Gooding v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 17

Order Adopting Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated in the Order, the 14 Report and Recommendation is adopted in full. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge, and by extension the final decision of the Commissioner, is affirmed. Signed by Judge Dan Aaron Polster on 7/31/2017. (K,K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

IAN GOODING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 5:16-cv-02100-DAP
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Case History
In April 2015, Ian Gooding filed an application for supplemental security income,
alleging disability beginning in December 2014. Gooding’s claim was denied initially and upon
reconsideration.
On April 21, 2016, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an opinion unfavorable
to Gooding, finding him “not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.”
Decision 11 (Tr. 25), Doc #: 10. On July 27, 2016, the Appeals Counsel denied Gooding’s
request for review. Notice 1 (Tr. 1).
The above-captioned case was filed on August 22, 2017, and, after the matter was fully

briefed, Magistrate Judge McHargh recommended the Court affirm the final decision of the
Commissioner. R. & R. 23, Doc #: 14. On July 7, 2017, Gooding filed an Objection. Doc #: 15.
The Social Security Commissioner filed a Response on July 20. Doc #: 16. This Order follows.
II. Legal Standard
In reviewing a denial of Social Security benefits, the Court’s review “is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative law
judge’s findings of fact and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Elam ex rel. Golay
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence is defined as
‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25
F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). On judicial review, it is not necessary that the Court agree with
the ALJ’s finding. Id. (citing Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389–90 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Rather, the ALJ’s finding must only be substantially supported by the record. Id. “Even if
supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld
where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on
the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478
F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006).
When a case is referred to a magistrate judge, under the relevant statute, a plaintiff is
entitled to object to the R&R within fourteen days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). Generally, the failure to timely file written objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R
constitutes a waiver of the right to obtain a de novo review of the R&R in the district court and
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also results in a waiver of the right to appeal. See United States v. Droganes, 728 F.3d 580, 586
(6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981). When objections
are filed, the district court must make a “de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). However, an Objection to an R & R is not meant to be simply a vehicle to rehash
arguments set forth in the petition, and a district court is under no obligation to review de novo
objections that are merely an attempt to have the district court reexamine the same arguments set
forth in the petition and briefs. Roberts v. Warden, Toledo Correctional Inst., No. 1:08-CV00113, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70683, at *22, 2010 WL 2794246, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 14, 2010)
(citation omitted); see Sackall v. Heckler, 104 F.R.D. 401, 402 (D.R.I. 1984); see also Howard v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
III. Discussion
Because the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Gooding’s request
for review, the ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. After a review of the
ALJ’s decisions and the record, the Magistrate Judge recommended affirmation of this decision.
Gooding objects on two bases:
The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ’s explanations for the
weight he assigned to the opinions of Plaintiff’s mental-health case manager
and Plaintiff’s mental-health counselor were sufficiently articulated, and
therefore not improper, and that the ALJ’s RFC was supported by substantial
evidence. Plaintiff does not object to the ALJ’s degree of articulation of the
weight he assigned, but respectfully submits that the stated rationale lacked
the support of substantial evidence and that the ALJ’s RFC also lacked the
support of substantial evidence. . . .
Moreover, Plaintiff specifically objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s absenteeism. . . . Plaintiff’s argument was not
merely speculative, but it contemplated the actual record evidence for the
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relevant period of time herein.
Obj. 1–2. The Court has reviewed the record de novo and presently adopts the Report and
Recommendation.
As to Gooding’s first objection—regarding the little weight afforded the testimony of
Gooding’s case manager and counselor—the regulations require that the ALJ “generally should
explain the weight given to opinions from these sources or otherwise ensure that the discussion
of the evidence in the determination or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to
follow the adjudicator's reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the
case.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2).
Gooding objects that the ALJ’s explanation of why he afforded these sources “little
weight” is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ opined that these sources were from a
time “during which the claimant had a vast uptick in symptoms” and did not “acknowledge the
claimant long period of stability, even without medications.” Decision 8–9 (Tr. 22–23); see
Decision 7 (Tr. 21) (explaining conclusions about stability). The ALJ’s conclusion regarding
unaddressed periods of stability is supported by the notes related to his psychiatric visits, which
included comments such as “Mother states Mr. Ian is doing well without meds, ” “There is no
evidence of psychoses at present,” and “No more psychotic symptoms It seems he had a Brief
psychotic reaction under extream stress,” on February 20, 2015. Psych Adult Progress Note
2/20/2015 at 2 (Tr. 307). Similarly, on May 27, 2015, the psychiatrist’s notes state, “Pt says that
since that time his symptoms have dissipated, been essentially non-existent . . . mom agrees that
patient’s symptoms have been non-existent.” Pysch Adult Progress Note 5/27/2015 at 1 (Tr.
320); see Psych Adult Progress Note 9/16/2015 at 2 (Tr. 330) (summarizing notes indicating
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Gooding had been doing well during February 20, March 20, May 27, and July 22, 2015, visits,
and observing “odd behavior” beginning with the September 16, 2015, visit). Accordingly, the
ALJ’s conclusion regarding the period of stability has basis in the record.
Similarly, Gooding’s second objection is overruled. It is clearly not speculative that
Gooding was hospitalized for ninety-four days, and it also is not speculative that an average of
five days per month absent may preclude competitive employment. See Tr. of Oral Hr’g 39–30
(Tr. 58–59) (vocational expert testifying regarding absenteeism). However, as the Magistrate
Judge observed, it is speculative to conclude that Gooding will be so hospitalized in the future.
R. & R. 22. Gooding cites no medical evidence for such a prediction, and in fact there is some
evidence supporting the ALJ’s opposite conclusion. See Psych Adult Progress Note 2/20/2015 at
2 (Tr. 307) (“No more psychotic symptoms It seems he had a Brief psychotic reaction under
extream stress rather than Paranoid pschizopherenea. But shall monitor and clarify the
diagnosis.”).
In essence, Gooding and the ALJ view Gooding’s situation through different lenses: the
former believing Gooding’s disability is permanent and disabling and the latter believing it
intermittent and otherwise under control by medication. Compare Request for Review Letter 2
(Tr. 9) (“The record herein depicts a fairly typical onset and diagnoses of schizophrenia in a
young adult, the course of which clearly is worsening in this case, not improving.”), with
Decision 9 (Tr. 23) (“The claimant began to have symptoms in late 2014, and these were
promptly treated. The claimant then discontinued treatment for most of 2015, and even without
any treatment, he remained stable. The claimant recently had another episode, which does
confirm that the claimant is schizophrenia and requires medications. However, it appears that he
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has stabilized again, and is experiencing little to no symptoms.”). It is not the role of the Court to
decide which, if either, interpretation is correct, rather the Court’s review “is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative law
judge’s findings of fact and whether the correct legal standards were applied.” Elam ex rel. Golay
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s decision is accordingly
affirmed.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation, Doc #: 14, is adopted in full. The decision
of the ALJ, and by extension the final decision of the Commissioner, is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Dan A. Polster July 31, 2017
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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