.80 (Related documents 50 and 47 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert on 7/29/13. (S,AA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

MEADOWLAKE, LTD, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:12CV1024
MAGISTRATE JUDGE GEORGE J.
LIMBERT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of
Plaintiffs, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), Barn-Storm Music, Inc., Belkin Music, Concord Music
Group, Inc., Dandelion Music Co., EMI Virgin Songs, Inc., Elijah Blue Music, Forrest Richard Betts
Music, G. DeGraw Music, Inc., Ronder Music International, Inc., Songs of Universal, Inc.,
Unichappell Music, Inc., and Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp. on May 29, 2013. ECF Dkt. #47.
Defendant, Roy E. Barr, acting pro se, filed a motion to deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and Defendant’s motion to dismiss the above-captioned case on June 7, 2013. ECF Dkt.
#50. No reply brief was filed.
For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion is denied and Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.
I.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should be granted “where the moving party has carried its burden of
showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits in the

record construed favorably to the non-moving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.
Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 870-873 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court must decide, “whether the
evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251-252 (1986).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden and must inform the court of the
basis for its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Further, the moving party must identify those portions
of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits” which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The moving party
must make a showing that no reasonable jury could find other than for the moving party. 60 Ivy St.
Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir. 1987).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that
“there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris
Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993); see Matisushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must present “some significant probative evidence
that makes it necessary to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the dispute at trial.” 60 Ivy St.
Corp., 822 F.2d at 1435, see First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Servs. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-290
(1968).

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B.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment.
BMI is a “performing rights society” under 17 U.S.C. § 101. As such, BMI has been granted the
right to license the public performance rights in approximately 7.5 million copyrighted musical
compositions, including those alleged to have been infringed. ECF Dkt. #1, Complaint, ¶3. The other
plaintiffs are the copyright owners of the various musical works that are the topic of this lawsuit. Id.
at ¶5-16.
Through agreements with copyright owners such as music publishing companies and
composers, BMI acquires non-exclusive public performance rights. ECF Dkt. #47-1, Declaration
of Hope Lloyd, BMI’s Assistant Vice President, Legal, ¶2. BMI has acquired such rights from each
of the Plaintiffs in this action. Id. BMI, in turn, grants to music users, such as owners of restaurants
and nightclubs, the right to publically perform any of the works in BMI’s repertoire by means of
“blanket license agreements.” Id. These agreements have been recognized as the most practical
means to exploit owner’s copyrights. See, Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 357 (D. Del. 1980),
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981), aff’d without publishing
opinion, 691 F. 2d 491 (3rd Cir. 1982).
BMI operates as a non-profit making music performing rights organization. It distributes all
of its income, after deducting operating expenses and reasonable reserves, to its affiliated
songwriters and music publishers, which include the Plaintiffs in this action. Lloyd Decl., ¶3.

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The Complaint names three defendants: Meadowlake Ltd., Roy E. Barr, and his son, Philip
R. Barr. Meadowlake Ltd. is a limited liability company (“LLC”) registered with the Office of the
Secretary of the State of Ohio.1 The individual defendants are members of the LLC. On March 15,
2013, Meadowlake Ltd. filed a petition for relief pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.S. Code. Dkt. #41.
On April 5, 2013, Philip R. Barr filed a petition for relief pursuant to Chapter 7 of the U.S. Code.
Dkt. #44. As a consequence, Plaintiffs seek summary judgment solely against Defendant, Roy E.
Barr (herein “Defendant”), the only defendant in the case to whom the automatic stay provision of
the Bankruptcy Code does not apply.
At the time of the Complaint, Meadowlake Ltd. operated and maintained an establishment
known as Rafters Bar & Grill, located at 1211 39th Street NE, Canton, Ohio 44714-1215
(“Establishment” or “Rafters Bar & Grill”). ECF Dkt. #32-1, First Set of Requests for Admissions
(“Req. for Adm.”), No. 1. Meadowlake Ltd. had the right and ability to direct and control the
activities of Rafters Bar & Grill, and had a direct financial interest in the Establishment on the night
of December 23, 2011. Req. for Adm., Nos. 2-3. Defendant has an ownership interest of 95% in
Meadowlake Ltd. ECF Dkt. #32-2, First Set of Interrogatories (“Interrogatories”), Nos. 1-2. Philip
R. Barr had been the owner of the remaining 5% interest. Id.
Prior to October 2008, BMI learned that Rafters Bar & Grill was offering musical
entertainment without a license from BMI and without obtaining permission from the copyright
owners whose music was being publically performed. ECF Dkt. #47-11, Declaration of Lawrence
E. Stevens, Assistant Vice President, General Licensing, ¶3. On October 24, 2008, BMI sent a letter
informing the Establishment that a license was required, and that BMI represented hundreds of
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Meadowlake Ltd. filed for dissolution as a LLC with the Ohio Secretary of State on March 18, 2013.
Dissolution/Limited Liability Company, Doc. Id. 201307900174.

