Maggiore v. Leonard

Filing 13

Memorandum Opinion and Order: No genuine issue of material fact exists in this case and Leonard is entitled to judgment on Maggiore's complaint as a matter of law. Leonard's motion for summary judgment is accordingly granted and the case is dismissed. (Related Doc # 9 ). Judge Sara Lioi on 5/2/2016. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MARIE MAGGIORE,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
DAVID LEONARD,

DEFENDANT.

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CASE NO. 5:16-cv-340

JUDGE SARA LIOI
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Marie Maggiore (“Maggiore”) filed this action against defendant David
Leonard (“Leonard”), asking the Court “to protect her Federal right” under the Protecting
Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”). (See Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 8.) She alleges she had both a
lease agreement and a purchase agreement with Leonard regarding premises in Canton, Ohio,
and that Leonard violated her rights under the PTFA by evicting her from the premises in a 2015
eviction action in Massillon Municipal Court. A judgment of eviction was entered against
Maggiore in Leonard v. Clayton Smith and Marie Maggiore, Case No. 2015 CVG 1274
(Massillon Municipal Court).
Leonard has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 9.) The motion is fully
briefed as Maggiore has filed an “answer in opposition” to the motion (Doc. No. 11) and
Leonard has filed a reply (Doc. No. 12). For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary
judgment is granted.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment and provides that “[t]he
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The party moving for summary judgment must initially demonstrate that there is an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d (1986). Once the moving
party meets this burden, to survive summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must
produce admissible evidence – not merely allegations or denials in pleadings – demonstrating a
triable issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
Rule 56 does not require that discovery be closed, or that there be any discovery, before a
court rules on a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (“a party may file a
motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery”);
Jefferson v. Chattanooga Publ’g Co., 375 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2004) (“it is well-established
that a motion for summary judgment may be filed prior to discovery”). Ruling on a summary
judgment motion may be improper where the nonmoving party has not had sufficient time to
engage in discovery. Jefferson, 375 F.3d at 463. However, if the nonmoving party claims an
inability to present facts essential to oppose a motion for summary judgment, it is the nonmoving
party’s burden to “show by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
facts essential to justify its opposition.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); Jefferson, 375 F.3d at 463.

Analysis
Leonard contends he is entitled to summary judgment on Maggiore’s action pursuant to
the PTFA for a number of reasons: Maggiore does not have a right of action under the PTFA
(which expired in 2014 and does not provide an express or implied private right of action); she
lacks standing to bring this action due to a pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding; she is
estopped from asserting she has a claim under the lease because she did not disclose such claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding; and she is barred from asserting Leonard was not entitled to evict
her due to prior rulings in the state eviction action and in the bankruptcy proceeding that Leonard
had a right to evict her. With his motion, Leonard has submitted records from the state eviction
action and the bankruptcy proceeding, including rulings in the eviction action that Maggiore was
in default under the lease and Leonard had a right to evict her. (Doc. No. 9-1 at 271-72.)
Upon review of the parties’ briefs and arguments, the Court concludes that Leonard is
entitled to summary judgment. The only claim Maggiore purports to assert in her complaint is
pursuant to the PTFA. The PTFA was originally enacted as a temporary measure to protect
tenants from eviction in the case of foreclosure on a federally related mortgage loan, and
required that successors-in-interest to foreclosed properties provide 90 days’ notice to tenants to
vacate the property. See Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 157 (6th Cir.
2014). As Leonard demonstrates, the PTFA expired on December 31, 2014, and was no longer in
effect when Maggiore was evicted. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010) (setting date of expiration);
Fairview Tasman LLC v. Young, No. 15–CV–05493–LHK, 2016 WL 199060, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 18, 2016) (party could not assert claims under PTFA where all alleged violations occurred
after its expiration).

In addition, the PTFA does not create a private right of action. Mik, 743 F.3d at 160 (“We
hold that the PTFA does not provide an express or implied private right of action”). Therefore,
Maggiore has no plausible federal cause of action under the PTFA even if it were in effect. See
McCoy v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 15-CV-00613-RBJ-KLM, 2016 WL 1047822, at
*7 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-CV-00613-RBJ-KLM,
2016 WL 1028325 (D. Colo. Mar. 15, 2016) (dismissing federal claim under the PTFA).
In her opposition, Maggiore does not contend she needs discovery to refute Leonard’s
motion demonstrating she has no viable claim under the PTFA. She contends the parties’ lease
agreement “is a nullity” and “there is simply no grounds for an eviction” under Ohio law. (Doc.
No. 11 at 5.) However, to the extent Maggiore purports to allege some state law claim in this
case challenging her eviction, such claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, which bars a
litigant from filing an action in federal court to re-litigate matters that were already decided in
state court proceedings. See Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“[w]ell-settled law directs federal courts to ‘give to a state court judgment the same preclusive
effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was
rendered’”), citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S. Ct. 892,
79 L. 2d 2d 56 (1984). Under Ohio law, res judicata bars a claim when: (1) there is a final, valid
decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves the
same parties or their privies as the first; (3) the second action raises claims that were or could
have been litigated in the first action; and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. Crawford v. Katz, No. 1:14-CV812, 2015 WL 2401643, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2015), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:14CV812, 2015 WL 3743467 (S.D. Ohio June 15, 2015).

Res judicata applies here as the Massillon Municipal Court already determined that
Maggiore was in default under the lease and that Leonard had a right to evict her under Ohio
law.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, no genuine issue of material fact exists in this case and
Leonard is entitled to judgment on Maggiore’s complaint as a matter of law. Leonard’s motion
for summary judgment is accordingly granted and the case is dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2016
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE