Carpenter v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
11
Report and Recommendation that the Court affirm the Commissioners decision. (Objections to Report & Recommendation due by 02/12/2025). Signed by Magistrate Judge James E. Grimes Jr. on 01/29/2025. (M,MT)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:24-cv-1085
SEBASTIAN CARPENTER,
DISTRICT JUDGE
JOHN R. ADAMS
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
Plaintiff
Sebastian
Carpenter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
filed
a
Complaint
against
the
Commissioner of Social Security seeking judicial review of its decision denying
childhood disability and supplemental social security income benefits. Doc. 1.
This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The Court
referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) for the
preparation of a Report and Recommendation. Following review, and for the
reasons stated below, I recommend that the District Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
Procedural Background
In October 2021, Carpenter filed an application for Childhood Disability
and Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset
date in December 2019. 1 Tr. 294–307. Carpenter alleged disability relating to
lower back and hip pain, migraines, insomnia, asthma, heart murmur, chronic
fatigue, frequent yeast infections, endometriosis, major depressive disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and autism. Tr. 319. The Commissioner
denied Carpenter’s application initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 135, 172,
192.
In August 2022, Carpenter requested a hearing. Tr. 206. Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michael F. Schmitz conducted a telephonic hearing in
March 2023. Tr. 102. Carpenter appeared, testified, and was represented by
counsel at the hearing. Id. Qualified vocational expert William Cody also
testified. Tr. 128. In April 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision, which found
that Carpenter was not entitled to benefits. Tr. 66.
In June 2023, Carpenter appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals
Council. Tr. 289. In April 2024, the Appeals Council denied Carpenter’s appeal,
Tr. 1, making the ALJ’s April 2023 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner, Tr. 102–32, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
“Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the
onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x
422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).
1
2
Evidence 2
1. Personal, Education, Vocational
Carpenter was born in 2001, making him 18 years old on his alleged
onset date. Tr. 94, 294. He attended high-school until the 12th grade and
received his GED in 2020. Tr. 113, 320.
2. Medical Evidence
In January 2021, Carpenter saw Erin Tisdale, APRN, 3 to address his
longstanding
gender
dysphoria
and
discuss
medical/hormonal transition.” Tr. 563. Nurse Tisdale indicated that
Carpenter’s mood, behavior, thought content, and judgment were all normal.
Tr. 566. Nurse Tisdale also prescribed testosterone injections at this
appointment. Tr. 567. Through at least 2023, Carpenter had periodic follow-up
appointments with Nurse Tisdale and continued to take testosterone. See, e.g.,
Tr. 571, 578, 586, 781, 791, 958. At all follow-up appointments, Nurse Tisdale
documented normal objective findings on mental status examinations. See, e.g.,
Tr. 574, 582, 590, 785, 795, 963.
In May 2021, Alf Bergman, MD, treated Carpenter over a period of three
days when he was hospitalized for suicidal ideation and an overdose, which
The recitation of evidence is not intended to be exhaustive and is
generally limited to the evidence cited in the parties’ briefs.
2
APRN is an abbreviation for Advanced Practice Registered Nurse.
Advanced
Practice
Registered
Nurse
(APRN),
OhioAPRN.com,
http://www.ohioaprn.com/what-is-an-aprn-.html
[https://perma.cc/69URXX65]. CNP is an abbreviation for Certified Nurse Practitioner. Id.
3
3
was described as a suicide attempt. Tr. 385–98. Three days after admission,
Carpenter was discharged when his “symptoms improved and stabilized” with
“no acute safety concerns” and “an improvement in state or status of risk of
suicide compared to the admission.” Tr. 385.
Providers at Coleman Behavioral Health treated Carpenter from June
2021 through at least April 2022. Tr. 492–562, 681–83. In June 2021, Tina
Steen, CNP, diagnosed Carpenter with depressive disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, and PTSD, and she restarted Carpenter on medications. Tr.
532–34. In July 2021, at follow up psychiatric care appointments, Nurse Steen
adjusted Carpenter’s medications. See Tr. 535, 539, 542, 546.
Also in July 2021, Susanne Bond, APRN-CNP, noted that Carpenter
reached out and asked her to restart his ADD medication. Tr. 435. Nurse Bond
explained that she was uncomfortable prescribing a stimulant at that time and
advised Carpenter to discuss the matter with his new psychiatrist. Tr. 435.
In September 2021, Michael Ray, MS, treated Carpenter on admission
to a hospital for suicidal thoughts and feelings of hopelessness. Tr. 399. Dr.
Ray noted that Carpenter was homeless at the time of his admission. Tr. 399.
With “minor medication adjustments and supportive educative counseling,”
Carpenter stabilized and expressed a willingness to restart outpatient
counseling. Tr. 399–400.
In October 2021, Carpenter underwent counseling services through
Coleman Behavioral Health. Tr. 496–507.
4
In November 2021, Allison Harrison, a school psychologist, evaluated
Carpenter and found that “early results of testing thus far suggests
symptomology associated with Autism Spectrum Disorder.” Tr. 466–67. She
also noted that the evaluation was “ongoing as additional testing was
requested by this client[.]” Tr. 466–67. Harrison conducted additional
evaluations in December 2021 and March 2022, culminating in a June 2022
report with overall findings that “suggest[ed]” that Carpenter “demonstrates
characteristics aligned with Autism Spectrum Disorder.” Tr. 693.
Later in November 2021, Ryan Goettsch, LISW, 4 conducted an adult
diagnostic assessment of Carpenter. See Tr. 475–82. Carpenter reported
recurrent
intrusive
memories,
dissociative
episodes,
self-sabotaging,
depersonalization, and derealization. Tr. 478–79. Mr. Goettsch diagnosed
Carpenter with PTSD and noted a need to “rule out” diagnoses of depression,
ADHD, and autism spectrum disorder. Tr. 481.
In March 2022, Kassandra Kornbau, DNP, APRN, FNP, 5 noted that
Carpenter reported “feeling okay,” though he also reported increased
The acronym LISW stands for “Licensed Independent Social Worker”
which is a designation obtained after completion of a master’s level education
and other training requirements established by state licensing boards.
National Association of Social Workers Washington Chapter, Licensed
Independent
Social
Workers
(LISW)
Overview,
https://careers.naswwa.socialworkers.org/career/licensed-independent-socialworker-lisw [https://perma.cc/4N5N-6HXL].
4
The acronyms DNP and FNP stand for “Doctor of Nursing Practice” and
“Family Nurse Practitioner,” respectively. An FNP is an APRN with
educational and training focused on family practice, while a DNP is the most
5
5
depression and suicidal ideation, but not intent, the previous evening. Tr. 720.
Kornbau advised Carpenter to “call hotline, office, 911 or go to ER if having
thoughts of self harm” and that he should continue taking his prescribed
medications, Zoloft and Buspar, because “symptoms may improve once other
meds take full effect.” Tr. 728.
In July 2022, Kyle Guterba, CNP, conducted a medication management
appointment and recorded that Carpenter was content with his medications
and that his hallucinations were well managed. Tr. 710. He noted that
Carpenter denied mood swings and overt depression or anxiety, though
Carpenter described continued struggles with focus, concentration, and
staying on task. Id. He also reported that Carpenter had intact judgment and
insight, appropriate speech and thought processes, and an appropriate affect
and mood. Tr. 713–14. Nurse Guterba also prescribed Vyvanse. Tr. 718. During
an August 2022 appointment, Carpenter described that “his focus [wa]s better
since starting the [V]yvanse last month, but [that] he [wa]s still getting
distracted.” Tr. 701.
The most recent records from Comprehensive Behavioral Health
Associates, show that in February and March 2023, Carpenter continued to
respond to treatment provided. Tr. 873, 875, 949. Providers reported that
Carpenter denied suicidal thoughts and stated that “things had been going
advanced degree available for nurse practitioners. Franklin University, FNP
vs. DNP.: The Definitive Comparison, https://www.franklin.edu/blog/fnp-vsdnp [https://perma.cc/LXW7-6LLH].
6
alright.” Tr. 873, 949. Carpenter also stated that his medications were
“working well” and that “overall moods ha[d] been stable” and his depression,
anxiety, and attention and focus issues were all well controlled. Tr. 949–50.
3. State Agency Reviewers
In January 2022, state agency psychological reviewer Robyn MurryHoffman, Psy. D, reviewed the record and found that Carpenter had no more
than moderate limitations in the four broad areas of mental functioning. 139–
41. Dr. Murry-Hoffman concluded that Carpenter could work in “a non-public
work environment in which interaction with coworkers and supervisors is
occasional and superficial,” where there were no more than occasional changes
in routine which were predictable and easily explained, and where tasks were
not production driven. Tr. 140–41. In March 2022, Kristen Haskins, Psy. D,
found that the initial assessment “remains appropriated on reconsideration,
and is affirmed. Findings are consistent and supported by the medical and
nonmedical findings.” Tr. 157–60.
4. Hearing Testimony
Carpenter testified during the administrative hearing that he lived on
his own but that he had providers who came to his home to help him. Tr. 112–
13. He also explained that, although he could not drive, he had medical transportation
provided by the state. Tr. 113.
