Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region et al v. Stickland, et al
Filing
197
ORDER denying 184 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott. (wam1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
PLANNED PARENTHOOD
SOUTHWEST OHIO REGION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MIKE DEWINE, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 1:04-cv-493
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS (Doc. 184.)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mike DeWine’s Motion to Dismiss,
Plaintiffs’ Response in opposition, and Defendant’s Reply. (Doc. 184, 190, 191.) For the
reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The facts and issues in this case are well-detailed in the Court’s previous orders and will
not be reiterated here except as needed for the opinion. In brief, this case involves the
constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code § 2919.123, a 2004 state law that bars Ohio physicians
from administering or prescribing mifepristone (RU-486) to induce an abortion unless the drug is
provided to a patient “in accordance with all provisions of federal law that govern the use of RU486.” The Act defines “federal law” as “any law, rule, or regulation of the United States or any
drug approval letter of the [FDA] that governs or regulates the use of RU-486 (mifepristone) for
the purpose of inducing abortions.” O.R.C. § 2919.123(F)(1). The Supreme Court of Ohio has
interpreted the Act to mean that “pursuant to R.C. 2919.123, a physician may provide
mifepristone for the purpose of inducing an abortion only through the patient’s 49th day of
pregnancy and only by using the dosage indications and treatment protocols expressly approved
by the FDA in the drug’s final printed labeling as incorporated by the drug approval letter.”
Cordray v. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, 911 N.E.2d 871, 879 (Ohio 2009).
The FDA approved mifepristone for use in the United States in September of 2000 based
on clinical trials submitted to the FDA in 1996. The treatment regimen specified by the final
printed labeling and approval letter calls for the administration of 600 mg of mifepristone orally,
followed by the oral ingestion of 0.4 mg of misoprostol two days later, and limits the
administration of mifepristone through seven weeks or for the first forty-nine days following the
woman’s last menstrual period (“LMP”). Clinical trials subsequently led to the development of
an evidence-based protocol calling for a lower dosage of mifepristone that can safely be
administered through sixty-three days following the LMP. However, under the Act, any
physician employing the evidence-based protocol—also referred to as an off-label mifepristone
abortion—is subject to criminal prosecution and disciplinary action, including suspension or
revocation of their medical license. O.R.C. § 2919.123(E). The Act contains no exception to
protect the health or the life of the patient.
Prior to the Act’s enforcement, Plaintiffs and/or their predecessors—physicians and
organizations providing abortions to their patients—brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to obtain declaratory relief that the Act is unconstitutional and injunctive relief barring its
enforcement. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the
grounds that it (1) is unconstitutionally vague, (2) violates a patient’s right to bodily integrity by
compelling surgery in circumstances where medical abortion would otherwise be desired or
appropriate treatment, (3) lacks the constitutionally-mandated exception to allow otherwise
restricted practices where they are necessary to preserve a women’s health or life, and (4)
imposes an undue burden on a patient’s right to choose abortion by prohibiting a safe and
2
common method of pre-viability abortion. Three of Plaintiffs’ claims have been litigated to final
judgment in Defendants’ favor.
The only claim remaining in this action is whether the Act is unconstitutional due to its
failure to include an exception to its restrictions where necessary to protect a woman’s life or
health. The Court previously granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on their
life/health exception claim, which remains in effect to the extent that enforcement of the Act
“prohibits off-label mifepristone abortions that are ‘necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.’” (Order Clarifying the Scope of the
Preliminary Injunction 7, Doc. 158 at PageID 2619.) Plaintiffs maintain that for women with
specified medical conditions, including some of Plaintiffs’ patients, the Act subjects them to
significant health risks. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that surgical abortions are difficult if not
impossible for women with particular medical conditions and “[i]f these woman cannot avail
themselves of an alternative evidence-based regimen of mifepristone medication after 49 days
LMP, their only alternative is to undergo an invasive medical procedure that carries significantly
more risk to their health or lives, or to forgo abortion and carry an unwanted pregnancy.” (Doc.
179 at PageID 2783.) Plaintiffs claim the Act is unconstitutional as applied to these women and
seek relief in the form of a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the Act
where necessary in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation or life of the woman.
II.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) respectively. As discussed below, the Court finds Defendant’s motion to
be without merit.
3
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant first argues that the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It is
Defendant’s position that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the life/health exception claim and that
the complaint is not ripe for review.
1. Standing
Defendant contends that the complaint should be dismissed because, as Defendant sees it,
the speculative and hypothetical nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations deprives them of standing to
bring the claim. Specifically, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs’ theory of harm impermissibly
“relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” (Doc. 184 at PageID 2794–95 (citing
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. __, 133, S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)).
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to the adjudication of
cases and controversies. One component of the case-or-controversy requirement is standing,
which requires a plaintiff to satisfy three elements. “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Second, a causal
connection must exist between the injury and the disputed conduct. In other words, the injury
must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (quoting Simon v. E.
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). Finally, it must be likely that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
4
The Court has previously determined that Dr. Kade—the former medical director of the
Planned Parenthood affiliate in Cincinnati and Plaintiff Dr. Kress’s predecessor in this action—
had standing to challenge the Act on behalf of herself and her patients. The Court reasoned that
as the director of Planned Parenthood Dr. Kade administered off-label medical abortions with
mifepristone in a manner prohibited by the Act and that Dr. Kade faced prosecution if she
continued her practice. On this basis, the Court found that she had standing to bring a preenforcement challenge. Observing the consistency with which courts have held that physicians
whose conduct is regulated by an abortion statute have standing to challenge those statutes on
behalf of their patients, the Court also found that Dr. Kade had standing to enforce her patients’
rights.
Nevertheless, Defendant cites Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. __, 133 S.Ct.
1138, 1148 (2013), for the proposition that Plaintiffs’ theory of harm impermissibly “relies on a
highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” In Clapper, the Supreme Court considered a preenforcement challenge to provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which
authorizes the surveillance of non-United States individuals reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information. The respondents in that
case—attorneys and organizations whose work allegedly requires them to engage in
communications with individuals targeted by the act—argued that they could establish standing
based upon the “objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications with their foreign
contacts will be intercepted under [50 U.S.C.] § 1881a at some point in the future.” Id. at 1143.
The Supreme Court held that the respondents failed to establish injury in fact, finding that
respondents’ theory of harm rested on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities. The Court noted
that:
5
Respondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear that: (1) the
Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with
whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke
its authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance;
(3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy §
1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the
Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents’
contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications that
the Government intercepts.
Id. at 1148. Importantly, the Court found it speculative that the Government would target
communications to which the respondents are parties, as the act “expressly provides that
respondents, who are U.S. persons, cannot be targeted for surveillance under § 1881a.” Id.
By contrast, Plaintiffs here are indisputably targeted by the Act. The Act in this case
specifically targets persons who “knowingly give, sell, dispense, administer, otherwise provide
or prescribe RU-486 (mifepristone) to another for the purposes of inducing an abortion” beyond
the patient’s forty-ninth day of pregnancy or in a manner other than the dosage indications and
treatment protocols expressly approved by the FDA in the drug’s final printed labeling.
Plaintiffs allege that they provided medication-based, off-label abortions beyond the forty-ninth
day of pregnancy prior to the Act, that they would continue to use the banned protocol but for the
Act, and that they fear prosecution if they continue to do so. The Court finds these allegations
distinguishable from Clapper and sufficient to establish standing to challenge the Act.
The Court also finds that Dr. Kress has standing to enforce his patients’ rights. In order
to establish third-party standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact and share a close
relationship with the third-parties who face an obstacle inhibiting them from bringing the claim
on their own behalf. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). As the Court noted in
finding that Dr. Kress’s predecessor had standing to challenge the Act on behalf of her patients,
6
physicians may bring suit on behalf of their patients due to: 1) the close relationship between
women and their physicians; 2) the fact that in the context of an abortion regulation, women’s
due process rights are inextricably bound up with the activity that a physician plaintiff wishes to
pursue; and 3) the fact that women are faced with several obstacles to asserting their own rights.
Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Reg., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (S.D. Ohio 2004). See also
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 150, 118 (1976) (“it is generally appropriate to allow a physician to
assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion
decision”); Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“the cases are legion that allow an abortion provider . . . to sue to enjoin as violations of federal
law . . . state laws that restrict abortion”); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp.
2d 1280, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (“federal courts routinely recognize an abortion provider’s
standing to assert the claims of its patients”) (collecting cases).
Having determined that Dr. Kress has third party standing to assert the rights of his
patients, as well as standing to assert his own rights, the Court dispenses with further inquiry into
the remaining Plaintiffs. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682 (1977) (ending
the standing inquiry after determining that one party had standing); Taft, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1045
(same).
2. Ripeness
Defendant next contends that Plaintiffs’ claim is not ripe. In order for this Court to have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim, the claim must be ripe for judicial review.
Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 970 F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir. 1992). The ripeness
doctrine operates to “ensure that courts decide only existing, substantial controversies, not
hypothetical questions or possibilities.” Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002)
7
(citations omitted). In determining whether or not a claim is ripe for adjudication, the Court
considers two basic questions: (1) is the claim fit for judicial decision in the sense that it arises in
a concrete factual context and concerns a dispute that is likely to come to pass and (2) what is the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration? Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d
521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), the Supreme Court specified that an asapplied challenge is the preferred mechanism for challenging a statute’s lack of a health
exception. The Court noted that such a challenge requires a showing that “in discrete and welldefined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure
prohibited by the Act must be used.” Id. at 167. Citing Gonzales, as well as Richmond Med.
Ctr. For Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009), Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’
claim lacks the specificity necessary to enable the Court to adjudicate the constitutional
challenge. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to allege discrete and welldefined instances in which the life/health exception is likely to apply or that any harm has
occurred or is sufficiently likely to occur in the future.
In Richmond, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia Act criminalizing intact dilation and
extraction (“D & E”) abortions, a procedure in which the fetus is terminated after its “entire head
is outside the body of the mother or, in a breach delivery, its trunk past the navel is outside the
body of the mother.” Id. at 169 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Although
similar in many respects to the federal partial birth abortion law upheld in Gonzales, the Virginia
law does not exclude accidental intact D & E abortions—that is, where the physician intends to
perform a standard D & E abortion, but the fetus emerges beyond the anatomical landmarks
identified in the act. The plaintiff physician in that case testified that “in less than 0.5% of cases,
8
the fetus is presented in a breach position and accidentally emerges intact up to its head, at which
point the head becomes lodged in the cervix.” Id. at 175. Failure to use the banned procedure in
this circumstance, the plaintiff testified, would risk the life of the mother. However, because a
physician will not know at the onset of the standard procedure whether an accidental intact D &
E procedure will become necessary, the plaintiff argued that if the act were to take effect his only
option would be to cease performing the standard D & E procedure or to violate the act. Id. at
171. On this basis, the plaintiff argued the act was facially unconstitutional because it imposed
an undue burden on a woman’s decision to have an abortion using the standard D & E procedure.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting that—unlike the Ohio Act in the instant case—the
Virginia law includes an exception enabling a doctor to take any step within reasonable medical
judgment necessary to prevent the mother’s death. Id. at 175, 178. In light of the plaintiff’s
testimony that the circumstances in which the intact procedure was necessary presented a risk to
the woman’s life, the Richmond court found “little or no evidence in the record suggesting the
inevitability of the ‘accidental’ intact D & E abortion that would violate the Virginia Act.” Id. at
175. The Fourth Circuit found the possibility that such a circumstance might arise in a rare case
to be insufficient to find the statute facially invalid. Id. To the extent that the plaintiff purported
to bring an as-applied challenge—as Plaintiffs have in the instant case—the court determined
that the plaintiff failed to present the concrete facts necessary to create a live case or controversy.
Specifically, the record contained “no concrete factual circumstance to which [the plaintiff] can
claim the Act applies unconstitutionally,” as the plaintiff failed to indicate that he had any
particular patient in mind “nor any discrete factual circumstance that is detailed by medical
records or other similarly concrete evidence.” Id. at 180. Furthermore, because the plaintiff
9
testified that the circumstances are unique in each of his cases, he could not determine how the
act might generally apply.
The Court finds Richmond distinguishable from the instant case. Plaintiffs have
identified discrete factual circumstances in which they claim the banned protocol is required.
According to Plaintiffs, the Act is unconstitutional as applied to women with anomalies of the
reproductive and genital tract, such as large uterine fibroids and cervical stenosis, which make
accessing the pregnancy inside the uterus difficult or impossible. See Planned Parenthood v.
DeWine, No. 1:04-cv-493, 2011 WL 9158009, at *16 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2011) (noting that
both parties in this action “are able to articulate the discrete instances in which an off-label
mifepristone abortion may be medically necessary”). Furthermore, the articulated circumstances
are not hypothetical, as Plaintiffs have alleged and the record includes testimony that they have
patients with the specified conditions. (Doc. 179 at PageID 2783; Trans. Pr. Hearing 12, Doc. 38
at PageID 786.) Finally, there is no uncertainty as to how the Act would operate in this case.
Because the Act prohibits mifepristone abortions after forty-nine days LMP, women with the
specified conditions would be forced to undergo a surgical abortion, which Plaintiffs claim
carries significantly more risk to their health or lives.
Accordingly, the Court finds Richmond to be distinguishable from the instant case and
otherwise insufficient to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim as unripe. To require that Plaintiffs identify a
particular patient with large uterine fibroids or cervical stenosis seeking a medical abortion
between forty-nine and sixty-three days LMP in order to state a justiciable claim—as Defendant
asks the Court to do1—ignores not only the reality of the factual circumstances in which this
1
Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ claim is unripe because they fail to specify any woman who has sought, or is
likely to seek, an abortion from Plaintiffs under circumstances that would render the Act unconstitutional.” (Reply
p. 9, Doc. 191 at PageID 2879.) In other words, Defendant contends that “Plaintiffs do not allege that any woman
10
action arises, but also the hardship to Plaintiffs if review is delayed. Cases such as this are the
very reason why courts permit physicians to bring actions on behalf of their patients in the first
place. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 (recognizing the “imminent mootness” of any individual
woman’s claim as an obstacle in support of permitting physicians to assert the rights of women
patients against governmental interference with the abortion decision). Cf. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at
189 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Surely the Court cannot mean that no suit may be brought until a
woman’s health is immediately jeopardized by the ban . . . . A woman suffering from medical
complications needs access to the medical procedure at once and cannot wait for the judicial
process to unfold.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For the above reasons, the Court finds Defendant’s motion without merit and denies the
Motion to Dismiss with respect to Defendant’s standing and ripeness challenges.
B. Health or Life Exception Claim
Having found that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim, the
Court must next determine if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, as Defendant argues.
1. Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
district court “must read all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true.” Weiner v. Klais
and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). However, this tenet is inapplicable to legal
who faces such risk has ever, or is likely to, come to one of their clinics from 50-63 days pregnant seeking an
abortion. Plaintiffs’ assertion that some of their patients suffer from medical conditions that would make a
mifepristone abortion ‘safer’ is potentially relevant if such a patient were pregnant and if she wanted an abortion and
if she came to the clinic between 50-63 days and if her medical condition were such that any alternative would
expose her to significant health risks. Plaintiffs do not plead that a woman meeting all of these necessary conditions,
has obtained, or is likely to seek, an abortion from Plaintiffs’ clinics.” (Id. at 5; Doc. 191 at PageID 2875.)
11
conclusions, or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, which are not entitled to an
assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To withstand a dismissal motion, a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions [or] a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“[T]he complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Harvard v. Wayne Cty., 436 F.
App’x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation or citation omitted). “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The Court does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2. Analysis
The lack of a life or health exception in an abortion statute imposes an unconstitutional
burden on a woman’s right to abortion if it subjects a woman to significant health risks.
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320,
328 (2006)). As noted above, a pre-enforcement as-applied challenge to an abortion statute’s
failure to protect the health of a mother may be maintained upon a showing that “in discrete and
well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure
prohibited by the act must be used.” Id. at 167.
In this case, Defendant first contends that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the Act subjects
women to a significant health risk. Citing Women’ Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th
12
Cir. 2003) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Defendant maintains that
Plaintiffs are required to demonstrate a risk of harm “that is both ‘serious’ and longstanding, if
not ‘irreversible.’” (Motion to Dismiss 13–14, Doc. 184 at PageID 2806–2807.)
Defendant’s argument is without merit, as it conflates the statutory language of health
exceptions upheld in these cases with the standard applicable to Plaintiffs’ claim. For example,
in Taft, the Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality of a health exception to an Ohio statute
restricting partial-birth abortions. The statutory exception in that case permitted the restricted
procedure when “necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the
mother as a result of the mother’s life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.” Taft, 353 F.3d at 444
(quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.11(B)(C)) (emphasis added). Although the Sixth Circuit
upheld the statute, it did so after interpreting the exception to “allow[] physicians to perform the
partial birth procedure whenever the procedure is necessary to protect the mother from
significant health risks,” noting that the Fourteenth Amendment requires nothing more. Id. at
445 (“Ohio’s maternal health exception is valid because it permits the partial birth procedure
when necessary to prevent significant health risks. The Fourteenth Amendment, as applied in
Casey and Carhart, requires nothing more.”). Similarly, in Casey, the Supreme Court
considered a Pennsylvania statute’s health exception which also used permitted a restricted
procedure to avoid “serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 879. The Court upheld the exception, deferring to the lower
courts’ statutory interpretation that the act does “not in any way pose a significant threat to the
life or health of a woman.” Id. at 880. Because Defendant’s argument misstates the standard
applicable to Plaintiffs’ claim it does not provide a basis for dismissal.
13
Defendant otherwise contends that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because they fail to
allege discrete and well-defined instances in which the procedure must be used. However, the
Court has already determined that Plaintiffs have alleged discrete and well-defined instances in
rejecting Defendant’s ripeness challenge. In short, Plaintiffs claim that certain specified medical
conditions make surgical abortion difficult or impossible. Under the Act, these women would
not have access to evidence-based or off-label mifepristone abortions after forty-nine days LMP,
leaving them to choose between carrying an unwanted pregnancy or undergoing a surgical
procedure. As this Court and the Sixth Circuit have previously observed, in these circumstances
the Act could subject these women to significant health risks. See Taft, 444 F.3d at 514 (“the
evidence presented to the district court established . . . that the abortion regulation at issue could
pose a significant health risk to women with particular medical conditions”); Taft, 337 F. Supp.
2d. at 1047 (“Plaintiffs have already presented expert medical testimony . . . that there are
women who have medical conditions that render surgical abortion riskier than the evidencebased protocol for medical abortion.”). The Court finds these allegations to be sufficient to state
a plausible claim for relief and to survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 184) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Susan J. Dlott
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
United States District Court
14
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?