Wright v. City of Akron et al.

Filing 3

Opinion and Order dismissing this action. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 6/3/24. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Michelle S. Wright
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Akron, et al.
Defendants.

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CASE NO: 5:24CV00332
JUDGE JOHN ADAMS
OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Michelle S. Wright filed this in forma pauperis civil rights action
against the City of Akron and several individuals associated with her state court case in
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, including two
magistrates, one judge, a prosecutor, a Sheriff’s Deputy, and Summit County Children’s
Services employees. (Doc. No. 1).
As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff’s complaint stems from the Juvenile Court
case in which legal custody of Plaintiff’s minor children was awarded to the children’s
father. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 11). Plaintiff appears to allege that all defendants have
engaged in misconduct in connection with her Juvenile Court case. Her allegations
include the unlawful removal of her children, a violation of her equal protection rights, a
violation of her parental rights, including the right to a hearing and the right to
reunification. (See Doc. No. 1). In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff claims that the
defendants seized her children’s SSI benefits. (Id. at 11). She also states that she was
“kidnapped, trafficked” and her children were “abducted.” (Id. at 12). Finally, as a basis

for jurisdiction, Plaintiff lists various criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail
fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), “RICO Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of
rights under color of law), and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000.
Plaintiff requests compensatory relief, the return of her children, and the
children’s SSI benefits returned.
I. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915. The Court grants that application. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis, her complaint is before the Court for initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365,
102 S. Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The Court, however, is required to dismiss
an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall,
898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.
1996).

A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it
lacks “plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127

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S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations
in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations but must provide
more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th
Cir.1998).
II. Discussion
To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to overturn a state court judgment and
issue judgment in her favor, the Court cannot grant that relief pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923). Under this principle, a party losing his
or her case in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based on the party’s claim
that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d
290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012). United States District Courts lack jurisdiction to overturn
state court decisions even if the request to reverse the state court judgment is based on an

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allegation that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005).
Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United States
Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id.
Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine with narrow application. It does not bar federal
jurisdiction “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter
previously litigated in state court.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293; Berry, 688 F.3d
298-99. It also does not address potential conflicts between federal and state court orders,
which fall within the parameters of the doctrines of comity, abstention, and preclusion.
Berry, 688 F.3d 299. Rather, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party
losing his or her case in state court initiates an action in federal district court complaining
of injury caused by a state court judgment itself and seeks review and rejection of that
judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To
determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to the “source of
the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451
F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299.
If the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state-court judgment itself, then the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is
some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an
independent claim.” Id. In conducting this inquiry, the Court should also consider the
plaintiff’s requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, No. 09-3998, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
10787, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1 (6th Cir. May 27, 2011).

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Here, the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury is the state juvenile court’s decision
awarding custody of Plaintiff’s children to the children’s father. Plaintiff asks the Court
to return the children to her. To do that, the Court would have to vacate the judgment of
the state juvenile court. Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to do so.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to litigate the matter for a second time in a
different court in the hope of obtaining a different result, this Court cannot grant that
relief. The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on the same event or
events. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S. Ct. 970, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210
(1979); Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed.
2d 552 (1979). The term “res judicata” literally means “a thing [already] adjudicated.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed. When one court has already resolved the merits of a
case, another court will not revisit them. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153; Parklane Hosiery
Co., Inc., 439 U.S. at 326. The doctrine of res judicata therefore precludes a party from
bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new defense to defeat
the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 918 F.2d
658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). It bars relitigation of every issue actually brought before the
Court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in the previous action. Id.
Furthermore, res judicata bars Plaintiff from relitigating in federal court claims
and issues that were previously decided by a state court. Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570
F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff asks this Court to make a determination on her parental rights. This issue
has been previously decided by the Summit County Juvenile Court. Res judicata

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therefore bars Plaintiff from relitigating her parental rights in federal court. This Court
must give full faith and credit to the judgment of the state court.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman or
res judicata, Plaintiff’s pleading fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff lists several federal criminal statutes, the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, a victim protections act, and several “parental rights.” And Plaintiff asserts
the following conclusory claims: abuse of power in transferring the children’s SSI
benefits; negligence in handling the children’s SSI benefits; Ms. Sewell “kidnapped and
trafficked” her son; Mr. Kabasinski threatened her; the prosecutor did not have probable
cause to remove her children from the home; Magistrate Mendlick “coerced me in a …
emergency custody hearing”; and a Sheriff’s deputy “followed, stalked, and harassed and
was part of the kidnapping and trafficking of my children.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6-7, 9, 11, 1314). Plaintiff’s allegations are so convoluted, vague, and conclusory that they fail to meet
basic federal pleading requirements or state any plausible claim for relief. See Lillard v.
Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to
accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a
complaint states a claim for relief); see also Heinz v. HSBC Mortgage Serv., Inc., N.
5:21-cv-542, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203680, 2021 WL 4942198, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
22, 2021) (finding Plaintiff’s unclear and conclusory “defendants-unlawfully-harmed-me
allegations” were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)); Kafele v. Lerner,
Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161 Fed. App’x. 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding
dismissal of a complaint for failure to meet basic pleading requirements).

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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal
from this decision could not be taken in good faith and that there is no basis on which to
issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 3, 2024

/s/ John R. Adams
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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