Neubert v. Life Insurance Company of North America

Filing 20

Opinion and Order: The Court grants in part and denies in part plaintiff's request for discovery. (Doc. No. 17 .) The Court further sets aside the scheduling order currently in place. The parties are instructed to confer and file with the Court by October 18, 2013, a joint motion with proposed dates for completing discovery and filing simultaneous briefs. Judge Sara Lioi on 10/10/2013. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

WENDELL NEUBERT,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA,
DEFENDANT.

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CASE NO. 5:13 CV 643

JUDGE SARA LIOI

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for discovery. (Doc. No.
17.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART. The Court further sets aside the scheduling order currently in effect.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Wendell Neubert and defendant Life Insurance Company of North

America (LINA) have been disputing defendant’s denial of Long Term Disability (“LTD”)
benefits for over four years. The first three years of the dispute are recounted in this Court’s
opinion remanding the case to LINA for a full and fair review of LINA’s decision to deny
benefits. See Neubert v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 5:10CV1972, 2012 WL 776992 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 8, 2012). Since that decision, defendant has conducted another review of
plaintiff’s medical files and has denied benefits once more. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.)1 Notified that
defendant would not accept an appeal, plaintiff filed the instant action.
Plaintiff has moved for limited discovery (Doc. No. 17), and has submitted

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Citations to page number refer to the Court’s continuous pageID numbers in ECF.

five interrogatories and four requests for production of documents. (Doc. No. 17-1.)
Defendant has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 18), and plaintiff filed a reply in
support of the motion for discovery. (Doc. No. 19.) Plaintiff’s motion for discovery focuses
on the issues of conflict of interest and bias.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Discovery in ERISA Cases
District courts within this circuit have repeatedly been beset by discovery
disputes in ERISA cases. As courts in this Court’s position always do, the Court begins by
observing that discovery in ERISA cases, where the district court’s review is “based solely
upon the administrative record,” is the exception and not the rule. Wilkins v. Baptist
Healthcare Sys., 150 F.3d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 1998) (Gilman, J., concurring). Discovery
beyond the record is warranted only if it “is offered in support of a procedural challenge to
the administrator’s decision, such as an alleged lack of due process afforded by the
administrator or alleged bias on its part.” Id. After Wilkins, courts grappled with two
seemingly inconsistent lines of Sixth Circuit precedent. One line of cases required a plaintiff
to do more than merely allege a conflict of interest before discovery was warranted,
following Putney v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 111 F. App’x 803, 807 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[M]ere
allegation of bias is not sufficient to permit discovery under Wilkins’ exception.”). The other
line of cases did not require any threshold showing of conflict of interest before a plaintiff
could obtain discovery into that issue, following Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d 286,
293 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that weighing conflict of interest would have been easier had
plaintiff used Wilkins’ exception to conduct discovery), and Kalish v. Liberty Mut./Liberty
Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 419 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2005).
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
105 (2008), the inconsistency largely evaporated. In Glenn, the Court stated that an inherent
conflict of interest exists when the plan administrator both evaluates and pays benefits
claims. Id. at 112. This conflict is “but one factor among many that a reviewing judge must
take into account.” Id. at 116. In cases in which an insurance company has a history of
biased claims administration, this factor shall prove of great importance to the district
court’s review of the administrative record. Id. at 117. On the other hand, when the
“administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy,” the
conflict is less important to the district court’s review, perhaps even “to the vanishing
point.” Id. Most importantly for discovery purposes, the Court discouraged special
procedural or evidentiary rules for evaluating conflicts of interest. Id. at 116 (“Neither do we
believe it necessary or desirable for courts to create special burden-of-proof rules, or other
special procedural or evidentiary rules, focused narrowly upon the evaluator/payor
conflict.”).
As the Sixth Circuit has interpreted that final admonition, threshold
evidentiary showings of bias—special procedural rules—are not prerequisites to discovery
in ERISA cases. Johnson v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 324 F. App’x 459, 466 (6th Cir.
2009). Yet, “[t]hat does not mean … that discovery will automatically be available any time
the defendant is both the administrator and the payor under an ERISA plan.” Id. The district
court must evaluate and determine “whether and to what extent limited discovery is
appropriate in furtherance of a colorable procedural challenge under Wilkins.” Id. In
Johnson, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
limited discovery into a conflict of interest when the plaintiff offered more than a mere
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allegation of bias. Id. In its most recent ruling touching on ERISA discovery, the Sixth
Circuit recommitted itself to district court discretion, stating that discovery “may be
appropriate to determine the weight to accord to a conflict of interest, but the district court
retains discretion to decide when to allow such discovery.” Bell v. Ameritech Sickness &
Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 399 F. App’x 991, 998 (6th Cir. 2010). Post-Wilkins
fluctuations notwithstanding, one discovery principle has reigned unchallenged: discovery is
strictly limited to the procedural challenge at issue, whether lack of due process or bias.
Mulligan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 584, 588 (E.D. Tenn. 2011)
(citing Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The Court will not attempt a complete review of the voluminous case law in
the years since Johnson, but it will briefly summarize the approaches to discovery in ERISA
cases typically taken by district courts within this circuit. In the first approach, discovery
into defendant’s potential bias is permitted even when no showing of bias other than the
inherent conflict of interest is made or even alleged. See Kinsler v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 660 F. Supp. 2d 830, 836 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). To deny the plaintiff this discovery until
the plaintiff has made an initial showing of bias, the court noted, “essentially handcuffs the
plaintiff, who … will rarely have access to any evidence beyond a bare allegation of bias, in
the absence of discovery.” Id. Other courts have also ruled that discovery into potential bias
is justified upon nothing more than the inherent administrator/payor conflict of interest. See
Cramer v. Appalachian Reg. Healthcare, Inc., No. 5:11-49-KKC, 2012 WL 996583 (E.D.
Ky. Mar. 23, 2012); O’Bryan v. Consol Energy, Inc., No. 08-11, 2009 WL 383401 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 11, 2009) (plaintiff must “demonstrate that the discovery he seeks would lead to a
finding that the denial of benefits was arbitrary by pointing to some evidence that the
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decision process raises questions of fairness” but inherent conflict of interest, standing
alone, meets this showing).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, other district courts employ various devices that
require more than a mere allegation of bias before throwing open the doors of discovery. For
some courts in this second group, “plaintiff must allege some facts to support her claim that
discovery might lead to relevant evidence” before the court will permit discovery. Donovan
v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 1:10 CV 2627, 2011 WL 1344252, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 8, 2011); see also Geer v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 08-12837, 2009
WL 1620402, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2009) (“discovery should be allowed where a
plaintiff has provided sufficient initial facts suggesting a likelihood that probative evidence
of bias or procedural deprivation would be developed”). For this group of courts, a single
sentence allegation of bias cannot pry open the door to discovery. To hold otherwise would
make a mockery of Wilkins, transforming its well-guarded discovery door into a turnstile.
Seeking the same ends, one court developed a two-step discovery process, in which the
plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery “limited solely to the issue of whether [defendant]
or the individuals participating in the review of the Plaintiff’s claim had any financial
interest in the outcome of the claim.” Clark v. Am. Elec. Power Sys. Long Term Disability
Plan, 871 F. Supp. 2d 655, 662 (W.D. Ky. 2012). Once plaintiff has shown a conflict of
interest exists at the first step, plaintiff “will be permitted to proceed with additional
discovery.” Id. Still other courts require plaintiff to actively demonstrate the need for
discovery if the defendant has produced measures taken to mitigate bias and promote
accuracy. Shay v. Sun Life Fin. Serv. Co., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-804, 2012 WL 3839527, at *3
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2012); see also Raver v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of New York, 2013
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WL 1149180 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19. 2013) (discovery denied when, after defendant provided
information outlining steps taken to reduce bias and promote accuracy, plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that discovery was warranted). Whatever the method, for these courts, a mere
allegation of bias does not unlock the door to discovery.
Whether employing the mere allegation approach or one of the heightened
requirement approaches, all district courts typically permit discovery in ERISA cases when
plaintiff makes “an additional showing of potential bias,” beyond the inherent conflict of
interest. Sundermeyer v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, No 2:12-cv-959, 2013 WL 3147952 (S.D. Ohio
June 19, 2013); see also Wilkens v. Disability Benefit Plan Procter & Gamble, No. 1:11-cv521, 2012 WL 4364277, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2012) (dual administrator/payor status
and significant evidence of disability combined to justify limited discovery); Cummins v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, No. 2:10-cv-108, 2010 WL 4809269, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 19, 2010) (discovery permitted when plaintiff offered evidence of “significant
financial relationship” between defendant and medical experts).
Different still is the approach taken by the court in Price v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Mich. 2010). There, the court ruled that
“[d]isputes over the scope of discovery in [ERISA] cases should be addressed in the context
of existing rules [of procedure] and the cases interpreting them.” Id. at 865. Yet, courts
“must be mindful that Wilkins instructs courts to decide these cases as actions for review on
an administrative record, intended to be expeditious and inexpensive, and must apply the
existing rules accordingly.” Id. at 866. Turning to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the
court noted that relevance, and with it, the scope of discovery, are determined by the parties’
claims and defenses, as set forth in their pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (“Parties may
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obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.”) Even when relevant, the court must limit discovery when it is “unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative” or when the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Following that reasoning, another
district court noted that Rule 26 allows discovery only when “reasonably calculated” to lead
to admissible evidence; thus, in an ERISA case, evidence of bias would only be
discoverable when it is probative of bias in the plaintiff’s particular claim. Mulligan v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 584, 590 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). Restricting
discovery in this manner, according to these courts, comports with both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the dictates of Wilkins.
The permitted scope of ERISA bias discovery varies between courts. A small
cadre of district courts, however, subscribes to a running list of permitted areas of inquiry:
(1) incentive, bonus, or reward programs or systems, formal or informal, for any employee
involved in reviewing disability claims; (2) contractual connections between the conflicted
administrator/payor and the reviewers utilized in plaintiff’s claim; (3) statistical data
regarding the number of claims files sent to the reviewers and the number of denials which
resulted; (4) statistical data concerning the number of times the reviewers found claimants
able to work in at least a sedentary occupation or found that the claimants were not disabled;
and (5) documentation of administrative processes designed only to check the accuracy of
grants of claims. See Geiger v. Pfizer, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 577, 583 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (citations
omitted); see also Mullins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 267 F.R.D. 504, 513 (W.D. Ky.
2010) (same).
This Court will evaluate each discovery request in the context of Wilkins’
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general prohibition of discovery in ERISA cases, as well as Rule 26’s field of discovery, as
fenced in by the parties’ claims and defenses. The Court will approve discovery only in
furtherance of a colorable procedural challenge of bias. Each discovery request will be
approved if it is narrowly tailored to the issue of bias and not overly burdensome,
considering both Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the Court’s rather circumscribed ERISA review.
When plaintiff provides more than a bare allegation of bias or conflict of interest as to his
claim for LTD benefits on remand, the Court will permit more burdensome discovery than it
will upon conclusory allegations. In evaluating each request, the Court will be guided by
twin ERISA goals: permitted bias discovery and limited record review.
B. Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests
In this case, plaintiff’s claim is simple: defendant has wrongfully withheld
benefits from him. Benefits have been withheld, according to the complaint, because
defendant’s inherent conflict of interest as administrator and payor interfered with its
decision regarding benefits, to the point of rendering the decision arbitrary and capricious.
(Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff therefore requests discovery on the issues of bias and conflict of
interest.2 (Doc. No. 17.) Plaintiff has pinpointed three areas of discovery purportedly related
to the conflict of interest: (1) whether defendant’s conflict of interest went beyond the basic
inherent conflict of interest (including its employees); (2) whether there was a bias or
conflict of interest with the medical reviewers or vendors; and (3) whether there was a bias
or conflict of interest regarding the vocational analysts. (Doc. No. 19 at 1241.) According to
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In its opposition to plaintiff’s motion for discovery, defendant argues that, because plaintiff did not request
discovery in the initial action, plaintiff is not entitled to discovery on remand. (Doc. No. 18 at 1233.)
Defendant fails to note, however, that plaintiff is alleging bias in LINA’s LTD benefits denial on remand. The
discovery permitted by the Court addresses only allegations of bias on remand; thus, the lack of discovery in
the initial action is wholly irrelevant.
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plaintiff, each of his discovery requests—of which there are five interrogatories and four
requests for production—is narrowly tailored to the procedural charge of bias. Because
plaintiff’s discovery requests vary wildly in scope and relevance, the Court will address
each in turn.
1.

Interrogatory No. 1

The first interrogatory asks only for the names and positions of each person who
responds to the discovery requests. Plaintiff’s motion for discovery as to this interrogatory is
GRANTED.
2.

Interrogatory No. 2 and Request for Production No. 1

The second interrogatory is extensive, requesting for each doctor, nurse, file
reviewer, or vendor used for medical examination in plaintiff’s claim: (1) their names; (2)
their employment or contractual relationship with defendant; (3) the number of times they
have been used in the last ten years by defendant; (4) the total fees they received in this case
and in the past ten years; (5) the number of times they have supported or recommended a
finding of no disability in the past ten years; and (6) the number of times their opinion has
led to a denial of benefits. The corresponding request for production asks defendant to
attach any contract or document identified in the interrogatory. (See Doc. No. 17-1 at 1226–
27.) In support of these requests, plaintiff avers that the opinions of “medical reviewer Dr.
Swales, the Venue(s) Forest Hills IPA, Inc., and/or ‘ACS’” may be “based upon a bias due
to an incentive for working for the Defendant, and such bias needs to be fully explored.”
(Doc. No. 17 at 1220.)
Dr. Swales administered neuropsychological testing to plaintiff during
plaintiff’s first claim for LTD benefits, and his opinion was strongly relied upon in the
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denial of benefits. After remand from this Court, Dr. Swales was reassigned to plaintiff’s
claim to conduct a file review, whereupon plaintiff’s claim was again denied. (Doc. No. 161 at 84.) In its opposition to the motion for discovery, defendant claims that it “does not
control the roster of reviewers that may be assigned to a claim by a particular vendor.” (Doc.
No. 18 at 1237.) Yet, Dr. Swales was assigned to conduct a file review on remand, which
review would necessarily include his own assessment of plaintiff’s condition during the first
claim for LTD benefits. Plaintiff asserts that “there seems to be a unique connection
between Defendant and Dr. Swales that bypassed the claimed lack of direct referral.” (Doc.
No. 19 at 1244.) Here, plaintiff has done more than allege general bias. Any discovery with
respect to Dr. Swales, who has been intimately involved with plaintiff’s claim from its first
denial to the review on remand, would be highly probative of potential bias on remand in
plaintiff’s claim for LTD benefits.
With respect to Dr. Swales, as well as the other persons identified in the
second interrogatory, defendant argues that compliance would be unduly burdensome,
requiring a file-by-file review of all claim files. (Doc. No. 18 at 1237.) Because ERISA
cases are to be expeditiously and inexpensively resolved, the Court concludes that the
requested information in interrogatory number two and request for production number one is
unduly burdensome and not in accordance with the directives set forth by the Sixth Circuit
in Wilkins. See Price v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 860, 869 (E.D.
Mich. 2010) (denying as overly burdensome interrogatory requiring file-by-file review).
Plaintiff has, however, made a showing of potential bias beyond a bare allegation and
beyond an inherent administrator/payor conflict of interest with respect to Dr. Swales and
his involvement in plaintiff’s claim. In such situations, district courts have routinely allowed
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discovery into bias. The Court thus limits the scope of interrogatory number two and request
for production number one to Dr. Swales alone and, as to interrogatory number two, only to
the information requested in subdivisions (a) and (b).3 Insofar as plaintiff’s motion for
discovery with respect to interrogatory number two subdivisions (a) and (b) and request for
production number one relates to Dr. Swales, the motion is GRANTED, but the motion is
DENIED with respect to subdivisions (c) through (f), even as they relate to Dr. Swales.
Insofar as the interrogatory and request for production of documents relate to other doctors,
nurses, file reviewers, or vendors, the motion is DENIED.
3.

Interrogatory No. 3

The third interrogatory is staggeringly expansive, requesting the total number
of claims made within the last ten years, filed under the disability plan that is the subject of
the complaint. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 1227.) The request is not limited to claims decided on
remand, like the claim currently before the Court, nor is the request even limited to the
policy at issue in this case, but rather encompasses the whole disability plan. Even if
evidence of historical bias is uncovered through this discovery request, it would not be
probative of bias in plaintiff’s claim, a claim decided on remand under a particular policy
within the overarching disability plan. See Mulligan v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
271 F.R.D. 584, 590 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (“evidence of a history of biased claims
administration is significant only insofar as it is probative of bias in the particular claim”).

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Limiting the discovery request to these subsections assures that defendant shall be burdened by producing
relevant information only. The full scope of interrogatory number two asks for all information regarding Dr.
Swales’ relationship with LINA. Much of this information is utterly irrelevant to the bias asserted in this case:
LINA and Dr. Swales’ bias on remand in Dr. Swales’ review of a claim for LTD benefits to which he had
previously been assigned. Discovery in ERISA cases is strictly limited to the bias at issue. Accordingly, the
Court will not approve discovery requiring a file-by-file review to produce information that is largely
irrelevant to the charge of bias on remand.
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Only dubiously relevant, but very burdensome, plaintiff’s motion for discovery with respect
to interrogatory number three is DENIED.
4.

