Rover Pipeline LLC v. Bartter et al

Filing 768

Memorandum Opinion: The Court reverses its prior decision and grants the landowners' motion (Doc. No. #695 ) to exclude the testimony of Rover's arborist. For the foregoing reasons, Doc. Nos. #695 , #755 , and #756 are granted. This case shall proceed to trial on January 14, 2019, at which time the jury will hear relevant testimony on and be permitted to enter an award representing the value of the fair market value of the property taken and the damages to the residue, which, in this case, will be limited to any reduction in the fair market value to the fee and damages for the lost tree crop on the property at the time of the taking. Judge Sara Lioi on 12/28/2018. (T,Je)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ROVER PIPELINE, LLC,

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
10.055 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR
LESS, IN ASHLAND COUNTY,
DEFENDANTS, et al.,

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CASE NO. 5:17-CV-239

JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently pending in this condemnation case concerning the property owned by
defendants Roger and Rita Dush (the “landowners”) are two motions in limine filed by plaintiff
Rover Pipeline, LLC (“Rover”): (1) motion to exclude the expert report and opinion testimony of
Barry Cavanna (“Cavanna”) (Doc. No. 755 [“Exp. Mot.”]); and (2) motion to exclude the
testimony of Rita Dush (Doc. No. 756 [“R. Dush Mot.”].) The motions are fully briefed. (Doc.
No. 765 [“Exp. Mot. Opp’n”]; Doc. No. 764 [“R. Dush Mot. Opp’n”].)
I. BACKGROUND
The condemned property that is the subject of the pending motions is part of a larger
condemnation action brought, pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), by Rover to
accommodate the construction of a pipeline through this judicial district. Both the pipeline
project and the landowners’ property have been the subject of several previous rulings, and
familiarity with these opinions is presumed. For purposes of framing the present motions,
therefore, it is sufficient to note that the present parcel being condemned consists of
approximately 7.528 acres of land in Wayne County, Ohio. The property is part of a larger tract

that totals more than 100 acres and upon which the landowners and/or related entities operate a
Christmas tree farm business, a retail boutique store, and a restaurant. The condemned property
includes a temporary construction easement and a smaller permanent easement.
Because all issues relating to immediate possession have been resolved by the parties, the
only remaining issues are limited to the amount of compensation that is due the landowners. On
August 28, 2018, the Court conducted a hearing on the then-pending motions in limine. On
September 14, 2018, the Court issued a memorandum opinion ruling on those motions. (See Doc.
No. 737 [“MO”].) In a subsequent telephonic status conference, counsel discussed with the Court
the existing monitoring program put into place by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) to mitigate the damage to agricultural land impacted by the construction of Rover’s
pipeline. (See Doc. No. 279-4 (Final Environmental Impact Statement [“FEIS”]); Doc. No. 760-1
(Rover Monitoring Plan) at 12671.) The Court instructed the parties to file trial briefs discussing
the impact of the monitoring program on the issues involving the present compensation
proceeding. (Doc. No. 760 (Rover Trial Brief [“Rover T.B.”]); Doc. No. 761 (Dush Trial Brief
[“Dush T.B.”]); Doc. No. 767 (Rover Trial Brief Reply [“Rover T.B.R.”]; Doc. No. 766 (Dush
Trial Brief Reply [“Dush T.B.R.”]).)
The parties are scheduled to participate in a mediation session on January 4, 2019, before
a private mediator. A final pretrial conference is set for January 7, 2019, and the jury trial in this
matter—limited to the determination of compensation—is scheduled to begin on January 14,
2019.
II. THE POST-CONSTRUCTION MONITORING PROGRAM
Because the Court finds that the monitoring program adopted by the FERC impacts the
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present in limine motions, it is necessary to briefly discuss the program’s contours. On February
23, 2015, Rover filed an application with the FERC under Section 7(c) of the NGA to construct
and operate the aforementioned interstate natural gas pipeline running through four states,
including Ohio. As part of its application, Rover filed an Agricultural Impact Mitigation Plan
(“AIMP”), outlining its plan to minimize the negative impact of the pipeline on the affected
property. (Doc. No. 559-4 (AIMP).)
1.

