Wiley v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that the ALJ failed to properly explain her reasons for according less than controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with the instant Opinion and Order. Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert on 8/26/2015. (S,L)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHELLE D. WILEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN1,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 5:14CV1162
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle D. Wiley (“Plaintiff”) requests judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) denying her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). ECF Dkt. #1. Plaintiff
asserts that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in her decision because she failed to accord
proper weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, consulting examiner, and state agency
physician. ECF Dkt. #14.
For the following reasons, the instant case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with the instant Opinion and Order.
I.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and DIB on April 20, 2010 and May 21, 2010,
respectfully. ECT Dkt. #11 (“Tr.”) at 22. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s
applications initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 5. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ,
and hearings were held on May 14, 2012 and October 24, 2012. Tr. at 40, 49.
On January 17, 2013, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s applications for SSI and DIB. Tr. at 19.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through
March 31, 2010, and that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September
1
On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the acting Commissioner of Social Security,
replacing Michael J. Astrue.
13, 2005. Id. at 24. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe
impairments: obesity; status-post left cerebral vascular ischemic infarction and left internal carotid
artery dissection; compression fracture of the T8 and T9 vertebral bodies, with mild spondylosis of
the T6 through T10 vertebral bodies; chondromalacia of the left knee; capsulitis of the left ankle;
right foot drop; hammer toes; acquired right metatarsal deformity; unspecified deformity of the right
foot; gastro-esophageal reflux disease; irritable bowel syndrome; dysphagia; migraine headaches;
depressive disorder (not otherwise specified); major depressive disorder; generalized depressive
disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; mood disorder (not otherwise specified); cognitive disorder
(not otherwise specified); bipolar spectrum features; and borderline personality disorder. Id. at 25.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment of combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. Tr. at 25. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with certain
exceptions. Id. at 27. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant
work, but considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. Id. at 35. Based
on the above findings, the ALJ held that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from September 13, 2005 through the date of the decision. Id. at 36.
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council
denied her request for review. Tr. at 1. The ALJ’s decision therefore became the final decision of
the Commissioner. On May 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking review. ECF Dkt. #1.
On September 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed a brief on the merits. ECF Dkt. #14. On October 29, 2014,
Defendant filed a brief on the merits. ECF Dkt. #15. Plaintiff filed a reply brief on November 26,
2014. ECF Dkt. #17.
II.
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
On January 17, 2013, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. at 25. The ALJ opined that because
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Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not cause at least two marked limitations or one marked limitation
and repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, the paragraph (B) criteria were
not satisfied. Id. at 26. Continuing, the ALJ indicated that she also considered whether the
paragraph (C) criteria were satisfied, and determined that they were not satisfied. Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that Plaintiff: may occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, but may never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; is limited to the
performance of simple, routine tasks that can be learned in thirty days or less, which are repetitive,
such that the environment is relatively static, undertaken in a setting that is low stress, defined as
precluding tasks that involve high production quotas, strict time requirements, arbitration,
negotiation, confrontation, directing the work of, or being responsible for the safety of others, which
requires no more than limited and superficial interaction with co-workers and the public. Tr. at 27.
Further, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, however, Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely credible for the reasons provided
by Plaintiff. Id. at 28.
The ALJ determined that the record did not support Plaintiff’s contentions of physical
deficiencies resulting from a stroke. Tr. at 29. Further, the ALJ found that physical examinations
included in the record consistently, albeit not universally, reported either minimal or normal
findings, and cited examples of these physical examinations. Id. The ALJ indicated that Plaintiff
followed a regimen of prescription medications intended to address her impairments, and, according
to Plaintiff, did not experience any side effects. Id. Additionally, the ALJ determined that, when
considered as a whole, the record did not support the contention that Plaintiff’s impairments would
be preclusive of all types of work. Id. at 31.
When discussing Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ indicates that Plaintiff was
diagnosed with depressive disorder (not otherwise specified), major depressive disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, mood disorder (not otherwise specified), cognitive
disorder (not otherwise specified), bipolar spectrum features, and borderline personality disorder.
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Tr. at 31. The ALJ opined that although these diagnoses would be consistent with Plaintiff’s
allegations of deficient memory and concentration, her quickness to anger, and her bouts of
depression, the record, when considered as a whole, is not supportive of the contention that the
existence of these impairments would be preclusive of all types of work. Id. The ALJ further
opined that the mental status examinations included in the record have consistently, albeit not
universally, reported either minimal or normal findings. Id. at 31.
Continuing, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff has been issued multiple global assessment of
function (“GAF”) scores, ranging from a low of thirty to a high of sixty. Tr. at 32. The ALJ noted
that typically Plaintiff was assigned a score of fifty, which is consistent with the ability to work. Id.
