Mitchell et al v. Barry et al

Filing 6

Memorandum Opinion and Order that the Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, and Plaintiff Gerald's motion for emergency injunctive relief is denied. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 3/29/16. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DARIUS MITCHELL, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
STEVE BARRY, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 5:16 CV 288
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Introduction
Pro se Plaintiffs Darius Mitchell, Ira Knox III, and Jeremy Gerald, who allege they are
detainees confined in the Summit County Jail, have filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 seeking damages and injunctive relief against Summit County Sheriff Steve Barry and
Sergeant Tackett at the Summit County Jail.
Plaintiff Gerald has also filed an “emergency motion” for injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 4.)
For the reasons stated below, the Plaintiffs’ action is dismissed in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§1915A and Plaintiff Gerald’s motion for emergency injunctive relief is denied.
Allegations
The Plaintiffs’ complaint consists of a list of grievances, expressed in a stream-ofconsciousness format with a paucity of factual development, regarding their treatment and
conditions of confinement in the Summit County Jail. The Plaintiffs complain that: (1) “Plaintiff

Mitchell did not get a fair or reasonable bail set since SCJ’s pretrial [department] did not forward
their recommendation to the court to review for bail purposes”; (2) Sergeant Tackett “made no effort
to contact the local hospital” after Plaintiff “Darius” informed him that he received bad news
regarding his infant daughter and refused to allow Darius to make an emergency phone call; (3)
residents in the Jail were subjected to “improper ventilation and climate control from November 22,
2105 to at least January 29, 2016”; (4) No Islamic services or location to assemble and study are
provided to “Muslims or those interested in Islam” and “no religious diet exists”; (5) Jail residents
are provided less than 2000 calories of food per day and “are not treated equally as those similarly
situated in [the] Ohio State Prison System” in terms of food options; (6) Jail detainees are deprived
of sufficient recreation spaces and (7) of “sufficient legal research capability”; (8) Plaintiff Gerald
and other detainees have been subjected to force and disciplinary confinement without notice of
rules violations, and are not afforded hearings or an appeal process; and (9) indigent inmates are
only provided four envelopes and eight sheets of paper every other week which is not sufficient to
maintain “communication of legal matters.”
The Plaintiffs do not allege any specific constitutional right or provision they claim was
violated in connection with any of their grievances, but they seek to have all of conditions of which
they complain improved or corrected in addition to an award of $3 million in compensatory
damages from the Defendants in this case.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings generally are construed liberally and held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the
lenient treatment generally accorded pro se plaintiffs “has limits” and pro se plaintiffs are “not
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automatically entitled to take every case to trial.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996).
Federal district courts are required under 28 U.S.C. §1915A to screen and dismiss before
service any complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from an officer or employee
of a governmental entity that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915A; Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).

In order to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, a pro se complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See id. (holding that the
dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §1915A). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit “has consistently held that damage claims against
governmental officials alleged to arise from violations of constitutional rights cannot be founded
upon conclusory, vague or general allegations, but must instead, allege facts that show the existence
of the asserted constitutional rights violation recited in the complaint and what each defendant did
to violate the asserted right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg. Psych. Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.
2002); see also Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lanman
v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)(“damage claims against government officials arising
from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate
what each defendant did . . . “).
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Analysis
The Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed pursuant to28 U.S.C. §1915A because it fails
to allege facts that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that either Sergeant Tackett
or Sheriff Barry are liable to them under §1983, even assuming the Plaintiffs complaint could be
construed as alleging a viable constitutional conditions-of-confinement claim or claims.1
First, the only allegedly wrongful conduct that can be discerned from the Plaintiffs’
complaint that is attributable to Sergeant Tackett is that he refused to call the local hospital to
“determine the details” of an emergency situation Plaintiff Darius informed him about regarding his
infant daughter and refused to allow Darius to make an emergency phone call. These allegations,
however, even if they are true, are simply insufficient to suggest that Sergeant Tackett deprived
Plaintiff Darius of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See, e.g.,
Harrill v. Blount Cty., Tennessee, 55 F.3d 1123 (6th Cir. 1995) (law enforcement officer did not
violate arrestee’s constitutional rights by refusing to allow her to make a phone call to her father
after her arrest). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any cognizable constitutional
claim and must be dismissed as against Sergeant Tackett.
Second, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege any plausible §1983 claim against Sheriff Barry.
It is well-established that liability under §1983 may not be imposed on a supervisory official solely
on the basis of respondeat superior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008). Rather,
proof of personal involvement is required to impose personal liability on a supervisory official. “At
a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized,
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To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2000).
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approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of [an] offending subordinate.”
Id., citing Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
The Plaintiffs do not allege that Sheriff Barry was personally involved in any of the conduct
of which they complain. The only allegations they set forth in their complaint regarding Sheriff
Barry are their purely conclusory allegations that he “is aware of all of the [conditions the plaintiffs
allege in their complaint] and due to his negligence and misappropriation of funds these conditions
exist.” These conclusory allegations, however, are insufficient to support a plausible claim of
supervisory liability under §1983. The allegations do not support a plausible inference that Barry
was personally involved in any of the misconduct the Plaintiffs allege, or that he “authorized,
approved, or knowingly acquiesced” in unconstitutional conduct of any subordinate. Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable claim against Barry under §1983. Furthermore, to the
extent the Plaintiffs’ suit could be construed as alleged against Sheriff Barry in his official capacity,
the Plaintiffs are required to allege and prove that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the
County was the moving force behind alleged constitutional violations. See, e.g, Garretson v. City
of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005). The Plaintiffs have failed to set forth
allegations in their complaint sufficient to support a plausible inference that an unconstitutional
custom or policy was the moving force behind the wrongful conduct they allege.
In sum, the Court finds the Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege any plausible §1983 claim
on which relief may be granted against the Defendants in the case.
The Plaintiff Gerald’s motion for emergency injunctive relief is also denied. Whether to
issue a preliminary injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and is based
on the court’s consideration of (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the
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merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a
preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest
would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736
(6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff Gerald seeks emergency injunctive relief here on the basis of the claims
he contends the Plaintiffs assert in the case regarding “access to the courts,” “calories of food
served,” and the “disciplinary process” in the Summit County Jail. However, because the Court has
determined that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege a cognizable claim in the case, the Court does not
find that the relevant factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, and Plaintiff Gerald’s motion for emergency injunctive relief is
denied. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 29, 2016

/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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