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thousands of artists and had the right to license several million musical compositions. There was no
response from Rafters Bar & Grill. Id. BMI issued no license to Rafters Bar & Grill, and had no
information or belief that any of the owners of the copyrighted material had done so either. Id. at ¶4.
Between November 2008 and December 2011, BMI sent additional letters to Rafters Bar &
Grill, including instructions to cease public performances of BMI-licensed music. Id. at ¶5-6. BMI’s
records indicate that BMI licensing personnel telephoned Rafters Bar & Grill on twenty-nine
occasions, and spoke to persons associated with the Establishment’s operations on a number of those
calls. Id. at ¶8. Additionally, BMI sent a representative to Rafters Bar & Grill on December 23,
2011, and the representative recorded nine compositions allegedly performed, and later identified.
Id. at ¶10-11; See also ECF Dkt. #47-12, Certified Infringement Reports, pp. 1-10. Defendant claims
that he received no correspondence from BMI on behalf of Meadowlake Ltd., except those letters
that were produced as part of Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s request for the Production of
Documents. ECF Dkt. #32-4, Letter of Faith R. Dylewski, Former Counsel, pp. 3-4 (“Dylewski
letter”).
Defendant maintains that he had been retired from Meadowlake Ltd. for several years, his
involvement was limited to approval of expenditures relating to inspection of the irrigation systems
on the golf course in the summer, he winters in the Southern United States and is not involved in
day-to-day operations of Rafters Bar & Grill.. Interrogatories, No. 5; Dylewski Letter. Defendant
further argues that he was retired at all times relevant to the Complaint, he did not take an active role
in hiring any bands or musicians, and that he was not present at Rafters Bar & Grill during the
period of the alleged copyright infringements. ECF Dkt. #50, Motion to Deny Plaintiff’s Motion,
¶2-5. As a consequence, Defendant maintains that he did not have the right and ability to direct and

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control or supervise the persons employed at Rafters Bar & Grill, and that he did not have a direct
financial interest in the Establishment. Req. for Adm., No. 9-11. Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts
asserted by Defendant, but, instead, argue that Defendant’s majority ownership of the infringing
company constitutes sufficient evidence to establish liability under the Copyright Act.
C.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright work with the exclusive right to
perform, and authorize others to perform, the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §106(4). Any person who
violates this exclusive right is an infringer. 17 U.S.C. §501(a).
Although the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the issue, almost every other circuit court in
the country has adopted a two-prong test to determine whether a corporate officer is jointly and
severally liable with the corporation for copyright infringement. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State
Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass’n, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2nd Cir. 1963); Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Development,
LLC, 284 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2002); RCA/Ariola Internat’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d
773 (8th Cir. 1988); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The
prerequisites for vicarious liability are: (1) the officer has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity, and (2) the officer has a direct financial interest in such activities. Jobete Music
Co., Inc. v. Johnson Communications, Inc., 285 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1083 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
Courts throughout the Sixth Circuit have adopted this two-prong test. Superhype Pub., Inc.
v. Vasiliou, 838 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (S.D. Ohio 1993); All Nations Music v. Christian Family
Network, 989 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Mallven Music v. 2001 VIP of Lexington, Inc., 1986
WL 10704 (E.D. Ky. 1986); Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 1981 WL 1391 (N.D. Ohio 1981). In fact, this

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Court has applied the two-prong test in past cases that are legion to the case at bar. See, Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Leyland Co., LLC, No. 5:11CV2264, 2012 WL 5879838, at *6 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
Under this standard, liability for copyright infringement is not limited to individuals who
directly engage in infringing activity, but also to individuals who have the right to supervise the
infringing activity and have a financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials. Jobete
Music Co. at 1083.
For instance, this Court has held that a direct financial interest and the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity makes the defendant liable. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc.,
582 F. Supp. 478, 484 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (emphasis added). In Warner Bros., the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant, a restaurant, hosted musical performances of ten of the company’s copyrighted
musical compositions. Id. at 480. The Court wrote, “The question of whether the defendant had the
right and ability to control the infringing activity is an issue of law.” Id. at 484. In Warner Bros., this
Court found that the defendant had both a direct financial interest in the infringing activity and the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and thus was personally liable. Id.
District courts in Ohio have further held that members of LLCs are subject to liability for
copyright infringement, and, like corporate officers, are analyzed under the same two-prong
standard. In Broadcast Music, Inc., v. DK 547, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-1064, 2013 WL 1615569, at *1
(S.D. Ohio 2013), a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, BMI alleged that defendants, DK 547,
LLC and Kuzmanovski, the owner of DK 547, LLC, committed nine counts of copyright
infringement on BMI’s copyrighted musical compositions. Kuzmanovski argued that he did not have
direct control over the activities or the ability to supervise his employees. Applying the two-prong
standard, the Court found that Kuzmanovski was vicariously liable for the infringement of plaintiffs’

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copyrights. Id. at *5. The Court permanently enjoined both defendants from publically performing
BMI’s copyrighted music, and awarded BMI both statutory damages and court costs to be paid by
DK 547, LLC and Kuzmanovski, due to his position as the owner of the LLC. Id. at *8.
Here, Defendant denies that he operated and maintained Rafters Bar & Grill, that he had the
right and ability to direct and control the activities of the Establishment, that he had the right and
ability to supervise the persons employed there, and that he had a direct financial interest in the
business. Req. for Adm., Nos. 8-11. He further argues that he received no income from the
Establishment. Interrogatories, No. 5. Defendant’s responses to inquiries regarding this apparent
discrepancy consist of claims that Defendant was retired, had little to do with Meadowlake Ltd.,
took long vacations over winters, and left the day-to-day supervision to Philip R. Barr and other
managers.
However, this Court has held that the fact that persons other than the defendant manage an
establishment on a day-to-day basis does not relieve him of liability. See, e.g. Warner Bros., 582 F.
Supp. at 483. The test does not require active supervision. Id. See also, Boz Scaggs Music v. KND
Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908 (D. Conn. 1980); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers,
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. NY 1977). Thus, the fact that Defendant was retired, took little personal
interest in managing Rafters Bar & Grill, took long vacations, and entrusted day-to-day operations
to others is irrelevant under the Copyright Act.
Furthermore, the fact that Defendant did not personally contract with the bands performing
the infringing music is also irrelevant. In Superhype Pub., 838 F. Supp. 1220 (S.D. Ohio 1993). the
defendant argued that musical performances were unapproved acts of agents, beyond the scope of