Carpenter described that he worked in a vocational workshop run by the
Board of Developmental Disabilities and that he was generally scheduled to
work between 12 and 20 hours per week. Tr. 114. At the vocational workshop
7
program, he was assigned as a document shredder. Id. Later during his
testimony, Carpenter stated that he did not go into work regularly and that
there were no repercussions for being absent. Tr. 124. He said he would
typically go in three or four days in a good week but that in a bad week he
might go in only two times. Id. Carpenter also explained that workshop
workers could take six breaks in a four- or five-hour shift, but that sometimes
he took more. Tr. 125. He testified that his team had recently decided that, due
to recent mental-health struggles, he was not ready to advance to the next level
of employment services. Id.
5. Vocational Expert
Qualified vocational expert William Cody, testified that there would be
jobs in the national economy for a hypothetical individual with Carpenter’s
residual functional capacity (RFC). 6 Tr. 130–31. Cody also testified that a
hypothetical individual with the same RFC, but that also required occasional
redirection or supervision to stay on task, would eventually be precluded from
sustained employment. Tr. 131. He testified further that if an individual were
absent from work more than once per month, no jobs would exist for that
person to perform. Tr. 132.
An RFC is an “assessment of” a claimant’s ability to work, taking his or
her “limitations … into account.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,
239 (6th Circ. 2002). Essentially, it is the Social Security Administration’s
“description of what the claimant ‘can and cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).
6
8
ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.
Born on December 27, 2001, the claimant had
not attained age 22 as of December 27, 2019,
the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.102,
416.120(c)(4), and 404.350(a)(5)).
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since December 27, 2019, the
alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.,
and 416.971 et seq.).
3.
The claimant has the following severe
impairments:
depressive
disorder,
schizoaffective disorder, anxiety disorder,
borderline personality disorder, autism
spectrum
disorder,
attention-deficit
hyperactivity
disorder
(ADHD),
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and
obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4.
The claimant does not have impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and
416.926).
5.
After careful consideration of the entire
record, I find that the claimant has the
residual capacity to perform medium work, as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c),
except that he is further limited in the
following nonexertional respects:
-
Can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds but can occasionally climb
ramps and stairs, and can frequently
balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and
crawl;
9
-
Must avoid all exposure to hazards
such as unprotected heights; and
Can perform a wide variety of both
simple and complex tasks, but cannot
perform tasks that require a high
production rate pace (such as
assembly-line work); can interact on an
occasional basis with supervisors and
coworkers in a non-public work setting,
and is limited to superficial contact,
meaning no group, tandem, or
collaborative
tasks
and
no
management, direction, or persuasion
of
others;
and
can
respond
appropriately to occasional change in a
routine and relatively predictable work
setting, as long as any such change is
easily explained and/or demonstrated.
6.
The claimant has no past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7.
The claimant was born on December 27, 2001
and was 18 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18—49, on the alleged
disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and
416.963).
8.
The claimant has at least a high school
education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416. 964).
9.
Transferability of job skills is not an issue
because claimant does not have past relevant
work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.958).
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, no
work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy
that the claimant can perform (20 CFR
404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability,
as defined in the Social Security Act, from
10
December 27, 2019 through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.350(a)(5), and
404.1520(g), and 416.920(g)).
Tr. 72–3, 79, 94
Standard for Disability
Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence
of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).
An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a
disability determination:
1.
Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
2.
Does the claimant have a medically
determinable impairment, or a combination of
impairments, that is “severe”? If not, the
claimant is not disabled.
3.
Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal
one of the listed impairments and meet the
duration requirement? If so, the claimant is
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
4.
What is the claimant’s residual functional
capacity and can the claimant perform past
relevant work? If so, the claimant is not
11
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
5.
Can the claimant do any other work
considering the claimant’s residual functional
capacity,
age,
education,
and
work
experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
If not, the claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d
417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the
burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden
shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The
claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional
capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the
duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).
Standard of Review
A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it
determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has
made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which
“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains
‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial
evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than
12
a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (citations
omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by
substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at
99.
A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or
decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.
2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence
supports a claimant’s position, a reviewing court cannot overturn the
Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,
477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”
the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.
Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Discussion
Carpenter asserts that the ALJ’s findings “lack[] the support of
substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in his analysis of the evidence from
[Carpenter’s] medical providers and vocational services providers.” Doc. 8, at
1. For at least the three following reasons, Carpenter’s argument that ALJ’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence fails.
13
First, to the extent that Carpenter’s argument can be construed as
taking issue with the ALJ’s analysis of the medical evidence by asserting that
the ALJ “erred in his analysis of the evidence from [Carpenter’s] medical
providers,” Doc. 8, at 1, 8, his argument is unconvincing. The Commissioner is
required to evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions using the
following
factors:
supportability;
consistency;
treatment
relationship,
including the length, frequency, purpose, and extent; specialization; and other
factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(a), 416.920c(c)(1)–(5). Supportability and
consistency are the most important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Supportability means that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion[] … the more persuasive the medical opinions … will
be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Consistency means “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion[] … is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion[] …
will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). The Commissioner must explain the
supportability and consistency factors when discussing a medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). “[A]n ALJ need not,” however, “specifically use the
terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ in his analysis.” Cormany v. Kijakazi, No.
5:21-cv-933, 2022 WL 4115232, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2022) (citing cases).
The Commissioner is not required to discuss the remaining factors. Id. “A
reviewing court evaluates whether the ALJ properly considered the factors as
14
set forth in the regulations to determine the persuasiveness of a medical
opinion.” Toennies v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 2841379, at *14 (N.D. Ohio
June 1, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Without citing any of the above authority, Carpenter advances an
argument that the ALJ “made mistakes and omissions in his analysis.” Doc. 8,
at 7–8 (citing only authority establishing the scope of judicial review and the
substantial evidence standard). Carpenter makes no argument that the ALJ
failed to articulate why he found certain medical evidence
persuasive or
unpersuasive. Doc. 8, at 8–9. (citing evidence that supported an outcome
different than the ALJ’s determination). He also does not argue that the ALJ
failed to discuss the supportability and consistency of the medical evidence.
See id. And, even if he had, the ALJ’s decision belies that argument. See Tr.
91–93 (specifically addressing the persuasiveness of the medical opinions by
articulating supportability and consistency factors). Carpenter’s failure to
provide any support, from the record or otherwise, to show that the ALJ’s
analysis fell below the requirements for evaluating medical opinion evidence
undercuts his argument that the ALJ erred in evaluating that evidence.
Second, the bulk of Carpenter’s brief, three-page argument is simply an
overview of the evidence that he views as supporting a different outcome. 7 See
Carpenter points out that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not include a
limitation for his absenteeism or alleged need for additional supervision. Doc.
8, at 8. But Carpenter does not provide any support for or clear argument that
the exclusion of these limitations justifies remand.
7
15
Doc. 8, at 8–9. Carpenter does not provide any reason why the ALJ’s decision
is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. This omission matters because “so
long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ,” it
doesn’t matter if substantial evidence also supports a claimant’s position. Key
v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). So whether––as Carpenter
says—“[s]ubstantial evidence supports a finding of disability, based on the
evidence outlined above, and based on the testimony of the vocational expert[,]”
Doc. 8, at 10, is irrelevant unless he shows that substantial does not support
the ALJ’s decision, see Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th
Cir. 2004). Beyond saying that “the ALJ’s determination lacks the support of
substantial evidence,” Doc. 8, at 10, Carpenter does nothing to substantiate his
claim, see Hunter v. Ferebauer, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1259 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
(holding that a “conclusory” statement “establishes nothing more than the fact
that” the person making the assertion “had that belief”). Carpenter has thus
forfeited any argument that the ALJ’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. See McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party
to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to
... put flesh on its bones.”).
Moreover, the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. In
addition to other detailed analysis, the ALJ provided an extensive summary of
16
the relevant objective medical records and specifically explained why his
findings were supported by those record. See Tr. 82–87. For example, at the
conclusion of his analysis for one portion of the evidence, the ALJ wrote that
the “medical evidence again shows that [Carpenter’s] symptoms of PTSD,
depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder respond well to medications and
added therapies, and there remains no significant report of significant features
relating to previously diagnosed borderline personality disorder or later
diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and autism within these records.” Tr. 85.
Elsewhere, the ALJ distinguished that “the summary pages provided by
[Carpenter’s primary counseling provider] do not support any significant
absences from scheduled appointments or attendance issues, which tend
against the testimony alleging that his symptoms at times affect his ability to
consistently attend these appointments[.]” Tr. 87. And these are just some
examples, which Carpenter ignores, that demonstrate the ALJ’s decision that
show substantial evidence supports his decision.
The District Court should thus affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
Third, and finally, Carpenter makes a passing claim that “[t]he evidence
supports a finding of disability at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation
process, if not at the third.” Doc. 8, at 9. But he does not further develop this
argument. There is also no indication from Carpenter’s issue statement or
argument heading that Carpenter challenges the ALJ’s analysis at any
particular step in the sequential evaluation. So, in this regard, Carpenter
17
failed to comply with the Court’s initial order. See Doc. 4, at 3 (“Each
introductory heading in the Argument or Analysis section of a brief must
correspond to the argument presented under the heading. Failure to comply
with this requirement may result in (a) waiver of the arguments in the heading
and in the test following the heading[.] … Similarly, bald assertions of error––
those unsupported by explanation and argument––will be deemed waived.”).
In either event, this argument, if it can be considered one, is also forfeited. See
McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995–96. Carpenter’s final, passing argument should
therefore also be rejected.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
Dated: January 29, 2025
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–531 (6th
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