Barnhart v. Carroll County, Ohio et al

Filing 49

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 29 Defendants' Motion for partial summary judgment and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Dale Williams, Ron Roe and Scott Soe. Count I and Count III remain pen ding with respect to the claims asserted against Defendant Lt. Robert T. Watson and Count II remains pending with respect to the claims asserted against Defendant Carroll County. See Order for details. Magistrate Judge Kathleen B. Burke on 7/28/2015. (D,I)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DEVAN J. BARNHART,

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Plaintiff
v.
CARROLL COUNTY, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants

I.

CASE NO. 5:14-cv-01533

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KATHLEEN B. BURKE

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Introduction

Plaintiff Devan J. Barnhart (“Barnhart” or “Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 1 alleging that he was he “was falsely arrested, detained, and prosecuted” by Defendants
and that Defendants “failed in their duty to follow an established protocol while conducting
undercover drug transactions utilizing a CI [Confidential Informant].” Doc. 3, pp. 3, 6, ¶¶ 3, 18.
The CI allegedly bought drugs from Barnhart on April 29, 2012. Doc. 3, p. 3, ¶¶ 14, 16. The
Carroll County Grand Jury indicted Barnhart for Trafficking in Drugs, a fifth degree felony, and
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, a fourth degree felony. Doc. 3, pp. 7-8, ¶31. On July 11, 2012,
Barnhart was arrested. Doc. 3, p. 8, ¶32. However, the felony charge of Aggravated 2

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As stipulated to by the parties, Barnhart’s § 1983 claims are predicated upon alleged violations of his Fourth
Amendment rights. Doc. 47. Barnhart does not assert a separate constitutional claim under § 1983 for alleged
violations of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. 47.

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At ¶ 31, Plaintiff indicates he was indicted for “Trafficking in Drugs” and at ¶38, Plaintiff states the charge of
“Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs” was dismissed.

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Trafficking in Drugs was dismissed on September 28, 2012, at the request of the Carroll County
Prosecutor’s Office. 3 Doc. 3, p. 8, ¶ 38.
Defendants are Carroll County, Ohio (“Carroll County), Carroll County Sheriff David
Williams (“Williams”), Lt. Robert T. Watson (“Watson”), Deputy Ron Roe (“Roe”), and Deputy
Scott Soe (“Soe”) (referred to collectively as “Defendants”). 4 Defendants have filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment seeking dismissal with prejudice of all of Barnhart’s claims
against Williams, Roe and Soe on the ground that there is no evidence that those Defendants
participated in the April 29, 2012, controlled drug buy or participated in or facilitated the
submission of information regarding the drug buy to the Carroll County Prosecutor. Doc. 29.
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is unopposed. Barnhart has not filed
a response to the Motion although the Court granted him an extension of time until July 15,
2015, in order to allow him an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to responding. Doc. 44.
For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe.
II.

Claims Alleged

In Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Individual
Officers, Barnhart alleges that Defendants Watson, Roe and Soe “violated his rights to be free of
unreasonable police seizures, warrantless seizures and/or seizures without probable cause which
are guaranteed to him under the Fourth Amendment.” Doc. 3, pp. 9-10.
3

There is no allegation in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint regarding the outcome of the Sale of Dangerous Drugs
charge.

4

Defendants Village of Minerva, Ohio; Minerva, Ohio Officers John Doe, Ron Roe, and Scott Soe; and MultiCounty Law Enforcement Against Drugs Task Force were named in the Amended Complaint and have been
dismissed by Plaintiff. See Doc. 32, Doc. 48.

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In Count II – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by Governmental
Entities, Barnhart alleges that Defendant Carroll County is liable and responsible for the acts of
Defendants Williams, Watson, Roe and Soe because it acted with deliberate indifference by
failing to establish and/or follow established policies, procedures, and regulations relating to
investigation, surveillance and use of confidential informants in undercover drug buys; by failing
to adequately train and supervise Defendants Watson, Roe and Soe regarding the appropriate use
of confidential informants; and the individual Defendants’ actions were done pursuant to
deficient custom, policies and practices of Defendant Carroll County. Doc. 3, pp. 10-11, ¶¶ 4651.
In Count III – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Barnhart alleges that
Defendants’ actions were extreme and outrageous and Defendants knew or should have known
that their actions would cause Barnhart to suffer severe mental and emotional distress, pain and
suffering. Doc. 3, pp. 12-13, ¶¶ 57-61.
III. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment and provides
that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett¸477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

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After the moving party has carried its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine
issues of material fact in dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). “Inferences to be drawn from
the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Id. at 587 (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. The non-moving party must present specific facts that demonstrate
there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “The ‘mere
possibility’ of a factual dispute is not enough.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th
Cir. 1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Even if unopposed, “a district court must review carefully the portions of the record
submitted by the moving party to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.”
F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767 F.3d 611, 630 (6th Cir. 2014).