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their employment. Id. at 1224. In Superhype Pub., much like the case at bar, the defendant’s son
contracted the bands to perform. Id. Applying the two-prong vicarious liability test, the Court stated
that, in copyright cases, neither knowledge of, nor specific consent with regard to infringement is
absolutely necessary for personal liability. Id. The Defendant cannot escape liability for copyright
infringement by looking the other way. Id.
Likewise, in Sailor Music v. IML Corp., the Court found that the defendants, a husband and
wife, were personally liable for the claimed copyright infringements because they, as the owners of
IML, derived financial benefit from the infringing activities that occurred at their nightclub. Sailor
Music, 867 F. Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The Court found that the husband, although a more
passive actor in the management of the nightclub, was liable for the infringement because he was
a co-owner. Id.
Having considered Defendant’s arguments and the relevant case law, the Court finds that
even though Defendant had limited involvement in the management of Rafters Bar & Grill, he
nonetheless had the ability to control the infringing activity. Moreover, this Court finds as a matter
of law that as a 95% owner of Meadowlake Ltd., which was the owner of Rafters Bar & Grill,
Defendant had a direct financial interest in the Establishment.
Finally, Defendant contends that Rafters Bar & Grill lost money during the years in question,
and that he has received no pay from the Establishment. Interrogatories, Nos. 3,5. In Major Bob
Music v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 480 (S.D. Ga. 1994), the Court found that, regardless of whether
the alleged infringer actually profited from the performance itself, it is well established that “a
profit-making enterprise which publically performs copyrighted musical compositions is deemed
to do so for profit.” Major Bob Music, 851 F. Supp. at 480. See also, U.S. Songs, Inc. v. Downside

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Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (ND. Ga. 1991) (quoting Gnossos Music v. DiPompo, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d 1539, 1540, 1989 WL 154358 (D. Me. 1989)). The Court stated, “Furthermore, such an
enterprise is considered to be profit-making even if it never actually yields a profit.” Major Bob
Music, 851 F. Supp. at 480 (quoting U.S. Songs, 771 F. Supp. at 1226; Bourne Co. v. Speeks, 670
F. Supp. 777, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (citing Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 595, 37 S.Ct. 232,
233, 61 L.Ed. 511 (1917) (J. Holmes) (“Whether [music] pays or not the purpose of employing it
is profit and that is enough”).
There is nothing in the record that suggests that Rafters Bar & Grill played music for a
purpose other than making a profit. When this is the case, it does not matter whether or not the
business is actually turning a profit. In Broadcast Music, Inc.v. McDade & Sons, 2013 WL 840133
(D. Arizona), the Court held, “The fact that the defendants were unsuccessful in their operation is
not relevant.” Id. at at *9 (quoting Criterion Music Corp. v. Biggy’s Inc., 701 F. Supp. 802, 804 (D.
Kan. 1988). Accordingly, the fact the Defendant did not derive any income from Rafters Bar & Grill
is not relevant to the determination of his liability for copyright infringement.
In summary, a person who owns the vast majority share of a profit-making establishment is
not shielded from liability for copyright infringement because he is not the sole owner or because
he has placed someone else in charge of his business. In the case at bar, Defendant owns 95% of the
company controlling Rafters Bar & Grill, and precedent is clear that a direct financial interest makes
an owner liable for copyright infringement at his establishment. District courts in the Sixth Circuit
have found owners liable for copyright infringement when they owned far less than 95% of the
infringing company. Next, the fact that Defendant was not the day-to-day manager, was not present
at the time of the alleged infringement, and did not personally contract with the bands that performed

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is irrelevant under the Copyright Act. It is clear that the mere right and ability to supervise
establishes liability. Finally, Defendant’s claim that he received no payment from Rafters Bar &
Grill is similarly irrelevant because an establishment of the nature of Rafters Bar & Grill is certainly
a “profit-making enterprise.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the
Copyright Act claims as a matter of law.
II.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
A.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

In addition to summary judgment on liability, Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief,
statutory damages, and attorney’s fees in their motion. 17 U.S.C. §502(a) provides that the Court
may grant final injunctions “to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” The Northern
District of Illinois observed:
A permanent injunction is especially appropriate where a threat of continuing
infringement exists… The threat of continuing infringement is substantial in the
present case. Niro’s provided unauthorized performances of copyrighted musical
compositions on its premises after receiving oral and written notices of infringement
and demands to stop such infringement from BMI. This behavior indicates a willful
disregard of copyrights held by BMI and should be permanently enjoined.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Niro’s Palace, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 958, 963 (N.D. Ill. 1985). In the case at
bar, like Niro’s, Defendant made no effort to obtain a license and willfully disregarded oral and
written requests by Plaintiffs to cease performing their copyrighted materials.
While it is true that Meadowlake Ltd. has declared bankruptcy, it is unclear whether Rafters
Bar and Grill is still operational at any level. Because there is a strong possibility that copyright
infringement may occur in the future and because the Defendant has shown a high level of disregard
for Plaintiffs’ rights in the past, injunctive relief in this case is appropriate.

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B.

STATUTORY DAMAGES

The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to receive an award of statutory damages “in a sum
of not less that $750.00 or more than $30,000.00” per infringement in lieu of an award representing
the Plaintiffs’ actual damages and the Defendant(s)’ profits. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Furthermore, “in
a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving… that infringement was committed
willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not
more than $150,000.00.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
For the nine acts of infringement described in the Complaint, the Plaintiffs request a total
award of $10,800.00. This constitutes an award of $1,200.00 for each of the nine infringements.
Courts have held that a statutory damage award of three times the amount of the licensing fees is
appropriate under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1229-30
(7th Cir. 1991). The statutory awards requested are twice the cost of the licensing fees, and are at the
lower end of the statutory range. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ request for statutory damages is
appropriate.
C.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Title 17 U.S.C. § 505 provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery
of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof.
Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
The Copyright Act permits an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party”
in a copyright infringement case. 17 U.S.C. § 505; Balsley v. LFP, 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B)(ii). “The grant of fees and costs ‘is the rule rather than the exception and
they should be awarded routinely.’” Id. (citing Bridgeport Music Inc. v. WB Music Corp. (WB Music
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II), 520 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2008)). The decision to grant attorney’s fees remains within the trial
court’s discretion. 17 U.S.C. § 505; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127
L.Ed.2d 455 (1994).
In determining whether a plaintiff is entitles to attorney’s fees, the Court considers several
nonexclusive factors, referred to as the “Fogerty factors,” which are: “frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness (factual and length), and the need to advance considerations of
compensation and deterrence.” Jones v. Blidge, 558 F.3d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In the present case, Defendant intentionally and repeatedly ignored his obligations under the
Copyright Act and has forced Plaintiffs to engage in litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should be
awarded full attorney’s fees. There are no factors that militate against an award of Plaintiffs’ costs
in the case at bar.
According to the Declaration of Ronald Isroff, the attorney who represented Plaintiffs in this
action, and has filed numerous copyright infringement actions on behalf of BMI in the past,
Plaintiffs have accrued attorney’s fees in the amount $16,965.80 and expenses in the amount of
$350.00, for a total of $17,351.80. In Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Leyland Co., LLC, supra, this Court
found that $350.00 per hour was a reasonable fee for Attorney Isroff. In the present case, Attorney
Isroff has billed Plaintiffs at a rate of $313.00 per hour. This sum is reasonable for the services
provided. Finally, the Isroff Declaration lists $350.00 in costs. Therefore, the Court awards
$17,315.80 in attorney’s fees and costs in this case.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. #47, is GRANTED,

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Defendant’s motion to deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the above captioned case, Dkt. #50, is DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is GRANTED against Defendant as follows:
(1) Defendant is permanently enjoined from further acts of infringement;
(2) Plaintiffs are awarded judgment for statutory damages in the amount of $10,800.00, plus
interest from this date;
(3) Plaintiffs are awarded costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $17,315.80.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 29, 2013

/s/ George J. Limbert
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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