Le Moor Bey-Razin Rose El et al v. Summit County Court of Common Pleas et al

Filing 19

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. An appeal from this decision may not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 1/31/18. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Dove Le Moore Bey-Razin Rose El, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Summit County Court of Common
Pleas, et al.,
Respondents.

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CASE NO. 5:17 CV 2564
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Petitioners Dove Le Moore Bey-Razin Rose El and DemaiRa Meru Yahawahi El,
initiated this action by filing a “Complaint in Mandamus” in the Ohio Supreme Court. The
Complaint names twelve Respondents, including the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, the
United States Bankruptcy Court, State and United States Bankruptcy Court Judges, their spouses,
other state and federal court employees, officials and their spouses, and private corporations. (Doc.
No. 1-3.) The federal Respondents removed the action to federal court, and it was subsequently
transferred to this district. The federal Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 18).
The Complaint, in which Petitioners assert they are “Aboriginal, Indigenous Moorish
American Nationals” and not “statutory” persons (see Doc. No. 2 at 7 and10, Page ID ## 105 and

108), does not contain allegations or legal claims against the Respondents that are intelligible to the
Court. Petitioners seek compensatory and punitive damages from each Respondent, but the
Complaint contains entirely incomprehensible legal assertions and rhetoric.
Although pro se pleadings generally are liberally construed and held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir.
2011), pro se plaintiffs are still required to meet basic pleading requirements and a court is not
required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and “a district court may, at any time,
sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of [the] complaint are totally implausible,
attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v.
Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Court finds this action must be dismissed in accordance with Apple v. Glenn. The
Petitioners’ allegations are so incoherent, implausible, unsubstantial, or frivolous that they do not
provide a basis to establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim against any
Respondent. Furthermore, many of the Respondents would be immune from civil liability in any
case. See, e.g., Baker v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 61 Ohio App.3d 59, 64, 572
N.E.2d 155, 158-59 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. 1989) (“A judge is immune from civil liability for actions
taken within his judicial capacity . . . This immunity extends to the clerks of a court . . . for actions
taken in performance of the court’s functions.”).
Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
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Court’s authority established in Apple v. Glenn. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. In light of the
dismissal for lack of subject-mater jurisdiction, it is not necessary for the Court to address the
federal Respondents’ motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 31, 2018

/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE