Martin v. Maurer et al

Filing 15

Memorandum Opinion and Order that the Wayne County Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED (Doc. # 9 ). Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint is DENIED (Doc. # 11 ). The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The complaint is dismissed. Judge John R. Adams on 2/10/14. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Amanda A. Martin,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Thomas Maurer, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 5:13CV1109
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
(Resolves Docs. 9 and 11)

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Defendants Wayne County Sheriff’s Department, Thomas G. Maurer – former Wayne County
Sheriff, the Wayne County Commissioners, and former Wayne County Sheriff Deputy Joel
Marmet, (the “Wayne County Defendants”). Also pending before the Court is a motion to
amend the complaint filed by Plaintiff Amanda Martin. The motion to amend (Doc. 11) is
DENIED. The motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not

to delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The standard for evaluating a
motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that applicable to a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12
(6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit stated the standard for reviewing such a motion to dismiss in
Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007) as follows:
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the law with respect to what a plaintiff
must plead in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court stated that “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Id. at 1964-65 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the
Court emphasized that even though a complaint need not contain “detailed”
factual allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In so
holding, the Court disavowed the oft-quoted Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (recognizing “the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief”), characterizing that rule as one “best forgotten
as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 548.
If an allegation is capable of more than one inference, this Court must construe it in the
plaintiff’s favor. Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)
(citing Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)). This Court may not grant a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion merely because it may not believe the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Id.
Although this is a liberal standard of review, the plaintiff still must do more than merely assert
bare legal conclusions. Id. Specifically, the complaint must contain “either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.”

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)

(quotations and emphasis omitted).
Additionally, the Court may deny leave to amend if the amendment would be futile.
Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995). AA proposed amendment is futile if the
amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.@ Riverview Health Inst. LLC
v. Medical Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). In the instant matter, the proposed
amendments, as detailed below, would not withstand the pending motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Accordingly, amendment would be futile.

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II. FACTS
In her complaint against the Wayne County Defendants, Martin claims that they
maliciously prosecuted her for burglary without probable cause to do so. Martin’s allegations
effectively center upon her belief that the investigation against her was shoddy and incomplete.
Martin asserts, for example, that Defendant Marmet declined to interview four alibi witnesses
that would have established that she was at her father’s home at the time of the alleged burglary.
Martin, however, does admit that she was arrested pursuant to a warrant and that her prosecution
began as a result of a grand jury indictment.

Perhaps recognizing that these facts would

generally bar a claim for malicious prosecution, Martin seeks to amend her complaint to add
allegations that the Wayne County Defendants willfully withheld exculpatory information from
the grand jury that would have eliminated its probable cause determination.
III. ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit has explained the law surrounding Martin’s claim for malicious
prosecution as follows:
This court recognizes a “‘constitutionally cognizable claim of malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment’” encompassing “wrongful
investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Barnes v. Wright, 449
F.3d 709, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d
244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003)). “The ‘tort of malicious prosecution’ is ‘entirely
distinct’ from that of false arrest, as the malicious-prosecution tort ‘remedies
detention accompanied not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful
institution of legal process.’” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir.
2010) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007)). The elements of a
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a
violation of the Fourth Amendment are as follows:
First, the plaintiff must show that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the
plaintiff and that the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to
prosecute. Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on the violation of a
constitutional right, the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable
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cause for the criminal prosecution. Third, the plaintiff must show that, as a
consequence of a legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty,
as understood in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial
seizure. Fourth, the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the plaintiff's
favor.
Id. at 308–09 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
Mott v. Mayer, 524 Fed.Appx. 179, 186-187 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Sixth Circuit has also explained that probable cause to initiate a criminal prosecution
exists where “facts and circumstances [are] sufficient to lead an ordinarily prudent person to
believe the accused [is] guilty of the crime charged.” MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 342
Fed.Appx. 138, 146 (6th Cir. 2009). As a general rule, “the finding of an indictment, fair upon
its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable
cause.” Barnes, 449 F.3d at 716. However, an exception applies “where the indictment was
obtained wrongfully by defendant police officers who knowingly present[ed] false testimony to
the grand jury.” Cook v. McPherson, 273 Fed.Appx. 421, 424 (6th Cir.2008); see also Peet v.
City of Detroit, 502 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing that a judicial determination of
probable cause has no preclusive effect if a claim of malicious prosecution is based on a police
officer's supplying false information to establish probable cause).
In support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Wayne County Defendants
rely heavily upon the fact that Martin admitted in her complaint that she was indicted by a grand
jury. As detailed above, absent an exception to the Barnes rule, this indictment conclusively
establishes probable cause.

Martin does not allege in her complaint, nor in her proposed

amendments, that the exception – supplying false information – is applicable. Instead, Martin
contends that liability should flow from the Wayne County Defendants failure to disclose
exculpatory information to the grand jury. However, the Wayne County Defendants properly

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note that the Sixth Circuit does not recognize such an obligation. “[T]he Supreme Court in
Williams announced there is no federal duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. See
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992)[.]” Carver v. Mack, 112 Fed.Appx. 432, 437
(6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the amendment would be futile.
In short, Martin has failed to allege facts that support a malicious prosecution claim under
binding Sixth Circuit law. Without such an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, Martin’s
Monell claim must also fail as a matter of law. “To impose § 1983 liability on a municipality or
local governmental entity, plaintiff must show that an officially executed policy, or the toleration
of a custom, resulted in a constitutional deprivation .” Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240,
243 (6th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the finding that a constitutional violation occurred is axiomatic to
analyzing whether the policy at issue resulted in the constitutional violation. Thurmond v. County
of Wayne, 447 Fed.Appx. 643, 651 (6th Cir.2011). Thus, absent a finding of a violation of
Martin's rights, there is no need for the Court to review whether the policy caused the alleged
harm. Here, as explained above, no constitutional violation has been properly pleaded.
There being no cognizable constitutional claims in the case, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Martin’s remaining, purely state-law claims, including those
raised against Defendants Yost and Breitenstine. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (if federal claims in a case are dismissed before trial, state law claims
should also be dismissed).
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Wayne County Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

The motion to amend the complaint is DENIED. The Court declines to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over the purely state law claims.

Accordingly, the complaint is hereby

DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 10, 2014

/s/ John R. Adams
Judge John R. Adams
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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