The AIMP and FEIS

Rover committed to compensating agricultural landowners “for a full 3 years (from the
start of construction) of productivity on lands impacted by construction.” (FEIS at 5690.1) It also
promised to continue to monitor crop yields for the first five years and compensate landowners if
yield reduction in the disturbed areas was higher than originally estimated. Finally, the AIMP
provided that Rover “would work with landowners to avoid or minimize impacts on specialty
crops, such as Christmas tree farms.” (Id. at 5719 (emphasis added).) According to the FEIS,
“[t]ypical mitigation measures [would] include topsoil segregation, decompaction, and
repair/replacement of irrigation and drainage structures.” (FEIS at 5690 (emphasis added); see
AIMP at 7700–01.)
After conducting an independent environmental review, and after providing for notice
and a period for public comment, the FERC staff issued the FEIS. Included within the report was
the conclusion that the Rover pipeline would have some adverse and significant environmental

Unless otherwise noted, all page number references are to the page identification number generated by the Court’s
electronic docketing system.
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impact on the property through which the pipeline would run, but the report also concluded that
this impact would be reduced by the implementation of Rover’s proposed mitigation laid out in
its AIMP and the additional measures recommended by the FERC staff. (FEIS at 5380.)
Specifically, the FERC found that the negative environmental impact would be ameliorated by
the portion of Rover’s plan that provided for compensation to landowners for crop damage or
loss of production, and ongoing monitoring of affected agricultural areas following construction
to verify crop yields from the affected areas and return to yield productions similar to those
enjoyed in adjacent undisturbed areas. (Id. at 5719.)
While generally satisfied with Rover’s AIMP, the FEIS was critical of Rover’s plan in
that it placed the burden on the landowner to monitor and report to Rover any crop yield
concerns. The FEIS recommended that, prior to construction, “Rover should file . . . a 5-year
post-construction monitoring program to evaluate crop productivity in areas impacted by the
construction of the” pipeline. (FEIS at 5690.) The monitoring program envisioned by the FEIS
put the onus on Rover to document any crop-related problems. Further, the FEIS provided that,
[i]f crop yields in restored areas are not similar to or greater than those on
adjacent undisturbed croplands, Rover would be required to develop and
implement restoration measures in conjunction with appropriate agency personnel
and landowners. Additionally, FERC staff would continue to conduct inspections
and would impose enforcement or mitigation measures as necessary if after the
end of 5 years FERC staff has determined not all restoration is satisfactory.
(Id.)
On February 2, 2017, the FERC granted Rover’s application for a certificate conditioned
on Rover’s compliance with certain environmental conditions, including the filing of the fiveyear monitoring program. (Doc. No. 279-2 (FERC Certification [“Cert.”]) at 5237.) Rover
subsequently filed its five-year monitoring program in which it committed to conducting surveys
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of agricultural areas during each growing season for five years following construction. Under
this program, Rover also was required to notify the FERC of any crop-related problems and take
corrective actions to address these issues. (Rover Monitoring Plan at 12671.)
2.

Application of the Monitoring Program

“It is beyond dispute that the FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the conditions of a
FERC certificate[.]” Am. Energy Corp. v. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, No. 2:09-cv-284, 2009
WL 2148197, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2009) (collecting cases). “Exclusive means exclusive,
and the Natural Gas Act nowhere permits an aggrieved party otherwise to pursue collateral
review of a FERC certificate in state court or federal district court.” Am. Energy Corp. v. Rockies
Express Pipeline LLC, 622 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2010). Rover acknowledges that if it fails to
comply with conditions of the FEIS and the certificate, including the monitoring and restoration
of the affected property, this Court has jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 717u to enforce those
conditions. See, e.g., Town of Dedham v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 15-12352-GAO,
2015 WL 4274884, at *2 (D. Mass. July 15, 2015) (noting that “[15 U.S.C.] § 717u is simply an
enforcement provision, not an open-ended grant of jurisdiction to the district courts”). Still, it
argues that, by seeking damages for the potential reduction in future crop yields that have not yet
occurred, the landowners are effectively attempting to bypass the conditions under which the
FERC certificate was issued.
The landowners disagree, arguing that Rover’s monitoring program is inapplicable to the
landowners’ property because the monitoring program was limited to annual crops. In support,
they rely primarily upon the deposition testimony of Rover’s representative, Mark Vedral. In his
deposition, Vedral detailed the five-year Rover monitoring and mitigation plan, noting that,
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because Christmas trees have a ten-year growth cycle, they would not be accommodated by a
five-year plan. (Doc. No. 741-2 (Deposition of Mark Vedral [“Vedral Dep.”]) at 12209 (102).2)
The Court need not reach Rover’s argument that this testimony was taken out of context because
neither this Court nor the FERC is bound by Rover’s representative’s opinion as to the
applicability of the conditions of the FERC certificate.
Instead, the Court looks to the language of the AIMP, the FEIS, and the FERC certificate.
While perhaps not models of clarity, these documents, taken together, demonstrate that the
landowners’ property was not excluded from the monitoring program. Beginning with the AIMP,
Rover’s plan defines agricultural land, in relevant part, as “[l]and used for cropland, hayland,
pasture land, managed woodlands . . . [and] land on which farm buildings are located[.]” (AIMP
at 7696.) The AIMP further defines “cropland” as “[l]and used for growing row crops, small
grains, . . . and Christmas trees[.]” (Id. (emphasis added).) The FEIS, in turn, does not exclude
Christmas trees from its discussion of crops. Under the heading of “Organic Farm Lands and
Specialty Crops,” the FEIS notes that the “[t]he Rover pipeline would cross two Christmas tree
farms[,]” as well as an organic cattle farm. (FEIS at 5695.) While the FEIS recommended that
Rover file a separate mitigation plan for the organic farm, it made no such separate provision for
the Christmas tree farms. (Id.) In light of the fact that the FERC understood that the pipeline
crossed two Christmas trees farms, it could have, as it had with the organic farm, singled out

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Because the deposition transcript is printed in a four to a page format, the Court also provides the page number
assigned by the transcribing court report in parenthesis.
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these properties for different consideration.3 It chose not to do so. In the absence of any
indication that the FERC intended to exclude Christmas tree farms from Rover’s mitigation and
monitoring obligations, the Court finds that the monitoring program, adopted by the FERC,
applies to the subject property.
III. MOTION IN LIMINE STANDARD
Although not explicitly authorized by the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the practice of ruling on motions in limine “has developed pursuant to the
district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.
38, 41 n.4, 105 S. Ct. 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984). Motions in limine allow the court to rule on
evidentiary issues prior to trial in order to avoid delay and focus pertinent issues for the jury’s
consideration. See United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999); Jonasson v.
Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997).
Courts should exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when it is clearly
inadmissible. Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). If the
court is unable to determine whether certain evidence is clearly inadmissible, it should defer
ruling until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice can be
evaluated in proper context. Id. Ultimately, the determination whether to grant or deny a motion
in limine is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Goldman v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sys.,
In fact, the only distinction the FEIS makes for a tree crop appears in the beginning of the discussion of Rover’s
mitigation and monitoring duties, noting that “[c]rops, other than trees, would be allowed to be cultivated within
both the construction and permanent rights-of-way once construction has been completed.” (Id. at 5690 (emphasis
added).) If anything, this language further demonstrates that the FERC treated “trees” as crops for purpose of the
certificate.
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Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 853, 858 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (citing United States v. Certain Lands
Situated in the City of Detroit, 547 F. Supp. 680, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1982)). In limine rulings are
preliminary, and the district court may change its ruling at trial for any reason it deems
appropriate. United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994).
IV. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rover seeks an order excluding the expert reports and opinion testimony of the
landowners’ soil expert, Barry Cavanna. According to the record, Cavanna visited the subject
property on two separate occasions—once before and a second time after the pipeline
construction—for the purpose of extracting soil samples. He used a backhoe to extract the soil on
his first visit and used a hand-held auger to extract the soil the second time. (Doc. No. 755-1
(Deposition of Barry Cavanna [“Cavanna Dep.”]) at 12415–17.4) Following each visit, he
produced a report containing the results of his analysis of the soil. The first report, dated October
14, 2016, contained no opinions but listed the results of his soil analysis. The report also outlined
certain preventative measures that could be taken to reduce the compaction of the soil from
pipeline construction. (Doc. No. 755-2 (Cavanna 2016 Report) at 12467.) The second report,
dated September 10, 2018, contained the results of his post-construction soil analysis. (Doc. No.
755-3 (Cavanna 2018 Report).) The report found “serious compaction” of the soil in the
disturbed areas and offered the opinion that Cavanna’s recommendations for soil compaction
minimization had not been followed.5 (Id. at 12472–73.)
Rover’s motion is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702

