Watley v. Carter, et al

Filing 76

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 75 MOTION to Vacate filed by Rayshan Watley: that motion to vacate (Doc. 56) be DENIED. Objections to R&R due by 7/26/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman on 7/9/13. (Attachments: # 1 Certified Mail Receipt) (jl1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
RAYSHAN WATLEY,

Case No. 1:00-cv-928

Plaintiff,

Beckwith, J.
Bowman, M.J.

v.

WARDEN HAROLD CARTER, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown,
Ohio, has filed a motion in this long-closed case. 1 In his motion (Doc. 75), Plaintiff
essentially seeks relief from the obligation to pay the full filing fee, previously ordered by
this Court in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2).
Soon after adoption of the PLRA, the Sixth Circuit held that the payment
obligation attaches when a prisoner files a non-habeas civil complaint and is not
obviated by the subsequent dismissal of the complaint. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997) (implicitly overruled on separate grounds in part by
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This case has been closed since October 10, 2001. Cm/ecf electronic case filing records reflect that Mr.
Watley has initiated suit in approximately 20 other civil cases in this Court, and has filed identical motions
in multiple closed cases. In fact, the instant motion identifies 14 cases in which Plaintiff has filed motions
on the same day, seeking the same relief. In light of the identical issues, this Report and
Recommendation has drawn liberally from Judge Spiegel’s recent analysis in Watley v. Collins, Civil Case
No. 1:06-cv-794-SAS-KLL, Doc. 8 (January 15, 2013 Order denying identical motion). Pursuant to the
orders of reference recently entered by Senior District Judge Beckwith, three additional Reports and
Recommendations have been filed in Civil Case Nos. 1:01-cv-222, 1:01-cv-622, and 1:02-cv-244. All of
the remaining identical motions filed by Plaintiff in other closed cases have previously been denied.

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Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (U.S. 2007), and explicitly overruled by LaFountain v.
Harry, 2013 WL 2221569, ___F.3d___ (6th Cir. May 22, 2013)). Although portions of
McGore have since been modified and/or overruled, the referenced holding has not. In
a subsequent case, In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 381-82 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit reiterated that even a voluntary dismissal does not eliminate a prisoner’s obligation to pay
the required filing fee, because the financial obligation under the statute attaches at the
moment that the complaint is filed. For that reason, subsequent dismissal of the case
has no impact upon the prisoner’s financial responsibility. Id. (citing McGore, 114 F.3d
at 607); cf. Goins v. Decaro, 241 F.3d 260, 261 (2nd Cir. 2001)(“The PLRA makes no
provision for return of fees partially paid or for cancellation of the remaining
indebtedness in the event an appeal is withdrawn. That is not surprising, since a
congressional objective in enacting the PLRA was to make all prisoners seeking to bring
lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
In a number of cases, Plaintiff’s claims have been dismissed under the threestrikes provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), but the same mandate applies. As the
Sixth Circuit explained in the Alea case:
Although the requirement that a prisoner litigant may be liable for the
payment of the full filing fee despite the dismissal of his action may be
burdensome, it is not unfair. A prisoner who has filed prior civil actions
should be aware of the disposition of those actions and the possible
application of § 1915(g) to any new actions he wishes to pursue. By
choosing to file a new action, he invokes the jurisdiction of the federal
court and avails himself of the process afforded by that court. Even if the
end result is an order of summary dismissal under § 1915(g), the action
will require a considerable amount of time and effort on the part of the
district court and the court staff. The requirement that the full fees be paid
for these actions - whatever their merit or disposition - will provide a
prisoner with the incentive to consider carefully whether or not to submit a
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new action to the district court. Not to require the payment of the full fee
would permit a prisoner subject to the three-strikes rule to continue to file
frivolous civil complaints - thus taking much valuable time away from other
non-frivolous litigation - without any consequence beyond their mere
dismissal under § 1915(g). The intent of the PLRA was to deter such
litigation and it would be anomalous for a provision of that Act to provide a
means for the repeated filing of frivolous actions without financial
consequences to the prisoner litigant.
See In re Alea, 286 F.3d at 382. In the instant case, some claims were dismissed on
initial screening (Doc. 4), while summary judgment was granted to the Defendants on
the remaining claims. (Doc. 63). Due to the age of this case, the Court’s order granting
summary judgment is no longer readily accessible to the undersigned for review of the
precise grounds on which judgment was granted, but the basis for judgment is irrelevant
in light of Plaintiff’s continuing obligation to pay the full filing fee.
II. Conclusion and Recommendation
As a prisoner subject to the PLRA, Plaintiff cannot escape the financial obligation
that requires him to pay the full, filing fee in this case, despite its dismissal more than a
decade ago. The undersigned would add only that, in the interest of expediency and
conservation of judicial resources, potential issues limiting the jurisdictional authority to
consider the instant motion have not been fully considered.

Regardless, because

Plaintiff clearly is entitled to no relief from the statutory requirement of paying the full
filing fee, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT his motion to vacate the Court’s prior order
regarding the payment of fees (Doc. 75) be DENIED.

s/Stephanie Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
RAYSHAN WATLEY,

Case No. 1:00-cv-928

Plaintiff,

Beckwith, J.
Bowman, M.J.

v.

WARDEN HAROLD CARTER, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
of the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law
in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to
make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981).

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