Heller v. Capella University et al

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Heller's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted and the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e) for failing to state a claim for relief. The Court certifies that an in forma pauperis appeal from this judgment could not be taken in good faith. Judge Sara Lioi on 5/29/2014. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DAWN HELLER,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
CAPELLA UNIVERSITY, et al.,
DEFENDANTS.

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CASE NO. 5:14CV0580
JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Dawn Heller (“plaintiff” or “Heller”) filed this in forma
pauperis action against Capella University, The Higher Learning Commission
(Accreditation), Sallie Mae-Department of Education c/o The OCR National Headquarters
and John Doe Subsidiaries, Affiliates, Assigns, Accreditation Boards, Alias Names granting
authorities under the Department of Justice. Plaintiff captions this action: “Qui Tam, Theft,
Fraudulent Accounting Practices, and other inter alia causes.” Heller seeks all damages
permitted by law.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff provides no relevant dates nor identifies any of the defendants by

name within the body of her complaint. She does allege she was enrolled in an
undergraduate program studying Human Resources. There she sustained civil injuries as a
result of the “unethical accounting and debt collection practice, i.e. theft, in the failure to
uphold their duty in the performance of any part of the contract, making the school unable to

collect any part of said tuition fees.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2.)1 Heller complains that “[n]o
legitimate services were performed associated with the performance of the contract,” even
though she was charged one month before classes started. (Id.) She refers to exhibits that
purportedly identify some of the charges to which she is referring. It is difficult to discern
any meaning from the balance of her two-page complaint. Although she “believes there to
be a strong case also for discrimination . . . exacted on the plaintiff,” (Id. at 3), and identifies
the Ohio Rehabilitative Services Commission, Good Will Industries International, and the
Department of Justice as alleged perpetrators, none of these parties are named as defendants,
and there are no facts alleged that support any discrimination allegation.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454

U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss any claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a basis upon which relief can
be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir.
1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).
III.

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
“Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not . . .

without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). District
courts are “not require[d] to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them[ ]” or “to
construct full blown claims from sentence fragments[.]” Id. To do so would require the court
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The complaint does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b), which requires that claims be set out “in
numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” As a result, it is
difficult to cite to the complaint with any accuracy.

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“to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, . . . [and] would . . .
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id.
Dismissal is appropriate “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly
incredible . . . .” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340
(1992).
Even liberally construed under these standards, the complaint herein does not
contain allegations reasonably suggesting Heller might have a valid federal claim.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Heller’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is

granted and the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failing to state
a claim for relief. The Court certifies that an in forma pauperis appeal from this judgment
could not be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 29, 2014
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.”

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