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Cavanna testified that he elected to use the auger on his return visit because he did not want to risk using a backhoe
near the underground pipeline, itself. (Id. at 12417.)
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states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
Fed. R Evid. 702. Rover maintains that Cavanna’s testimony fails to satisfy the third (and
presumably fourth) element necessary under Rule 702. It claims that Cavanna’s methods are
unreliable because Cavanna purportedly used “two different methodologies to prepare a ‘before
and after’ analysis” by collecting the first sample with a backhoe and the second sample with an
auger.6 (Expert Mot. at 12390.)
However, the Court finds that Cavanna’s testimony fails to qualify under Rule 702 for the
more fundamental reason that it will not “help the trier of fact . . . to determine a fact in issue[.]”
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The only issue before this Court is the “just compensation” that is owed to the
landowners for any diminution in market value and any associated damages. Cavanna opines in
his 2018 report that the post-construction soil was seriously compacted. (Cavanna 2018 Report at
12473.) Yet, the FEIS envisions Rover’s post-construction mitigation measures to include
The landowners do not suggest that Rover was aware of or was required to adopt Cavanna’s recommendations for
soil compaction minimization.
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It is unlikely that this and the other cited deficiencies in Cavanna’s reports would justify exclusion under Rule 702.
For example, while Cavanna used a different “method” for collecting his “before” and “after” soil sample, Rover
does not challenge the reliability of either method. Moreover, Cavanna testified that the method he used for
analyzing each soil sample was the same. (Cavanna Dep. at 12415–16.) Ultimately, any questions raised by the
different soil extraction procedures would go to the weight and not the admissibility of such testimony. See, e.g.,
Powell v. Tosh, 942 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (finding difference in “before” and “after” valuation
methods did not render expert testimony unreliable), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, No. 5:09-CV-00121TBR, 2013 WL 1878934 (W.D. Ky. May 3, 2013)). Rather, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469 (1993).
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decompaction of the soil, and there is no way to know at this time if those measures will be
ineffective. (FEIS at 5690; see AIMP at 7700–01.) In fact, Cavanna testified in his deposition
that decompaction might be possible. (Cavanna Dep. at 12446.7) Until such time that the results
of these measures can be evaluated, there is no way to determine whether compaction of the soil
will adversely affect the market value of the property.8 As such, information and expert
testimony on the current compaction of the soil will not aid the jury in their determination of just
compensation, and the testimony is subject to exclusion. Rover’s motion is GRANTED.
V. MOTION TO EXCLUDE RITA DUSH’S TESTIMONY
Rover also seeks to exclude the lay testimony of Rita Dush. In her deposition, Rita Dush
testified that she believed that, prior to the pipeline construction, a willing buyer would have paid
1.1 million dollars, reasoning that a buyer would recoup the purchase price within two Christmas
tree growth cycles (twenty years), based on the likely generation of $500,000 in income from
each tree cycle. (Doc. No. 757 (Deposition of Rita Dush [“R. Dush Dep.”]) at 12608–10.) She
further opines that, following the pipeline construction, the property have been devalued to zero
because she believes that Christmas trees, and especially the farm’s prized Fraizer Fir trees, will
never again be able to grow on the temporary or permanent easement. (Id. at 12616–17.) While
generally acknowledging the right of a landowner to offer opinion testimony as to the fair market
value of condemned property, Rover argues that Rita lacks the qualifications to offer an income
approach to valuation. Rover notes that Rita readily acknowledged that she is not a trained
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Cavanna testified that there is no way to fully restore soil to its pre-compaction condition. (Cavanna Dep. at
12445.) Nonetheless, he also testified that decompaction “might be possible if it is done under suitable conditions. If
it is not moist and to the proper depths and things. Again, as long as the original soil is still there that hasn’t been
excavated.” (Id. at 12446.)
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Indeed, until future crop yields can be measured, it is unknown whether these measures will even be necessary.
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accountant, and further notes that she has no information on the going market rate for similar
Christmas tree farms.
Like the law in many states, Ohio law recognizes an exception to the general rule that one
must be qualified as an expert before offering opinion testimony as to the value of property.
Owner-opinion testimony is an estimate of the property’s value and is admissible “although [the
owner’s] knowledge on the subject is not such as would qualify him to testify if he were not the
owner.” Smith v. Padgett, 513 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ohio 1987) (quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). The “owner-opinion” rule presumes that owners of personal or real property are
“generally quite familiar with their property and its value,” and are “permitted to testify on value
by virtue of their ownership alone.” Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 605 N.E.2d
936, 940 (Ohio 1992).
However, as the Tenth Circuit has observed, “the owner’s qualification to testify does not
change the ‘market value’ concept and permit him to substitute a ‘value to me’ standard for the
accepted rule, or to establish a value based entirely upon speculation.” United States v Sowards,
370 F.2d 87, 92 (10th Cir. 1966); see also Baumer v. Franklin Cty. Distilling Co., 135 F.2d 384,
390 (6th Cir. 1943) (noting that Ohio law does not permit recovery of speculative damages);
MADFAN, Inc. v. Makris, 86 N.E.3d 707, 714 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (reversing jury award of
speculative damages); Dir. of Highways v. Lordstown Realty Co., 262 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1970) (“The limitations on the right to damages resulting from the exercise of the power of
eminent domain are that such damages must be actual and not merely speculative or
contingent[.]”).
Applying the owner-opinion rule, Ohio courts have permitted property and business
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owners to offer opinions based upon an income approach, as well as upon a personal valuation of
the damage to the residu3 resulting from the condemnation. See, e.g., Worthington City Sch. Bd.
of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 17 N.E.3d 537, 544 (Ohio 2014) (holding that an
employee of a corporate affiliate could give opinion testimony based on income method of
valuation); Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. McNamara, No. 95833, 2011 WL 2519514, at *2–
5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 23, 2011) (permitting property owner to testify that, in her opinion, her
property lost $40,000 in value because the county removed trees from her front lawn). In the
present case, Rita Dush is the President and Secretary of Pine Tree Holdings, the portion of the
business that grows and sells Christmas trees. (R. Dush Dep. at 12586.) She testified that she
based her pre-construction valuation on her understanding of the number of trees that could be
grown and generated for sale from the approximately seven and one-half acres of affected land,
and the amount of income the sale of those trees would generate. (Id. at 12608–12.) Such beforeconstruction valuation testimony would appear to fall within the owner-opinion rule, as it is
grounded in the knowledge Rita gained through her personal experience with her property and
the related tree farm business.
Nevertheless, her testimony is still subject to exclusion because her after-construction
valuation relies on conjecture and speculation that her property will never again grow Christmas
trees. Notwithstanding the fact that her own soil expert has testified that decompaction and
rehabilitation of the soil is possible, Rita Dush speculates that Rover’s mandated monitoring and
remediation efforts will fail and that future crop yields will be negatively impacted. While a
reduction in crop yield can result in a corresponding drop in market value, it remains to be seen
whether crop yields will be affected (or whether Rover’s mandated remediation efforts to correct
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any such deficiencies will be ineffective). Accordingly, any opinion that the property will be
devalued as the result of potential future crop reductions would be steeped in speculation.
This testimony would also be irrelevant and subject to exclusion, under Fed. R. Evid. 401
and 402, because the landowners already have a complete remedy for any possible reduction in
the productivity of the land due to the condemnation. At trial, the jury will be limited to
awarding the property owners “the value of the land taken and . . . [the] damages to the residue
of the property.” See Am. Energy Corp., 622 F.3d at 606-07 (citing City of Norwood v. Forest
Converting Co., 476 N.E.2d 695, 700 (1984)). Given the fact that Rover is obligated by the
FERC certificate to remediate and compensate for any reduction in future crop production, an
award now for possible crop reduction would amount to an impermissible windfall. Should
Rover fail to meet its obligations under the certificate, the landowners may seek enforcement
under the Natural Gas Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 717u (“The District Courts . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter . . .[and] to enforce any liability or duty created by” the
statute.) Because the jury would not be permitted to award damages for any possible future
failings by Rover under the certificate, Rita Dush’s prediction that Rover will be unable to meet
its remediation obligations would not constitute evidence “of consequence in determining the
action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Therefore, it is subject to exclusion under Rule 402.
While Rita Dush is permitted to offer competent opinion testimony as to the valuation of
her property, she will not be permitted to offer testimony based on an income approach for future
crops. To this extent, Rover’s motion to exclude such testimony is GRANTED.

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VI. PRIOR RULING
Such a ruling also requires the Court to revisit its prior in limine rulings. See Yannott, 42
F.3d at 1007 (noting that in limine rulings are preliminary and subject to change). As previously
noted, the Court did not have the benefit of the parties’ briefing on the applicability of the FERC
mandated monitoring and remediation program when it issued its September 14, 2018 decision
denying the landowners’ motion to exclude the expert testimony of Rover’s arborist, Alan
Klonowski. (MO at 12160; see Doc. No. 695 (Dush Mot. to Exclude).) Because the Court has
determined that testimony on the likely success of Rover’s remediation efforts would be
speculative and irrelevant, Klonowski’s opinion that Rover’s site restoration process will return
the land “to the production of high quality Fir Christmas Trees” is also subject to exclusion.
Therefore, the Court REVERSES its prior decision and GRANTS the landowners’
motion (Doc. No. 695) to exclude the testimony of Rover’s arborist
VII.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Doc. Nos. 695, 755, and 756 are GRANTED. This case shall
proceed to trial on January 14, 2019, at which time the jury will hear relevant testimony on and
be permitted to enter an award representing the value of the fair market value of the property
taken and the damages to the residue, which, in this case, will be limited to any reduction in the

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fair market value to the fee and damages for the lost tree crop on the property at the time of the
taking.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 28, 2018
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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