United States of America v. Noble Homes, Inc. et al

Filing 81

Order denying FHAA's Motion to intervene as a party. (Related Doc # 70 ). Judge John R. Adams on 9/10/14.(L,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America,
Plaintiffs,

Noble Homes, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 5:13CV2659
JUDGE JOHN ADAMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a motion to intervene filed by movant Fair Housing Advocates
Association (“FHAA”). FHAA filed its motion on August 14, 2014, and no timely opposition has
been filed. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 allows for two types of intervention: intervention of
right and permissive intervention. Subsection (a)(2) of the rule provides that a non-party may
intervene as “of right” when, “[o]n timely motion,” the movant “claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). In other words, Rule
24 allows an absentee party to petition for intervention when it “stands to have its interests
harmed.” Glancy v. Taubman Centers, Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 670 n.13 (6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth
Circuit has held that Rule 24 “should be ‘broadly construed in favor of potential intervenors.’”
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 1991)).

[FHAA] must establish four factors before being entitled to intervene: (1) the
motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal
interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed intervenor’s ability to
protect their interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the
parties already before the court cannot adequately protect the proposed intervenor’s
interest.
Granholm, 501 F.3d at 779 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397–98 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Each of the factors must be shown, as the absence of even one will compel the Court to deny the
motion. United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Grubbs v. Norris,
870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989)).
The Court finds that the first factor noted above has not been satisfied, that is, the motion is
not timely. The United States filed its complaint in this matter on December 2, 2013. The Court
conducted its case management conference on March 18, 2014, setting a discovery deadline of
September 18, 2014. Parties were to be joined and pleadings were to be amended by no later than
May 14, 2014. FHAA, however, did not seek to intervene until August 14, 2014. As such, the
motion did not become ripe for adjudication until August 29, 2014, a mere three weeks before the
close of discovery. FHAA offers no argument with respect to why its motion was not filed until
the end of discovery. Moreover, while asserting that its intervention will not cause any delay in
this matter, FHAA contends that it will conduct no independent discovery. In so arguing, FHAA
ignores whether its intervention will cause any of the nine named defendants to be required to seek
or expand discovery to address FHAA’s allegations.
While accepting that FHAA has a legal interest in the matter before the Court, the Court
also finds FHAA’s adequacy of representation argument less-than-compelling.
Lastly, the movants must show that the parties before the Court will not adequately
represent the movant’s interests. The burden for this showing is “‘minimal.’”
Horrigan, 1998 WL 246008 at *3 (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10 (1972)). It is sufficient for the movant to show
that another’s representation may be inadequate—the movant need not show that

representation will in fact be inadequate. Miller, 103 F.3d at 1247. For instance, it is
enough that the movant shows a party already in the case may make different
arguments or pursue different trial tactics. Id.
Id. at 547. In the instant matter, FHAA has done nothing other than allege that it may at some
unknown point in the future raise different arguments than the United States. It fails to even hint
at what these arguments may be.

While the burden is minimal, adopting FHAA’s argument

would reduce it to non-existent.
Furthermore, any assertions that FHAA and the Government’s interests and arguments
may diverge is underscored by the remainder of FHAA’s brief. In fact, FHAA concedes that it
will seek no independent discovery – an almost tacit admission that its interests are and have been
adequately represented by the United States.
Assuming arguendo that FHAA’s bare bones assertion regarding different arguments is
sufficient to satisfy its burden, the Court would still find that the untimely nature of its filing is
sufficient reason standing alone to deny the motion to intervene. The untimely nature of the
motion is highlighted by the fact that FHAA first began its investigation of the properties at issue
on August 8, 2011. As noted above, suit was filed nearly two years after that investigation was
started and specifically alleged the actions taken by FHAA and the diversion of its resources. As
such, the Court can find no justification for the delay in FHAA seeking to intervene in this matter.
The motion to intervene is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 10, 2014

/s/ John R. Adams
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE