Nixon v. Doherty

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2 ) is granted, and his complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Any state-law claim plaintiff purports to assert in his complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (Related Doc. No. 1 ). Judge Sara Lioi on 9/21/2018. (P,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID A. NIXON,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
JUDGE BECKY L. DOHERTY,
DEFENDANT.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 5:18-cv-1099
JUDGE SARA LIOI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff David A. Nixon, an Ohio prisoner, has filed a civil rights complaint in
this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Portage County Court of Common Pleas Judge
Becky L. Doherty. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff pleaded guilty in two Portage County cases to one
count of domestic violence and one count of violating a protective order, and was sentenced to a
three-year term of imprisonment. State of Ohio v. David A. Nixon, Case Nos. 2016 CR 0394 and
2016 CR 0496 (Portage County Court of Common Pleas). In his complaint in this case, plaintiff
contends defendant Judge Doherty violated his constitutional and statutory rights in the Portage
County cases by, among other things, altering court dockets, transcripts, orders, and judgment
entries, and denying him a hearing on competency, a copy of the evaluator’s competency report,
and “due process throughout [the] entire cases.” (Id. at 5.) He asserts he does not seek monetary
relief, but only a ruling “that [he] was not given a fair, impartial trial, and to acknowledge . . .
violations of [his] rights.” Id.
Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, principles requiring
generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. Beaudett v. City of Hampton,

775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). Federal district courts are expressly required, under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to screen all in forma pauperis actions, and all actions in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental officer or employee, and to dismiss before
service any such action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. To state a claim on which relief may be granted, a complaint must set forth factual
matter, accepted as true, sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010).
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed because, even
liberally construed, it does not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that a state prisoner does not have a cognizable claim for damages under §
1983 if a judgment in the prisoner’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence” unless the prisoner can show that his conviction or sentence previously
had been invalidated by being “reversed on a direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck has been extended to §
1983 claims seeking declaratory relief. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645, 117 S. Ct. 1584,
137 L. Ed. 2d 906 (1997). In Balisok, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s claim for
declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the
decision-maker in a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in his loss of good time credits, was not
cognizable under Heck because success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of
the punishment imposed on him. Id. at 648.

In this case, plaintiff’s success on any § 1983 claim that he was deprived of federal rights
and “not given a fair, impartial trial” in his Portage County criminal cases would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his state convictions. Under Heck, plaintiff has no cognizable claim for §
1983 relief unless he demonstrates that his convictions have been invalidated or set aside in one
of the ways Heck articulates. Nothing in his complaint suggests that plaintiff’s convictions have
been so invalidated. Accordingly, he has failed to allege any plausible federal claim.
Further, because plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any cognizable federal claim, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claim plaintiff may also
be attempting to assert. See Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)
(a federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the
plaintiff’s state-law claims).
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, and his
complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Any state-law claim
plaintiff purports to assert in his complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2018
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE