Payne v. McCarthy et al

Filing 7

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983, and is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. The Court further certifies that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (Related Doc # 1 ). Judge Sara Lioi on 1/29/2016. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL A. PAYNE,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.

ALISON McCARTHY, et al,

DEFENDANTS.

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CASE NO. 5:15-cv-2253

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Before the Court is a § 1983 action brought by Michael A. Payne (“plaintiff” or
“Payne”) claiming that his constitutional rights were violated because of an alleged defect in a
criminal indictment upon which he was convicted. (Doc. No. 1 [“Compl.”].) For the reasons that
follow, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
A. Background
Pro se plaintiff Michael A. Payne is a state prisoner in the custody of the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, having been convicted pursuant to a jury verdict in
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas of one count of felonious assault, two counts of
domestic violence, and one count of violating a protective order. The Ohio court of appeals
affirmed his convictions and sentence, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Plaintiff subsequently sought habeas relief from his convictions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Payne v. Sheldon, Case No. 5:12-cv-1354 (N.D. Ohio 2012). In that case, Payne
alleged that his convictions were void because they were based upon an indictment that was

invalid because the indictment was not properly endorsed as a “true bill” by signature of the
grand jury foreman. Judge Nugent dismissed plaintiff’s habeas action because “it is well
established that allegations of technical defects in the indictment fail to state a claim for federal
habeas corpus relief.” Payne v. Sheldon, No. 5:12-cv-1354 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2012). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied Payne’s request for a certificate of appealability, finding that
reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s dismissal of Payne’s habeas petition.
Payne v. Sheldon, No. 12-4315 (6th Cir. May 3, 2013). The United States Supreme Court denied
Payne’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Payne v. Sheldon, 134 S. Ct. 1795, 188 L. Ed. 2d 763
(2014) (petition for rehearing denied, Payne v. Sheldon, 135 S. Ct. 17, 189 L. Ed. 2d 869
(2014)).
In the instant action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Payne claims that his
constitutional rights were violated by the judge in his state criminal case, the prosecutor, the
assistant prosecutor, the warden and former warden of the correctional institution in which he is
incarcerated, and the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, based
upon the same alleged technical defect in his indictment that he challenged in his habeas petition.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the “acts and omissions described herein violate his rights under
the Constitution and laws of the United States,” $600 million dollars in compensatory damages,
and $600 million dollars in punitive damages. (Compl. at 21-22.1).

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All references to page numbers are to the page identification numbers generated by the Court’s electronic
docketing system.
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B. Discussion
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S. Ct. 700, 70
L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972). However, federal district courts are required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to dismiss
sua sponte any in forma pauperis action that the court finds is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed.
2d 338 (1989). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires federal district courts to screen and
dismiss before service any complaint in which a prisoner seeks relief from officers or employees
of a governmental entity that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. See Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).2
The plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A for at least two reasons. First, the Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, that “in
order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment . . . , a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has

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Due to the disposition of plaintiff’s complaint prior to service of the complaint, the plaintiff’s request for an entry
of default (Doc. Nos. 4 and 5) lacks merit and would be inappropriate.
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not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the
complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (emphasis in original). Nothing in the plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the
state convictions he contends are unconstitutional have been invalidated as described in Heck. To
the contrary, the plaintiff’s pleading makes clear that his criminal convictions have been upheld
and that his claims regarding the constitutionality of his indictment and convictions have been
rejected. Accordingly, under Heck, the plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim for damages
under § 1983.
Second, in order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d
810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). In denying the plaintiff a certificate of appealability
in his habeas case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiff’s allegations regarding constitutional
violations with respect to a technical defect in his indictment and subsequent convictions failed
to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). These same allegations form the basis for Payne’s § 1983 action, and as explained

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above, do not constitute a constitutional violation. Thus, even if Heck did not bar his action,
plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983, and must be dismissed.3
C. Conclusion
For all of the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, and is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. The Court further certifies that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(a)(3), an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2016
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The Court also notes that the judge and prosecutors in the plaintiff’s state criminal case would be immune from an
action for damages under section 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128
(1976) (discussing prosecutorial immunity); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing
judicial immunity).
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