Campana v. State of Ohio et al
Memorandum of Opinion and Order For the reasons set forth herein, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, and this action is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Benita Y. Pearson on 1/30/2015. Related document(s) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . (JLG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, et al.,
CASE NO. 5:14CV1785
JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER [Resolving ECF Nos. 1; 2; 3; 4]
Pro se Plaintiff William Campana filed the above-captioned in forma pauperis action
against the following Defendants: the State of Ohio, Kaman & Cusimano LLC, David W.
Kaman, Joseph J. Cusimano, M. Katherine Bushey, Darcy Maling Good, Cullen J. Cottle, Rovert
E. Kmiecik, Erika R. Finley, Cedar Property Management Co., Larry Cedar, Continental
Management Co., Unnamed Shareowners of Continental Management Co., Board of Directors
for Waterford Point Condominium Association, Robert Peterson, R.N. Landis Property
Management Co., Richard Landis, Golden Gate Villas, Condominium Association, Inc., and
Waterford Pointe Condominium Association. ECF No. 1. Later, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Add
Three Defendants (ECF No. 3), and, a couple of days later, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Add One
More Defendant. ECF No. 4. Those Motions are granted.
Plaintiff’s 264-page Complaint (ECF No. 1) consists almost entirely of legal assertions
and conclusions. The thrust of the factual allegations sets forth appears to be that the Waterford
Pointe Condominium Association has refused to cash checks Plaintiff has submitted because of
qualifying endorsements he has repeatedly placed on the checks to control how the funds are
applied. Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the Ohio statute regulating the manner in which owner
payments for expenses are credited by a condominium association (R.C. § 5311.18) fosters
RICO enterprises, is an ex post facto law impairing the obligation of contracts, and violates the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court is required
to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);
Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d
1196 (6th Cir. 1990).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief my be granted when it lack
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell At. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the pleading are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but the complaint must provide
more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits.
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of a viable legal theory
to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never
squarely presented to them. Beaudette, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would require the courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, . . . [and] would . . . transform the
district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id.
Even construing the Complaint in this case liberally in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 2008), it simply does not contain allegations
reasonably suggesting he might have a valid federal claim against Defendants based on any of the
legal theories he sets forth. See, e.g., Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal
conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief); see also Leisure v.
Hogan, 21 F. App’x 277 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that RICO complaint containing neither direct
nor inferential allegations respecting all material elements to sustain recovery permitted district
court to dismiss action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
For the foregoing reasons, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, and this
action is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 30, 2015
/s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
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