Parker v. Metlife Insurance Company et al
Filing
88
Memorandum Opinion and Order that this Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims contained in the Complaint pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Therefore, Defendant's motion is GRANTED (Doc. # 84 ). Accordingly, this matter is DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice, and all other currently pending motions are rendered MOOT by this order. Judge John R. Adams on 9/23/19. (K,C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
THOMAS M. PARKER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO.:
5:17CV01066
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND
ORDER
(Resolves Docs. 84, 87)
Pending before this Court is Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s
(“Metropolitan”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, which asserts that the instant matter
should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) as this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. (Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 84.) Plaintiff Thomas M. Parker, Jr.
(“Parker”) has filed a Motion in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Opp’n to Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 87.)
For the reasons explained herein, this Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over
this action. Therefore, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Accordingly, this matter is DISMISSED
in its entirety, with prejudice, as this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and all other currently pending
motions are rendered MOOT by this order.
I.
BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2017, Parker, pro se, filed his Complaint against Metropolitan and Defendant Dale
K. Parker (“Dale”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Although the Complaint is not pled with clarity, Parker
appears to assert varying state law civil claims, with associated bald criminal accusations, against
both Metropolitan and Dale arising out of discrepancies regarding the beneficiaries of a decedent’s
life insurance policies and a flexible retirement annuity. (Id. at 2, 4-5, 7-9, 11-20.) The Complaint
does specify, however, that Parker’s claims are brought before this Court pursuant to the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). (Id. at 1-5, 7-8, 17, 20.) In fact, a thorough
reading of the Complaint makes clear the following: (1) Parker does not recite any other legal
authority for the claims brought before this court besides ERISA; and (2) Parker’s claims involve
life insurance policy 726-615-739-A, life insurance policy 770-107-251-MS, life insurance policy
957-706-808-M, and flexible retirement annuity 030-052-308. (See generally id. and associated
exhibits.)
Against this background, Metropolitan filed its Motion to Dismiss, with pertinent documents
attached, arguing that Parker’s Complaint should be dismissed as this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 84 and associated attachments.) Parker
provided a response, to which he attached two hundred eighty-seven pages of exhibits. (Opp’n to
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 87 and associated attachments.)
II.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
It is well settled that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” as Article III, § 2 of
the United States Constitution narrowly defines “[t]he character of the controversies over which
federal judicial authority may extend.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746
(2019) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Ins. Corp.
of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). For district courts, specifically, they “may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory
basis.” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 511 U.S. at 1746 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Therefore, by statute, this Court may properly exercise jurisdiction over a subject matter in two
instances: (1) when a case arises under federal law, called “federal question jurisdiction”; or (2)
when the amount in controversy for a case exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship
between the parties as enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), called “diversity jurisdiction.” See 28
U.S.C.S. § 1331; 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332(a). When a court properly possesses either federal question
jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction in an action, the court is said to possess subject matter
jurisdiction over that action, in other words, “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis in
original). As subject matter jurisdiction is required for this Court to adjudicate a matter, “defects
in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties . . ..” Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363,
1367 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
With respect to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, properly brought
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Sixth Circuit has recognized that such
motions can present facial attacks or factual attacks to a court’s authority over a matter. United
States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). Facial attacks challenge “the sufficiency of the
pleading itself” while factual attacks challenge “the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id.
When a facial attack occurs, “the court must take the material allegations of the [complaint] as
true and construe[] [them] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1974)). See also Gentek Bldg. Prods. v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). When a factual attack occurs, “no presumptive truthfulness
applies to the factual allegations . . . and the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself
as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. (citing Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)). With factual attacks, a court “has wide discretion to
allow affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts.” Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 922 F.2d at 325.
Regardless of whether the attack on the matter before the court is facial or factual, it remains
“the plaintiff’s burden . . . to prove that this court has jurisdiction over his claim[s] . . .” Kiser v.
Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915
(6th Cir. 1986)). See also Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove subject matter jurisdiction exists).
B. Discussion
First, and foremost, Parker alleges that this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
arises pursuant to federal law, and therefore, federal question jurisdiction applies. (Compl. 2, ECF
No. 1.) More specifically, Parker pleads: “Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is proper to 28
U.S.C. 1331 (federal question), as this civil action is brought pursuant to (ERISA) Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Section 1132(a)(1)(B [sic] . . .”. (Id.) Parker is correct
that subject matter jurisdiction in this Court “is granted to cases arising under ERISA pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).” Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, ERISA, a federal law enumerated in 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001 et seq., was enacted by
Congress to “’protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries’ by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and
to ‘provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’” Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C.S. § 1001(b)). An employee
benefit plan, as contemplated by the statute, is “any plan, fund, or program . . . established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization” to provide insurance benefits or
retirement income to employees. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1002(1)-(3).
The analysis of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter begins
and ends with the statutory definition of employee benefit plan. Although Parker alleges that this
Court properly has jurisdiction over his claims because they are brought pursuant to ERISA, and,
therefore, present a federal question, the downfall for Parker is that ERISA does not actually apply
to his claims. Utilizing the statutory definitions enumerated above, ERISA is only applicable in
cases where employee benefit plans are at issue - in other words, where insurance or retirement
benefits are established or maintained by an employer.
Metropolitan, in attacking Parker’s Complaint facially, argues that the policies at issue are
individually-purchased policies, not employer-maintained policies, making ERISA inapplicable.
(Mot. to Dismiss 4, ECF No. 84.) Metropolitan’s facial argument is well-taken, as Parker himself
alleges in his Complaint that the life insurance policies were “purchased by the deceased . . . from
MetLife Insurance Company” and that the deceased “contracted with MetLife Insurance
Company” to enroll in the flexible retirement annuity. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.) Although Parker
alleges that the deceased was employed at Whitacre-Greer Fireproofing Company, he fails to plead
a connection between the decedent’s employer and the policies at issue. (Compl. 8, ECF No. 1.)
Therefore, even when viewing the material allegations of Parker’s Complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to Parker, facially, Parker fails to meet his burden of
establishing that this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over this action.
In addition, Parker has not been able to factually demonstrate that ERISA applies to his claims.
In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Metropolitan provided copies of life insurance policy 726615-739-A, life insurance policy 770-107-251-MS, life insurance policy 957-706-808-M, and
flexible retirement annuity 030-052-308 along with an associated affidavit setting forth that neither
the life insurance policies nor the flexible retirement annuity enumerated in Parker’s Complaint
were established or maintained by an employer or an employee organization. (Mot. to Dismiss
Exhibit A, ECF No. 84-1.) Despite the volume of materials Parker filed with this Court in
opposition to Metropolitan’s Motion to Dismiss, the evidence provided does not dispute
Metropolitan’s factual attack on Parker’s Complaint. Employing its wide discretion to consider
extrinsic evidence when determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, this Court
concludes that the life insurance policies and flexible retirement annuity at issue were all purchased
by an individual and not established or maintained by an employer or an employee organization.
Therefore, ERISA does not apply, and this Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over
the pending action. As the remainder of the claims pled in Parker’s Complaint arise under state
law, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over the
instant matter. This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims
contained in the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Therefore, Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED. Accordingly, this matter is DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice, and all other
currently pending motions are rendered MOOT by this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: September 23, 2019
/s/ John R. Adams
Judge John R. Adams
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?