Miller et al v. Wayne Savings & Loan Company

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (Related Doc # 1 ). Judge Sara Lioi on 2/12/2013. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DENNIS MILLER, et al.,
PLAINTIFFS,
vs.
WAYNE SAVINGS & LOAN COMPANY,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 5:13cv135
JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiffs Dennis D. Miller, Gladys C. Miller and Russell Jay Gould
(collectively “plaintiffs”) filed the above-captioned complaint against Wayne Savings & Loan
Company (“defendant”). (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons stated below, the complaint is
DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Dennis and Gladys Miller (“the Millers”) are married to each other. Their
relationship to plaintiff Russell Gould, who resides in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is not disclosed.
The 16-page complaint the parties filed is distinguished solely by the fact that it does not contain
a single grammatically complete sentence. It is, however, captioned a “Quo-WarrantoComplaint.” (Doc. No. 1.) Therefore, the court will construe the action as such.1
It is worth noting that the Millers attached a mortgage contract to the complaint on
which they marked the word: “Evidence.” (Doc. No. 1-2.) It appears they entered into an Open
End Mortgage Agreement with Wayne Savings & Loan on or about April 20, 1981. At the
bottom of the agreement is a stamp that reads, as follows, “The conditions of this mortgage have

1

Although the Millers indiscriminately use the words “fraud” and “fraudulent” throughout their complaint, there are
no facts alleged in the pleading. Therefore, the Court cannot construe the nature of their allegations beyond the
complaint caption.

been complied with and the same is hereby satisfied and discharged. [Signed] Wayne Savings &
Loan Co. Gary C. Miller V.P.” Id. Adjacent to that statement is another stamp, which reads:
RELEASE [hand written] ‘7-3-86’, COPIED FROM THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGE. [Signed]
Richard Graven RECORDER.” Id. The document is riddled with handwritten annotations,
including: “ITALICS-WORD=NO-WORD.” Id.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a “district court may,
at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure when the allegations of a complaint are
totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit or no longer open to
discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the proposition that patently
frivolous claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290,
300 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that federal question jurisdiction is divested by obviously
frivolous and unsubstantial claims).
B. Federal Jurisdiction
“Article III of the Constitution limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to
the resolution of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). “As an incident to the elaboration
of this bedrock requirement, [the Supreme] Court has always required that a litigant have
‘standing’ to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.” Id. To establish

standing under Article III, the following three requirements must be in place: (1) the plaintiff has
suffered “an injury in fact,” (2) that injury bears a causal connection to the defendant’s
challenged conduct, and (3) a favorable judicial decision will likely provide the plaintiff with
redress from that injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61(1992). As the
parties bringing the claim, plaintiffs bear the burden to show their standing to bring it. Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
In consideration of these principles, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that
a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to
his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not
state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74. Where, as here, plaintiffs
have not articulated any injury they suffered based on an act performed by defendant, they have
failed to satisfy the most basic pleading requirement.
Legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim. Morgan v.
Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). This Court is not required to accept
unwarranted factual inferences. Id.; see also, Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir.
1971) (“A pleading will not be sufficient to state cause of action under Civil Rights Act if its
allegations are but conclusions.”). To set forth a valid claim, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). See also, Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard
articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim.”) Even liberally
construed, the complaint in this case does not set forth a colorable claim for relief.

C. Writ of Quo Warranto
Even allowing an analysis of this action as a writ of quo warranto, it must still fail.
Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2733.01(A), a quo warranto action may be brought in the name of the
state “[a]gainst a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office . . . within this state . . . .” As set forth in Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2733.04 and 2733.01, the
Ohio Code authorizes the Attorney General or prosecuting attorney to initiate a quo warranto
action. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huron Cnty. Prosecutor v. Westerhold, 72 Ohio St. 3d 392, 394
(1955). In addition, any “person[s] claiming to be entitled to a public office unlawfully held and
exercised by another” may also bring a quo warranto action under Ohio Rev. Code § 2733.06.
State ex rel. Coyne v. Todia, 45 Ohio St. 3d 232, 238 (1989) (quoting State ex rel. Annable v.
Stokes, 24 Ohio St. 2d 32, 32–33 (1970)).
The Millers do not fall within any class or entity entitled to bring a quo warranto
action. Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, plaintiffs lack
standing to bring this action. Thus, having failed to secure original jurisdiction, this Court would
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any quo warranto claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a).2

2

Although plaintiff Russell Gould resides in Wisconsin, no other relevant facts are alleged that might suggest
plaintiffs are attempting to establish jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §1332.

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2013
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

Section 1915(a)(3) provides, “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing
that it is not taken in good faith.”