Oden v. PNC Bank, National Association

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion: Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2 ) is granted and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (Related Doc # 1 ). Judge Sara Lioi on 4/3/2015. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BRYAN W. ODEN, JR.,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
DEFENDANT.

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CASE NO. 5:14cv1981
JUDGE SARA LIOI
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se plaintiff Bryan W. Oden, Jr. filed this action under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 and
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e, against PNC Bank, National Association (APNC@). In the
complaint, plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully terminated from his employment with PNC. He
seeks monetary damages.
Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. No. 2).
That Application is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff=s complaint is very brief and contains few factual allegations. In

pertinent part, it states:
On 12 March 2013 I Bryan W. Oden, Jr., after 3 years of service, was
wrongfully terminated by PNC Bank, N.A. due to the bias of the investigation
performed. I was restricted from defending myself during the entire
investigation. The statements and responses from (PNC Bank) presented were

fraudulent, unethical, and unjust in regards to the investigation.
(Doc. No. 1 [complaint] at 1).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.

364, 365, 10 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an in forma
pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324,
109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (6th
Cir. 1990); see also Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal
theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of
action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks plausibility in the
complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 16 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007).
A pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.
2d 868 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The factual allegations in the pleading must be
sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The plaintiff
is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than an unadorned,
the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers
legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this
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pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th
Cir. 1998).
III.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff=s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. See Wells
v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading
requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir.
1988) (citations omitted). Plaintiff asserts no factual allegations in his complaint. His pleading is
stated entirely as a legal conclusion. Legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid
claim, and this Court is not required to accept unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v.
Church=s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d
1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1971) (conclusory § 1983 claim dismissed).
The Court is aware that plaintiff is not required to plead his discrimination claim
with heightened specificity. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14, 122 S. Ct.
992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court clarified that a plaintiff must still
provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570. Recently, the Sixth Circuit explored the scope of Twombly and Iqbal noting that “even
though a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its ‘[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true.’” New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Lousiville Tractor, Inc., 650
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F.3d

1046,

1051

(6th

Cir.

2011)

(quoting

Twombly,

550

U.S.

at

555).

Plaintiff=s complaint never rises above the speculative level. The Court is left to
guess as to the reason for his termination and whether that reason is one of the criteria
prohibited by Title VII. “Title VII is not ‘a general civility code for the American workplace’
and prohibits discrimination only on the basis of race, religion, gender or national origin.
Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 533 U.S.75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998)). As written,
plaintiff=s complaint indicates he was fired from his employment based on the results on an
investigation. Those limited allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for relief under Title
VII.
Finally, PNC is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. To establish a
prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, plaintiff must assert that a person acting under
color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the U.S.
Constitution or federal laws. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 68 L.
Ed. 2d 420 (1981). Generally, to have acted “under color of state law,” the defendant must
be a state or local government official or employee. PNC is not a government entity; it is a
private corporation. A private party may be found to have acted under color of state law to
establish the first element of this cause of action when the party “acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials” and did so to such a degree that its actions may
properly be characterized as “state action.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. Inc., 457 U.S. 922,
937, 102 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1982). A private party may also be considered to be a
state actor if the party exercises powers traditionally reserved to a state. Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974). Plaintiff does not
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allege any facts to suggest PNC should be treated as a state actor for purposes of ' 1983.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2015
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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