However, a district court

is not obligated to “sua sponte comb the record from the partisan perspective of an advocate for
the non-moving party.” Id. at 630, n. 11 (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Tp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399,
410 (6th Cir. 1992)).
IV. Analysis
A.

Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim – Count I
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he was deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused
by a person acting under color of law.” Webb v. U.S., --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 3756919, *8 (6th

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Cir. 2015). Further, “[t]o establish a § 1983 . . . claim against a public official in his personal
capacity, a plaintiff must show that the official either actively participated in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct or ‘implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct of an offending subordinate.’” Id. (quoting Scott v. City of
Cleveland, 555 F.Supp.2d 890, 896 (N.D. Ohio 2008)).
Barnhart alleges a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that Defendants,
while acting under of color of law, violated “his rights to be free of unreasonable police seizures,
warrantless seizures and/or seizures without probable cause which are guaranteed to him under
the Fourth Amendment.” Doc. 3, pp. 9-10, ¶¶ 42-45. Defendants assert that Barnhart’s claims
against Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe fail because there is no evidence that Defendants
Williams, Roe or Soe 5 participated in, facilitated or directed any activity regarding Barnhart and
the April 29, 2012, controlled buy or the submission of evidence regarding that incident to the
Carroll County Prosecutor and therefore no causal connection between Defendants Williams,
Roe or Soe and his arrest or indictment. Doc. 29, pp. 2-6.
In support of their motion, Defendants attach an affidavit from Defendant Watson
attesting that he, and he alone, worked with the confidential informant; oversaw the controlled
drug buy and prepared the confidential informant for the April 29, 2012, controlled buy from the
Plaintiff; completed the paperwork and report of the controlled buy from Plaintiff; made the
decision to turn the evidence regarding the buy from Plaintiff over to the prosecutor; and testified
before the Grand Jury regarding Plaintiff’s conduct. Doc. 29, pp. 16-17, ¶¶ 8-12. In his sworn
affidavit, Defendant Watson also states that, although Defendant Williams is his superior officer,

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Defendants assert that there are no Carroll County Sheriff Deputies named Ron Roe or Scott Soe now or at any
times relevant to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. 29, p. 2; Doc 29, p. 15, ¶ 5. Also, Plaintiff has not
sought to add new, previously unknown Carroll County Sherriff Deputies, in place of previously unknown
defendants.
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“Sheriff Williams was not a part of or directly informed specifically about the April 29, 2012
controlled buy or Plaintiff Barnhart either before or after April 29, 2012 . . . At no point in the
process of my actions as described in Plaintiff Barnhart’s Complaint was I acting on or under
Sheriff Williams’ or any Sheriff Department employee’s specific direction. Rather I was
working in the course of my general charge . . . to investigate and make arrests related to
trafficking in illegal drugs in the jurisdiction of the Sheriff’s Department.” Doc. 29, pp. 17-18,
¶¶ 14-15.
Defendant Watson’s affidavit evidences no participation, active or implicit, on the part of
the Defendants Williams, Roe or Soe with respect to Barnhart and the constitutional violations
he alleges and Barnhart has presented no facts to dispute this. The Court therefore GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismisses with prejudice Count I as to
Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe.
B.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Count III
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law has been defined

as:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
serious emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Wright v. MetroHealth Medical Center, 58 F.3d 1130, 1139 (6th Cir. 1995)(quoting Russ v.
TRW, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 42, 47 (1991). “[L]iability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Id.; see also Riddle v.
Egensperger, 998 F.Supp. 812, 819 (N.D. Ohio 1998)(quoting Wright, 58 F.3d at 1139).

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As discussed above, Barnhart has presented no evidence of participation, active or
implicit, by Defendants Williams, Roe or Soe with respect to Barnhart and the alleged
constitutional violations. Accordingly, there being no evidence of involvement or conduct on the
part of Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe, “much less conduct which goes beyond the bounds of
decency,” Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe are entitled to summary judgment on Barnhart’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Riddle, 998 F.Supp at 819. The Court
therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and dismisses with
prejudice Count III as to Defendants Williams, Roe and Soe.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Dale Williams, Ron Roe and Scott Soe. Count I and Count III remain pending with
respect to the claims asserted against Defendant Lt. Robert T. Watson and Count II remains
pending with respect to the claims asserted against Defendant Carroll County.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2015
KATHLEEN B. BURKE
United States Magistrate Judge

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