The ALJ opined that, in sum, the evidence indicated that the symptom limitations relevant to
Plaintiff’s impairments were not as severe as alleged. Id. The ALJ stated that Plaintiff engaged in
the following daily activities: attending to her own hygiene and grooming; engaging in routine
household chores, including cleaning, laundry, and meal preparation; engaging in child rearing
activity for a young child; and driving, shopping in stores, using a computer, visiting with others,
watching television for pleasure, and exercising regularly. Id. The ALJ stated that while none of
the above activities, considered in isolation, would warrant a finding of “not disabled,” when
considered in combination, they strongly suggest that Plaintiff would be capable of engaging in the
work activity contemplated by the RFC determination. Id. The ALJ also stated that, although the
inconsistent information provided by Plaintiff may not be the result of a conscious intention to
mislead, nevertheless the inconsistencies suggest that the information provided by Plaintiff generally
may not be entirely reliable. Id. at 33.
The ALJ discussed the weight she accorded to various opinions offered by Plaintiff’s
psychologists and physicians. At issue in this case is the weight accorded to the opinions offered
by Richard Litwin, Ph.D., Bruce Goldsmith, Ph.D., and Vera Astreika, M.D. ECF Dkt. #14 at 1.
Accordingly, only the opinions from the above three psychologists and physicians will be discussed
herein.
The ALJ indicated that she accorded considerable weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s
consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Litwin, which indicated that Plaintiff could perform
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simple, routine tasks in a static environment, with infrequent changes, and with no requirement of
strong interpersonal teamwork. Tr. at 33. The ALJ indicated that Dr. Litwin examined Plaintiff on
a single occasion and reported within the bounds of his professional certifications and specialty. Id.
at 33-34. Further, the ALJ stated that Dr. Litwin’s opinion was largely consistent with the medical
evidence on the record, including Plaintiff’s presentation during the hearing. Id. at 34.
The ALJ indicated that she accorded some weight to the opinion of the state agency medical
consultant, Dr. Goldsmith, namely, that Plaintiff could perform simple to moderately complex tasks,
with no time or production demands, in a static environment where changes are easily explained,
and with no strict production quotas. Tr. at 34.
The ALJ opined that Dr. Goldsmith had the
opportunity to examine Plaintiff’s records, to which she cited liberally in his opinions, is well versed
in the terminology and analytic framework employed in the disposition of Plaintiff’s claims, and that
Dr. Goldsmith’s opinion was broadly consistent with the evidence of record. Id.
The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Astreika,
indicating that Plaintiff would have multiple marked and extreme limitations in her ability to
understand, remember, and carry out instructions, to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace,
to relate to others, and to withstand the stressors of day-to-day work. Tr. at 34. The ALJ stated that
Dr. Astreika treated Plaintiff over a lengthy period and was reporting within the bounds of her
professional certification, however, persistent references in the treatment notes of Plaintiff’s
cooperative behavior and at least fair concentration suggested that the limitations as set forth were
at least somewhat overstated. Id. Further, the ALJ opined that the extremity of the limitations
opined were inconsistent with all opinion on the record. Id.
Continuing, the ALJ indicated that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work.
Tr. at 35. The ALJ stated that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. Id. Based on the above considerations, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been
under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 13, 2005, through the date
of the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 36.
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III.
STEPS TO EVALUATE ENTITLEMENT TO SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
An ALJ must proceed through the required sequential steps for evaluating entitlement to
DIB or SSI. These steps are:
1.
An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful
activity will not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical
findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b) (1992));
2.
An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be
found to be “disabled” (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)
(1992));
3.
If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe
impairment which meets the duration requirement, see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1509 and 416.909 (1992), and which meets or is equivalent to a
listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, a finding of
disabled will be made without consideration of vocational factors (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d) (1992));
4.
If an individual is capable of performing the kind of work he or she
has done in the past, a finding of “not disabled” must be made (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e) (1992));
5.
If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the
performance of the kind of work he or she has done in the past, other
factors including age, education, past work experience and residual
functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can
be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f) (1992)).
Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1992). The claimant has the burden to go forward with
the evidence in the first four steps and the Commissioner has the burden in the fifth step. Moon v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990).
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ weighs the evidence, resolves any conflicts, and
makes a determination of disability. This Court’s review of such a determination is limited in scope
by § 205 of the Social Security Act, which states that the “findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). Therefore, this Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether substantial
evidence supports the findings of the Commissioner and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards. Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990).
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The substantial-evidence standard requires the Court to affirm the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (2011) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as “more than a scintilla
of evidence but less than a preponderance.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.