Interrogatory No. 4 and Request for Production No. 2

The fourth interrogatory asks for the name of each person involved in
denying LTD benefits, as well as whether each person was employed by defendant and
whether each person receives bonuses or incentives from defendant for denying claims.

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Bonus or incentives for claims denials would indeed be relevant to and probative of bias in
plaintiff’s claim and are thus discoverable. See Hays v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
623 F. Supp. 2d 840, 844 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (plaintiff “entitled to know generally if the
defendant had . . . any type of incentive, bonus, or reward program or system”);
Sundermeyer v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, No. 2:12-cv-959, 2013 WL 3147952, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
June 19, 2013) (discovery permitted as to “incentives and bonuses based on company
profitability or claim denial rates”). Plaintiff’s motion for discovery with respect to
interrogatory number four and request for production number two is GRANTED as herein
modified:
Interrogatory No. 4
As to each person who performed any administrative review or analysis, or was
involved in the decision making process of the plaintiff’s claim, who also has an
arrangement with Life Insurance Company of North America to receive any bonus
or incentive if the subject claim is denied, please state the following:
a.
the name of each person;
b.
whether each person is employed by defendant; and
c.
how each person’s bonuses or incentives are awarded or calculated.
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Defendant has already stated that it “does not pay any of the reviewers it utilizes bonus or incentive pay.
External reviewers retained through a vendor are not paid differently for reaching a particular conclusion. In
fact, external reviewers retained through a vendor do not know if LINA pays or denies a claim following their
review. Similarly, LINA’s employees are paid fixed salaries, which are wholly unrelated to the number of
claims paid or claims denied.” (Doc. No. 18 at 1238.)
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5.

Request for Production No. 3

Plaintiff requests production of performance reviews, commendations,
awards, reprimands and/or evaluations within the past five years of any employee involved
in the decision to deny or terminate plaintiff’s LTD benefits. The burden of this request for
production, particularly its effect on the privacy of the employees involved, is high, while
any benefit conferred by discovery of employment files is not immediately apparent, nor is
it specifically developed in plaintiff’s motion. Moreover, district courts in this circuit
overwhelmingly deny these requests for production. See, e.g., Myers v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 581 F. Supp. 2d 904, 914 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (court disinclined to allow discovery of
personnel files); Mullins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 267 F.R.D. 504, 516 (W.D. Ky.
2010) (“well established” that employee personnel files not discoverable); McQueen v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 595 F. Supp. 2d 752, 756 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (no discovery of performance
reviews or personnel files). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for discovery with respect to
request for production number three is DENIED.
6.

Interrogatory No. 5 and Request for Production No. 4

Interrogatory number five asks for the following information as to each
vocational expert, file reviewer, or vendor used for vocational file reviews in plaintiff’s
claim: (1) their names; (2) their employment or contractual relationship with defendant; (3)
the number of times defendant has utilized them in the last ten years; (4) the total fees paid
to them in this case and in the past ten years; (5) the number of times within the past ten
years their opinions have supported a finding that a claimant could not return to any
substantial gainful activity; and (6) the number of times within the past ten years that their
opinion has led to a benefits denial. The corresponding request for production asks for
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contracts or documents identified in the interrogatory. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 1229–30.)
With respect to this request, plaintiff states that “the vocation evidence is
extremely relevant due to the unique facts of the case which put substantial weight on the
vocational evidence in the file.” (Doc. No. 17 at 1220.) The vocational expert reviews may
indeed be important. The decision to deny benefits may have even turned on those reviews.
The rule for ERISA discovery is not, however, discovery of important facts. It is discovery
of facts relating to a colorable procedural challenge; here, a charge of bias. Plaintiff has not
made even the barest showing or allegation that discovery into defendant’s relationship with
vocational experts will produce relevant evidence of bias. Coupled with the enormous fileby-file review that this request necessitates, the Court finds the interrogatory and request for
production overly burdensome. See Price v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp.
2d 860, 869 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (denying as overly burdensome interrogatory requiring fileby-file review). With respect to interrogatory number five and request for production
number four, plaintiff’s motion for discovery is DENIED.
III.

CONCLUSION
In accordance with the analysis set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN

PART AND DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s request for discovery. The Court further sets
aside the scheduling order currently in place. The parties are instructed to confer and file
with the Court by October 18, 2013, a joint motion with proposed dates for completing
discovery and filing simultaneous briefs.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: October 10, 2013
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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