Heller v. Pre-Paid Legal Services et al

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this action for the reasons stated within. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 3/27/13. (R,Sh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DAWN M. HELLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Pre-Paid Legal Services, et al.
Defendants.

) CASE NO. 5:13CV519
)
)
) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
)
)
) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) AND ORDER
)

On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff Dawn Heller filed this matter giving notice that she “hereby
appeals” to this Court from a decision made by the Ninth District Court of Appeals for the State of
Ohio. For the reasons that follow, this matter is DISMISSED.
Analysis
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court may dismiss an
action sua sponte if the complaint is so “implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion” as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Apple v. Glenn, 183
F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)(citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). For the
following reasons, the Court finds the claim asserted in this action satisfies these criterion.
While it is unclear what error Heller is alleging in the state court,1 it is clear that she is
challenging the decision of that court. United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction over

1

In that respect, Heller in fact has misrepresented the outcome of her appeal, contending
that the appellate court reversed dismissal of her action. The attached opinion, however, affirms
dismissal of her action.

challenges to state court decisions even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was
unconstitutional. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Federal appellate review of state court judgments
can only occur in the United States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this
principle, generally referred to as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in state court
is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United
States District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her
federal rights. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied two elements to a RookerFeldman analysis. First, in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in
federal district court, the issue before the court must be inextricably intertwined with the claim
asserted in the state court proceeding. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998) (overruled
on other grounds); see Tropf v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002).
“Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is
difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal
of the state court judgment.” Catz, 142 F.3d at 293 (quotation and citation omitted). The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the party losing his case in state court files suit in federal
district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself. Coles
v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857-59 (6th Cir. 2006). Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes
a district court’s jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly or
unconstitutionally applied in plaintiff’s particular case as opposed to a general constitutional
challenge to the state law applied in the state action. Id.; Tropf, 289 F.3d at 937.
2

In this matter, Heller specifically entitles her complaint an “appeal” from the state court
judgment. Accordingly, the elements of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine are easily satisfied. Heller
may not challenge the state court judgment through a purported “appeal” to this Court.
Conclusion
Based upon the above, this action is DISMISSED. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 27, 2013

/s/ John R. Adams
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3