2007). Accordingly, when substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding
must be affirmed, even if a preponderance of the evidence exists in the record upon which the ALJ
could have found plaintiff disabled. The substantial evidence standard creates a “‘zone of choice’
within which [an ALJ] can act without the fear of court interference.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d
762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). However, an ALJ’s failure to follow agency rules and regulations “denotes
a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon
the record.” Cole, 661 F.3d at 937 (citing Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 407 (6th
Cir. 2009)) (citations omitted).
V.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A.
TREATING PHYSICIAN’S OPINION
Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the opinion of Dr.
Astreika, her treating physician. ECF Dkt. #14 at 11-18. An ALJ must adhere to certain standards
when reviewing medical evidence in support of a claim for social security. Most importantly, the
ALJ must generally give greater deference to the opinions of the claimant’s treating physicians than
to those of non-treating physicians. SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996); Wilson v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). A presumption exists that the opinion of a treating
physician is entitled to great deference. Id.; Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243. If that presumption is not
rebutted, the ALJ must afford controlling weight to the opinion of the treating physician if that
opinion regarding the nature and severity of a claimant’s conditions is “well supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in [the] case record.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
If an ALJ decides to discount or reject a treating physician’s opinion, he must provide “good
reasons” for doing so. SSR 96-2p. The ALJ must provide reasons that are “sufficiently specific to
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make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Id. This allows a claimant to understand how her
case is determined, especially when she knows that her treating physician has deemed her disabled
and she may therefore “‘be bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that [s]he is not,
unless some reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.’” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting Snell
v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir.1999)). Further, it “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating
physician rule and permits meaningful appellate review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id.
If an ALJ fails to explain why he rejected or discounted the opinions and how those reasons affected
the weight accorded the opinions, this Court must find that substantial evidence is lacking, “even
where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243,
(citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544).
The Sixth Circuit has noted that, “while it is true that a lack of compatibility with other
record evidence is germane to the weight of a treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ cannot simply
invoke the criteria set forth in the regulations if doing so would not be ‘sufficiently specific’ to meet
the goals of the ‘good reason’ rule.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 Fed. App’x 543, 551 (6th
Cir. 2010). The Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s failure to identify the reasons for discounting
opinions, “and for explaining precisely how those reasons affected the weight” given “denotes a lack
of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the
record.” Parks v. Social Sec. Admin., 413 Fed. App’x 856, 864 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rogers, 486
F.3d at 243 ). However, an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative
record so long as he considers all of a claimant’s medically determinable impairments and his
opinion is supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2); see also Thacker v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 99 Fed.Appx. 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence can be “less than
a preponderance,” but must be adequate for a reasonable mind to accept the ALJ’s conclusion. Kyle
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
In the instant case, the ALJ’s discussion regarding the opinion of Dr. Astreika, in its entirety,
reads as follows:
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Little weight was accorded to the opinion of [Plaintiff’s] treating psychiatrist, Vera
Astreika, M.D. [co-signed by [Plaintiff’s] counselor, Shari Burgeson, PPC] that
[Plaintiff] would have multiple marked and extreme limitations in her ability to
understand, remember and carry out instructions, to maintain concentration,
persistence and pace to relate to others and to withstand the stressors of day-to-day
work. Dr. Astreika treated [Plaintiff] over a lengthy period and was reporting within
the bounds of her professional certifications; however, persistent references in the
treatment notes to [Plaintiff’s] cooperative behavior (6F/3, 4) and at least fair
concentration (14F/21, 29), suggest that the limitations set forth are at least
overstated. Moreover, the extremity of the limitations opined are inconsistent with
all other opinions of record.
Tr. at 34.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ’s decision performed no analysis of the medicallyacceptable clinical and testing diagnostic techniques, as required by Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 710 F. 3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013). ECF Dkt. # 14 at 15. Gayheart requires that “[t]reating-source
opinions must be given ‘controlling weight’ if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion ‘is well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,’ and (2) the
opinion ‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Id. at 376
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). Additionally, the Commissioner must provide good reasons
for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Defendants argue that, despite Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Astreika’s opinion. ECF Dkt. #15 at 8.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s decision noted only four areas of functioning covered
by Dr. Astreika’s opinion. ECF Dkt. #14 at 15. Plaintiff continues, highlighting fives areas of
limitation reported by Dr. Astreika that were not mentioned in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr.
Astreika’s opinion. Id. at 16. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision is clear regarding the
weight that she gave to Dr. Astreika’s opinion and the reason for giving that weight, and that,
despite Plaintiff’s contentions, the ALJ provided good reasons for her assessment. ECF Dkt. #15
at 8.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s assertion that Plaintiff’s “cooperative behavior” and “at
least persistent concentration” suggest the limitations set forth in Dr. Astrekia’s opinion is a
mischaracterization and does not contradict Dr. Astreika’s opinion about Plaintiff’s ability to sustain
cooperative behavior for a forty-hour workweek. ECF Dkt. #14 at 17. Plaintiff continues, arguing
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that even if the limitations reported by Dr. Astreika “are at least somewhat overstated,” they would
still indicate disability. Id. at 18. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was incorrect in
generalizing that the extremity of the limitations opined by Dr. Astreika are inconsistent with the
other opinions on the record. Id. Defendant contends that there are severe discrepancies between
the treatment notes and Dr. Astreika’s opinion, and that substantial evidence support the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Astreika’s opinion. ECF Dkt. #15 at 10.
As stated above, a presumption exists that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to
great deference. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243. “If the ALJ decides to discount or reject a treating
physician’s opinion, he must provide good reasons for doing so.” SSR 96-2p. The ALJ is required
to provide reasons that are “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinions and reasons for the weight.”
Id. This allows a claimant to understand how the case is determined, and ensures that the ALJ
applies the treating physician rule and permits a meaningful appellate review of the ALJ’s decision.
Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (internal citations omitted). If an ALJ fails to explain why he rejected or
discounted the opinion of a treating source, the Court must find that substantial evidence is lacking,
even when the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based on the record. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243
(citing Wilson, 378 F. 3d at 544).
In the instant case, the ALJ has failed to provide good reasons that are sufficiently specific
to make clear to subsequent reviewers the reasons for the weight given to Dr. Astreika’s opinion,
or to make Plaintiff aware of how her case was determined. Accordingly, the Court must find that
substantial evidence is lacking. Here, the ALJ has failed to follow agency rules and regulations, and,
although the ALJ’s decision could potentially be justified based on the record, the case must be
remanded.
The only indication the ALJ provides regarding the substance of her decision about the
weight to accord Plaintiff’s treating physician is “... however, persistent references in the treatment
notes to [Plaintiff’s] cooperative behavior and at least fair concentration, suggest that the limitations
set forth are at least overstated. Moreover, the extremity of the limitations opined are inconsistent
with all other opinions of record.” Tr. at 34. The ALJ’s brief, vague indication of why she decided
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to provide only little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician is not sufficiently specific
and fails to explain clearly the ALJ’s basis for her decision. Plaintiff points out that the ALJ
completely omitted five of the nine limitations in Dr. Astreika’s opinion. Simply stating that
Plaintiff’s “cooperative behavior” and “fair concentration” suggest that the limitations in Plaintiff’s
treating physician’s opinion are somewhat overstated is not sufficient to create good reasons for
discounting that treating physician’s opinion. Further, the only additional statement made by the
ALJ, namely, that the extremity of the limitations opined by Dr. Astreika was inconsistent with the
record, without any additional discussion, examples, or citations, is likewise insufficient to create
good reasons to discount Dr. Astreika’s opinion.
The ALJ has failed to comply with agency rules and regulations, and has failed to provide
good reasons for discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. Accordingly, the case is
remanded to the ALJ to properly weigh the opinion of Dr. Astreika. This Opinion and Order notes
that it is not determinative of the proper weight to accord Dr. Astreika’s opinion, but rather orders
that the ALJ must provide a proper analysis for the weight provided to Dr. Astreika’s opinion as
Plaintiff’s treating physician.
B.
NON-TREATING PHYSICIAN’S OPINIONS
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in failing to provide any explanation for not
adopting the opinions of Dr. Litwin that agreed with Dr. Astreika’s opinion, but not with the ALJ’s
RFC finding. ECF Dkt. #14 at 22. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to explain why
some of the limitations contained in Dr. Goldsmith’s opinion were omitted from the ALJ’s decision
without explanation. Id. at 24. Dr. Litwin was a consulting examiner, and Dr. Goldsmith was a
state-agency reviewing psychologist.
The above mentioned claims made by Plaintiff are no longer ripe for review because the
determinations regarding the opinions of Dr. Litwin and Dr. Goldsmith are directly tied to the
determinations regarding the weight accorded to the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Astreika.
Accordingly, if upon remand the ALJ determines that a different amount of weight must be given
to the opinion of Dr. Astreika, the ALJ must likewise determine the proper level of weight to accord
to the opinions of Dr. Litwin and Dr. Goldsmith.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that the ALJ failed to properly explain her
reasons for according less than controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician,
and REMANDS the case for further proceedings consistent with the instant Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATE: August 26, 2015
/s/George J. Limbert
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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